TOP Reddit Mentions | ChartExchange

Fresh batch of company write-ups from Substack authors, all published within the last week.
Not my work - sourced from Giles Capital's weekly compilation: [https://gilescapital.substack.com/](https://gilescapital.substack.com/)
# Americas
**Long Term Pick** on [**Microsoft Corporation**](https://longtermpick.com/p/microsoft-analysis-2026) (🇺🇸 MSFT US - US$3.4tn) Azure crossed $100B in annual revenue this quarter, growing 43%, with $678B in contracted future revenue up 84% year-on-year. Trades 23.9x forward P/E, below the five-year average, as the capex cycle temporarily compresses free cash flow. Net cash, 68% gross margins.
**Archive Invest** on [**Meta Platforms**](https://archiveinvest.substack.com/p/the-ad-business-is-accelerating-and) (🇺🇸 META US - US$1.75tn) All the anxiety surrounding Meta's capex spending seemed to overlook that ad revenue accelerated 28% in Q2, with pricing and volume both expanding. Trades 17x forward P/E versus the five-year average of 24.5x. One-time legal charges obscure 9% underlying operating income growth.
**Kairos Research** on [**FTAI Aviation**](https://kairosresearch.substack.com/p/ftai-update) (🇺🇸 FTAI US - \~US$8bn) FTAI Aviation trades 9-11x 2028 EBITDA with a $350 base case - roughly 70% upside from current levels. Aerospace margins compressed deliberately to 28.5% as management prioritises market share over near-term profitability. The Power segment, guiding $450-750m EBITDA by 2027, is the unpriced option.
**Show Me the Incentives** on [**E.W. Scripps**](https://showmetheincentives.substack.com/p/the-ew-scripps-company-ssp) (🇺🇸 SSP US - \~US$500m) Scripps is a controlled, highly-levered equity stub at 10.7x EV/EBITDA with $125-150m EBITDA growth targeted by 2028. The CEO carries a $10m award tied to EBITDA targets plus 100% payout on any change of control. Aggressive insider buying signals confidence in a near-term M&A outcome as the regulatory environment improves.
**Acid Investments** on [**Vaso Corporation**](https://acidinvestments.substack.com/p/quick-deep-value-idea-vaso-corp) (🇺🇸 VASO US - US$37m) The market is ascribing a negative value to this profitable business as a going concern. Net cash roughly equals the entire market cap, meaning the GE HealthCare partnership business comes free. Founder family controls 44% and the exclusive service contract runs to 2030.
# Europe, Middle East & Africa
**Asymmetric Ventures** on [**LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton**](https://asymventures.substack.com/p/lvmh-1h-2026-results) (🇫🇷 MC PA - US$257bn) Fashion and leather organic growth turned positive in Q2 for the first time in seven quarters, ending a prolonged declining run. The question of when luxury would recover has now been answered. Arnault family owns 48%, stock trades at 20x earnings.
**Rock and Turner** on [**Universal Music Group**](https://rockandturner.substack.com/p/royalty-king-universal-music-group) (🇳🇱 UMG AS - US$28bn) Imagine finding a company with 13.3% revenue growth and stable 20.5% EBITDA margins trading 50% below a rejected takeover bid from three months ago. That is UMG at €14.50 today. Bolloré family owns 31.7%, buybacks accelerating.
**Trident Opportunities** on [**Avingtrans**](https://tridentopportunities.substack.com/p/avingtrans-plc-avgl-a-nuclear-beneficiary) (🇬🇧 AVG LN - US$330m) Nuclear supply chain covering decommissioning, life extension, and new build through Hayward Tyler, Metalcraft, and Booth Industries. Management projects nuclear revenue of £90m by FY31 from £35m today, at 35-38% EBITDA margins.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**BTG Consulting**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/btg-consulting-fy26-review) (🇬🇧 BTG LN - US$233m) Most investors see a 21x P/E and move on. The underlying number is 9x once acquisition accounting non-cash charges are stripped out - a distinction most will never bother to check. FY27 profit guided up 53%, dividend 4.3%.
**The Finance Corner** on [**PARKEN Sport & Entertainment**](https://thefinancecorner.substack.com/p/parken-sport-and-entertainment-a) (🇩🇰 PARKEN CSE - US$195m) The beautiful thing about Lalandia's business model is that 2,300 holiday home owners pay recurring commissions, making the revenue stream predictable. PARKEN trades DKK 2.1bn versus a fair value estimate of DKK 2.94bn across three assets: Lalandia, Copenhagen's national stadium, and F.C. Copenhagen.
**Demystified Value** on [**EuroEyes International Eye Clinic**](https://demystifiedvalue.substack.com/p/euroeyes-international-eye-clinic) (🇩🇪 1846 HK - US$100m) Founder-led German ophthalmology group at 4.5x EV/EBIT with 60% insider ownership. The HK$1.2B FYEO Europe acquisition drives 58% proforma revenue growth, and at 18% capacity utilisation the proforma earnings number is deliberately conservative.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**James Cropper**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/who-gives-a-crpr) (🇬🇧 CRPR LN - US$43m) A £34m paper mill pivoting into fuel cell substrates and aerospace composites, both growing 20%+ at 45% margins. Trades 0.85x NAV and 4.8x EV/EBIT. The new CEO comes from Zotefoams, where he ran the same playbook. This is operational accumulation, not financial engineering.
**Etruscan Capital** on [**Cedergrenska**](https://etruscancapital.substack.com/p/cedergrenska-ab-a-tiny-profitable) (🇸🇪 CEDER ST) Whether Swedish education policy shifts post-election is subject to interpretation. What's clear is that Cedergrenska buys schools at 3-4x EBITDA and trades at 7x, with 21% annual revenue growth across 54 facilities. The discount is political, not operational.
# Asia-Pacific
**Crack the Market** on [**SK Hynix**](https://crackthemarket.substack.com/p/sk-hynix-the-flagship-at-half-price) (🇰🇷 000660 KS - US$716bn) SK Hynix hit its first-ever 30% limit-up on July 31 after record Q2 revenue, then kept climbing. One cannot completely rule out the risk of a memory down-cycle reverting. But so far, the evidence is thin - and at 4.4x forward P/E with KRW 69 trillion in net cash, the downside is well backstopped.
**Angsana Anderson** on [**Nexon**](https://www.angsanaanderson.com/p/nexon-11-fcf-yield-zero-debt-and) (🇯🇵 3659 JP - US$12bn) Zero debt, founding family majority, and the Saudi sovereign wealth fund at 11%. DNF Mobile 2.0 relaunches August 13 - a catalyst with a known date. Trades at 11% FCF yield with takeover optionality priced at zero.
**Value Zoomer** on [**Ultragreen.AI**](https://valuezoomer.substack.com/p/ultragreenai-the-green-light) (🇸🇬 ULG SI - US$1.5bn) Think of Ultragreen.AI as the infrastructure layer beneath industrial cooling: 70% global market share, invisible from the outside, impossible to remove from within. Listed in December 2025, P/E 10x, net cash $176m, Sajwan family majority. The "AI" in the name is cosmetic.
**PP Invest** on [**GRAVITY Co., Ltd.**](https://ppinvest007.substack.com/p/good-prospects-for-a-revaluation) (🇰🇷 GRVY US - US$452m) TOP PICK GRAVITY is the South Korean game publisher behind Ragnarok Online, a franchise with over 100 million registered users that has dominated Southeast Asian gaming for two decades. At a $452m market cap the company holds $434m in net cash, meaning the franchise, the licensing royalties, and a new Chinese government approval for the mobile sequel are all priced at zero. First-ever dividend paid this year. P/E 8x.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**Altyn Gold**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/altn-gold-double-or-fold) (🇰🇿 ALTN LN - US$320m) TOP PICK Gold at $4,035 per ounce, production plan to double by 2027, and an enterprise value approaching zero. Inventory is carried at one-third of spot price - you could almost buy the company, sell the inventory at market, and be left with more than you paid. Assaubayev family holds 65%.

I have been doing research for a potential youtube video on DCFs. And while doing a deep dive into DCF math and logic I came back to a common belief that intuitively felt wrong to me and now I am much more confident is wrong.
Limiting terminal growth rate to 2-3% is incorrect and illogical.
The common logic is as follows, GDP growth since the inception of the metric has been 2-3% CAGR. Thus if a company is assumed to grow faster than 3% into infinity it will become larger than the entire economy.
There are some logical problems with this and some practical problems with this.
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A. Logic Errors
The first and most glaring error is this, the growth of cash flow and earnings of the US market has been closer to 5.5% over the last 100 years. This is because GDP is an inflation adjusted number, the GDP grows 2-3% ON TOP OF INFLATION. So a company can grow at the rate of the GDP growth plus the inflation rate and not become any larger relative to its peers, and can do so into infinity without becoming a larger portion of the economy.
The second logic error is conflating cashflow, earnings, or revenue growth with GDP growth. GDP instead tracks gross value added. A company that doubles all or any of these numbers doubles its contribution to the GDP. If a company were to lay off or offshore a large portion of its staff it would increase earnings and cashflow, but actually lower its GDP contribution. If a company with an inelastic good like a lifesaving drug instead makes half as many and quadruples the price, its revenue will double but its GDP contribution would be cut in half.
A third logic error is to assume all of the company's growth comes from within the US, entering foreign markets and offshoring will increase a company's earnings and revenue and cashflow without contributing to the GDP of the US.
A fourth logic error is to assume part trends can always be extrapolated into the future. GDP growth has been decelerating due to the law of large numbers but that is not set in stone and it is fully possible that AI and robotics can in the future re-accelerate things as it can provide easy access to labor. Also AI and robotics may be drastically deflationary, and as GDP is inflation adjusted it would also be deflation adjusted which could cause GDP to grow faster than earnings if the dollar gains value.
A fifth logic error is the fact that these issues arise from the fact we are running any growth number into infinity. Infinity does not play nice with reality. The universe will not exist infinitely, the world will not exist infinitely, the USA and its markets will not exist infinitely, and most certainly the companies we invest in will not exist infinitely.
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B. Exit Multiple = Terminal Growth rate
So personally it would seem to me that picking an exit multiple simplifies things and avoids dealing with infinity in my formula and the insanity it adds to the equation. But people will say that picking an exit multiple is the exact same as picking a terminal growth rate.
Yes according to the math formula these can be substituted, a terminal growth rate and discount rate can be converted into an exit multiple. So lets look at some of these conversions.
With a 10% discount rate (10% desired rate of return) a 0% terminal growth rate = 10x FCF exit multiple, 2% TGR = 13x FCF exit, 3% TGR = 15x FCF exit, 4% TGR (mathematically impossible) = 17x FCF. 5% TGR (super impossible) = 21x FCF, 6% (impossible including inflation) FCF = 27x FCF. If you want a 10% return and expect to sell your stock at 17x cashflow in 10, 20, or 30 years you are apparently expecting your stock to be the entire world's economy some day.
With an 8% discount rate: 0% TGR = 12.5 FCF, 2% TGR = 17x FCF, 3% TGR = 21x FCF, 4% TGR = 26x FCF, 5% TGR = 35x FCF, 6% TGR = 53x FCF.
So if you desire 8% annual returns and expect to sell your shares for 26x FCF in 5, 10, 20 years you are once again projecting the company will become the entire world's economy some day.
##########################################
C. Backtesting failures
So lets go and backtest, we can do a DCF on an actual company's cash flow for the last 20 years using their real year-by-year cash flow numbers, and set our discount rate to the desired rate of return. This will tell us what price we would need to have bought the company at 20 years ago to get our desired rate of return. But we will use a terminal rate of 3% as anything higher than that means the company will become the entire world's economy some day...
Lets look at Walmart. When plugging in its real cashflow numbers from 2005-2025 and using a 10% discount rate and a 3% terminal growth rate shows we would need to buy Walmart stock at $24.42 per share in 2005 to get 10% annualized returns, and the stock was trading between $43 and $53 that year, so with perfect knowledge of the next 20 years of cash flow we can see that walmart stock was twice as expensive as it should be to get 10% annualized returns...
Except if you bought at the low price that year you would get 10.8% annualized returns, at the high price 9.6% annualized returns, at the mid price 10.2% annualized returns. If you bought at the price the perfect knowledge DCF says you would actually get 15% annualized returns...
So why is this? The terminal growth rate is wrong, Walmart today trades at a Price to Free Cash Flow of 71x right now, you would need to use a terminal growth rate of 8.5% to accurately model that exit multiple and actually perform our "perfect knowledge" backtested DCF on Walmart. Yet apparently such a thing is 3x higher than the highest possible number we are allowed to assume without Walmart taking over the entire world's GDP someday. I also checked their 3 year normalized FCF in case this was an irregular year, still a P/FCF of 62x which as an exit multiple is equivalent to a terminal growth rate of 8.3%.
This is true for any mature company trading much above 20x FCF today, any past DCF done on the company even if it guessed the future cashflows perfectly would be unable to accurately predict its value because they limit themselves to a terminal growth rate of 3% because of logic errors, WMT came to mind as a clear example but any company with a P/FCF of 25+ would run into this same issue, perfect cash flow knowledge would still lead to massive underestimation of value/returns because an exit multiple above 20 is more or less impossible in traditional DCF math.
In summary I think limiting your DCF to only a 3% terminal growth rate or exit multiples in the teens is begging for underestimating businesses. Even if you are perfectly correct about every other assumption it can lead to massive underestimation of a company's value.
Some may say that this adds margin of safety, but that is not what it is there for. The point of a DCF is to come to a comfortable conclusion on the total future returns. If you pick a lower exit multiple than you think is realistic, a lower growth rate, a higher discount rate, lower margins, then look for margin of safety on top of that you are compounding your underestimation of the company. I would say you should try to run an accurate and reasonable DCF and adjust the discount rate for the risk of the investment and look for a margin of safety on the final output, not apply a margin of safety to every single ingredient within the DCF. Also running multiple DCFs with multiple scenarios. But a 3% discount rate or 15x-20x exit multiple is actually a pretty conservative assumption, especially for shorter DCFs, and should not be treated as the upper limit.

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