IR
Ingersoll Rand Inc. Common Stock
stock NYSE

**Public-source BCCL / BHARATCOAL investor update.**
This is not a routine “coal removal” report.
As reported by ***Hindustan, Dainik Jagran and Prabhat Khabar*** **on 04 July 2026, armed men allegedly reached the Gazlitand coal dump in the Angarpathra/Katras area at around 11:30 PM in** black Scorpio vehicles, threatened security personnel with pistols, assaulted them, snatched mobile phones, locked security personnel in a container, fired in the air, opened the main gate, and used **15–20 Hyva trucks and three JCB machines** to lift around **450 tonnes of coal** by about 4:30 AM. The reported value is around **₹45 lakh**.
The report also says live cartridges were found at the site and police said investigation was underway.
The important investor point is that this was reportedly **mined and stocked coal from a coal dump/stockyard**, not coal extracted by outsiders from an unmeasured seam.
If the report is accurate, this was an armed, organised, vehicle-assisted, multi-hour stockyard breach involving heavy equipment and multiple trucks.
I have not found any checked public report confirming that the armed persons were apprehended, that the JCBs/Hyvas were seized, or that the coal was recovered. That point should be treated carefully: **recovery, seizure and arrests are not confirmed in the checked public sources available to me.**
**Why should BHARATCOAL shareholders care?**
Because BCCL’s own prospectus positions the company as India’s largest coking coal producer in FY25, accounting for **58.50% of domestic coking coal production**, and says BCCL is the only source of prime coking coal in India. **When the listed company’s core product is reportedly taken from a stockyard after an armed breach, the issue is not only the ₹45 lakh value.** The issue is **inventory custody, stockyard security, dispatch control, contractor oversight, customer confidence and disclosure adequacy**.
The direct amount is small in financial-statement terms. ₹45 lakh = ₹0.45 crore. Against BCCL’s FY26 numbers, this is approximately:
**0.0033%** of FY26 revenue from operations of **₹13,644.78 crore**
**0.057%** of FY26 EBITDA of **₹785.38 crore**
**0.30%** of FY26 PBT of **₹149.18 crore**
**0.35%** of FY26 PAT of **₹128.28 crore**
**0.0025%** of market cap of about **₹18,246 crore** as per Screener’s 03 July close data.
On production quantity also, 450 tonnes is small by itself. It is **0.0013%** of FY26 production of **35.52 MT**, **0.0014%** of FY26 offtake of **33.05 MT**, and about **0.0048%** of FY26 closing raw coal stock of **9.41 MT**.
But the reported valuation is worth asking about. ₹45 lakh for 450 tonnes implies **₹10,000 per tonne**. BCCL’s FY26 average sales per tonne was **₹3,085.76**. Its FY26 raw coal average realisation was **₹2,809.61/tonne**, while washed coking coal realisation was **₹9,760.19/tonne**, with PCC at **₹10,666.90/tonne** and MCC at **₹8,649.15/tonne**. This does **not** prove the grade of the reported coal, because the checked news report does not clearly identify the coal grade. But the implied value makes grade, custody and reconciliation important questions.
**The operating backdrop is also not strong**. BCCL’s FY26 production fell from **40.50 MT to 35.52 MT**, down **12.30%**. Offtake fell from **38.26 MT to 33.05 MT**, down **13.62%**. Profit per tonne fell from **₹446.84 to ₹46.12**. Trade receivables days increased from **34 to 67**, and gross debtors rose from **₹2,218.10 crore to ₹3,024.97 crore**.
Q1 FY27 production disclosures also show weakness.
BCCL’s June 2026 exchange disclosure says June raw coal production was **2.29 MT**, down **11.8% YoY**, and April–June raw coal production was **6.56 MT**, down **27.5% YoY**. Coking coal production for April–June was **6.21 MT**, down **27.9% YoY**.
So I am not saying this ₹45 lakh incident alone changes earnings. It probably does not.
**The shareholder question is sharper:**
**How did armed persons** reportedly enter a coal dump, overpower security, bring in multiple Hyvas and JCBs, load coal for nearly five hours, and leave — with no checked public confirmation yet of recovery, seizure or arrests?
**The disclosure angle is also relevant.** BCCL’s materiality policy says the company must assess events under Regulation 30 and consider whether omission may cause discontinuity of public information, significant market reaction if later disclosed, or crosses value thresholds; the policy also refers to disclosures being appropriate and consistent with the facts of each event. I did not find a specific NSE/BSE/BCCL disclosure on the Gazlitand 450-tonne incident in the checked sources as of 05 July 2026, subject to further verification. BCCL’s IR page shows other Regulation 30 disclosures and production disclosures, but I did not find this incident listed there.
**For investors, the due-diligence questions are:**
1) Was the coal BCCL-owned stock, contractor-custody stock, or customer-linked stock?
2) What was the exact grade and reconciled quantity?
3) Was any coal recovered?
4) Were the Hyvas/JCBs identified or seized?
5) Were any accused persons arrested?
6) Was insurance or contractor liability invoked?
7) Did the incident affect dispatch, billing, customer supply, inventory, EBITDA, PAT or cash flow?
8) Has BCCL made, or does it plan to make, any exchange clarification?
This post is not making an independent finding beyond the newspaper report. Where the report alleges criminal conduct, I am treating it as a reported allegation only. The investor issue is limited to stockyard controls, inventory custody, security, materiality and disclosure.
Source line: *Hindustan*, 04 July 2026; attached Prabhat Khabar / Dainik Jagran / Hindustan / Dainik Bhaskar clippings; BCCL prospectus, FY26 performance presentation, June 2026 production disclosure, BCCL IR page and BCCL materiality policy.
Disclaimer: Not investment advice. No buy, sell, hold, short, entry, exit or averaging view. This is a public-source investor update for discussion among shareholders and market participants.

ProText Mobility, Inc. (OTC: TXTM) – Stock Analysis
Important opening note: TXTM is a micro-cap stock listed on the OTC Pink Sheets (not a major exchange) with a share price in the extremely low single-cent range (about $0.005 as of early July 2026). The company has no verified, audited (PCAOB) financial statements, no reported revenue, EBITDA, or net income in standardized databases, and a track record of company-issued press releases with unusually promotional language (e.g., claims of a “$505 million debt-free balance sheet,” “tokenization,” “uplisting”). These are hallmarks often seen in highly speculative/pump-like OTC stocks. The analysis below follows the requested structure, but should be read with significant caveats.
1. Company Overview
Business model: ProText Mobility is a biotech company developing a hemp/cannabidiol (CBD)-cannabis medicines platform for the legal cannabis industry, using live plant extraction processes and technologies. The company engages in research, testing, and development of natural ingredients for nutraceutical and pharmaceutical applications via proprietary plant extraction technology, and operates subsidiaries including Plandai Biotechnology, Cannabis Biosciences, and RSAMMD Acquisitions.
More recent company announcements also describe a pivot toward “real-world-asset” tokenization, research into “kettle” and nanotechnology, and plans for uplisting via a preliminary valuation with Deloitte. The company also states it has a debt-free, non-dilutive capital structure, no management salaries, and no reverse split.
Markets and competitive position: The company operates in the broad field of botanical/CBD nutraceuticals as well as (recently) tokenized assets — both highly competitive and partly unregulated/speculative niches. There is no publicly available documentation of commercial scaling, product launches, or market share.
Key figures:
|Metric |Value |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Share price (early July 2026)|approx. $0.005–0.007 |
|Market cap |approx. $12–43 million (fluctuates significantly depending on measurement date)|
|Shares outstanding |approx. 1.95 billion (other sources cite figures in the billions) |
|Revenue (ttm) |Not reported / “–” |
|EBITDA |Not reported |
|Net income |Profit margin 0.00% |
|P/E, EV/EBITDA |Not meaningfully calculable (no earnings/revenue) |
|Debt |Company claims to be debt-free |
|52-week range |$0.0005–$0.0092 |
There are therefore effectively none of the classic valuation multiples (P/E, EV/EBITDA) available, because the company has not reported revenue or earnings in a format that auditors/databases can verify.
2. Strengths & Risks
Potential positive factors:
• The company claims to have completed IFRS-audited financials for 2022 and 2023 and is working on 2024 filings with a view to a possible SEC Form 10.
• The company’s chairman has repeatedly purchased shares on the open market and has never sold, which could be interpreted as a signal of ownership alignment.
• Exposure to CBD/botanical nutraceuticals and “RWA” tokenization, both themes with potential future interest.
Critical risk factors:
• No verifiable revenue or earnings. The company effectively has no operational substance to support a fundamental valuation.
• Extreme dilution history and share price level (sub-cent), typical of “shell” companies.
• Unusually promotional IR communications (e.g., the claim of a $505 million balance sheet for a company with under $50 million in market cap and no reported revenue) is a significant red flag.
• The company is a former delinquent SEC filer now voluntarily resuming filings — indicating a period without ongoing, verified disclosure.
• No independent, third-party-confirmed audit is publicly available in standard databases (Yahoo/CNBC/Seeking Alpha all show blank fields for earnings).
• Very low liquidity and high volatility make the position difficult to trade without significant price impact.
• High risk of further dilution, corporate changes, or total loss of value.
3. Scenarios
Since there is no analyst consensus, real earnings estimates, or a functioning valuation model for TXTM, the scenarios below are not based on fundamental multiples, but on qualitative, speculative assumptions typical for this type of OTC stock. The probabilities are estimates, not statistically grounded figures.
🐻 Bear Case (probability: ~55–60%)
Triggering factors: Promised real financial filings fail to materialize, “uplisting” plans and the Deloitte valuation don’t lead to anything concrete, continued absence of revenue, or the company loses its OTC status/becomes further delinquent.
Price trajectory: Decline toward or below the 52-week low (approx. $0.0005–0.002), potentially total loss of value.
Time horizon: 6–18 months.
📊 Base Case (probability: ~30–35%)
Realistic expectations: The company continues as a low-liquidity, speculative OTC shell with sporadic press releases, without meaningful real commercial revenue. The price remains largely sideways with high volatility, driven by news flow rather than fundamentals.
Price trajectory: Continued trading in the range of approx. $0.003–0.010.
Time horizon: 12 months.
🐂 Bull Case (probability: ~10–15%)
What needs to go right: The company actually delivers audited financials accepted by the market, successfully completes an uplisting to a more regulated exchange, and one of the mentioned LOIs/partnerships (e.g., TruLeaf) generates real, verifiable revenue.
Price trajectory: Significant price increase (several multiples of the current price), but from a very low base and with continued high dilution risk.
Time horizon: 12–24 months.
Overall assessment: TXTM appears to be an extremely high-risk, speculative OTC micro-cap without verifiable fundamental data to support a traditional valuation. This is not investment advice — I am not a financial advisor or a licensed analyst in a legal sense, and any decision should be based on your own due diligence, including review of the company’s actual SEC/OTC filings, as well as potential guidance from a licensed financial advisor.

Beginning-Balance312,
$50 mil funding from offering, additional funding from warrants only if stock price reaches $13.20, so we can only say $50 mil right now.
$60 mil in tax credits is only at full capacity (linked in a previous reply)
I have no idea where you got $42 mil for 2026 from. Even if they do get $42 mil in tax credits in 2026, it's for their current plant, which means it lowered their COGS, which means their margins went up. Q1 reported gross margin up from 9.3% to 33.5%, so I believe they did get tax credits. Unless you are saying they would get a 42M loan backed by tax credits, but this 2026 tax credit would be factored into 2026 net income backed loan.

Operations yielding $200 mil from 2026 and 2027 are true assuming they hit their projected 2026 $100 mil net income and they make the same or more for 2027.

But this does not translate to direct funding unless you’re saying this $200 mil net income can translate to a $200 mil loan. Banks look at free cash flow and debt service coverage, not net income, and even a 1 to 1 loan is unlikely (let's just say they do as I did in a previous reply).
At the end of the day, we are arguing over loans that are circumstantial, so it’s more of a wait and see if the company can secure $300 mil in ABL, loans, other debt, etc.

*“So far the company has always delivered on timelines. I am happy to see less shares with Abalance and more US tutes into the picture with this offering.”*
This doesn’t sound right at all. If the current ownership structure has always delivered on timelines, then why would you want to see less shares with Abalance? You are contradicting yourself a bit here.
It is also strange that “per my contact in IR / IR contact” you wouldn’t know that the shares with Abalance are actually between BestToyo and WA Global, who both are solely owned by Junsei Ryu, CEO who recently stepped down, who used to work for a subsidiary of Abalance. (New CEO also worked at Abalance btw)
Right before this $50 mil offering, N.A.GLOBAL. CO. LTD., acquired a 9.27% ownership (3.26 mil shares), with no purchase price, but through a private agreement (Form 13G). Its sole director, Lee, has business agreements with WWB, which was the subsidiary Junsei Ryu was at. So less shares with “Abalance” isn’t true.

If anything, just more float for institutional investors, and the control "looks" to be more spread out, but has the same vested interest.

This may all sound like I'm being critical of the company, but I’m simply sharing my due diligence and research. If you like the company and the product, you should understand the risks of their current situation and wait for a better entry.

That's some crab boil you have going.
I'm not advocating for blocking the proxy at all. I advocated for taking shareholders into account. I advocated for getting more meaningful info/answers on a number of fronts - especially with an execution roadmap. I advocated for culture change. Consistently. I advocated in a face-to-face with Glen as well, and several other large shareholders here were also in that face-to-face. They can tell you exactly what I said, if they choose. \[I am invested FYI so I have no idea where you came up with that one.\] Moreover, a number of suggested actions presented have been acted upon. Some important ones. I don't seek credit, the actions were all that mattered.
But they've also whiffed big in the past month too. When the June 25th Q&A fell flat, and I participated in that so I'm well aware of why it fell flat, within an hour of its end, myself and others were in a zoom call with IR lobbying for a supplemental. I had no idea what would be in it, but myself and others were not shy about communicating what should be in it - and what fell short in the Q&A. Then we got a supplemental. Imperfect, but better than standing pat on the 6/25 Q&A.
No one (of reasonable intelligence) thinks an RO could happen before the 10th. I recall saying as much to Bob openly in the Q&A. A lot of things have to happen right for it to be a possibility. I've said this a number of times here too. Those conditions don't exist right now. They may exist shortly though. When they do, I can present a better nuanced version to the company. Is it a priority? No. But unlike your 'friend' at Goldman, some in my orbit (Davos attendees, private placement connections ,and yes GS et al too) see a very clear path IF certain things happen - and why that would be beneficial. And some I know don't. Perhaps we can all settle it with a few games of tic tac toe?
Management is definitely starting to listen. For the first time in a long time. Would they have done so without some loud, pointed, pushback? Maybe, maybe not. Do other companies have shareholder events? Yes. I attend about 30 or so a year. Do we need a top tier CFO? Yes. I posted about this maybe 6 months ago, in detail. Go look. Are they executing? Yes. But it's not where it needs to be and it's not being communicated such that the \[pro\] market gets it. Evidence: the share price. We just saw a .2-handle. And while I am an investor, I'm constantly positioning and I'm not a member of the blind-faith league. There are things the market and myself need to see... and myself and others are pushing for those. They are doable. I understand what they can and cannot do as well.
You want to make the enemy of the proxy? That's foolish and inaccurate. Unlike what you just posted above, I'm not hyperbolifying "something big is coming" or "best position ever" either - I'm looking at why the market is not valuing the company the way management or shareholders are valuing it and trying like hell to get that addressed. That's way more valuable than your skate-to-the-puck bullshit, if we're going to have a war of words.
"Look, cheap shares" touted by someone noting 'this is front-running' and buying into it... that's foolish to me. We agree they need funding ASAP, or **meaningful execution**, the latter being far more important because it will dictate and define flexibility. There are better things to focus on than projecting a load of horseshit onto me. I am not the problem.

Hi Ok\_boot.
They have about 50Mil cash and they have completed their 2GW assembly plant so remaining cash burn will be entirely towards the 350 mil expansion.
Per my contact in IR we will see 42M in tax credits in 2026 and likely 60M in 2027.
Operations for the rest of 2026 and 2027 are expected to yield another 200M.
The funding from the offering is another 50 mil. Plus there are additional warrants.
My IR contact has stated any additional funding will likely be from short term loans. The timeline on the build out is also flexible and does not have to commit to the 20M timeline they are planning on.

42+ 60 + 200+ 50 = 350. So as you can see it is nearly completely paid for.
Their capacity is sold out through 2026 and most of 2027 already as well
So far the company has always delivered on timelines. I am happy to see less shares with Abalance and more US tutes into the picture with this offering.

Does it use the same controls as the Wii? Does it need the IR bar as well?

**NEWS: BIOLARGO, INC.** President and director Dennis P. Calvert reported two stock awards that increased his direct holdings of common stock. On **June 30, 2026** he acquired **699,569** shares at **$0.1135** per share, and on **July 1, 2026** he acquired **219,914** shares at **$0.113** per share, both classified as grants or awards rather than open-market purchases.
The shares were issued by the company in exchange for reducing amounts it owed him for salary and unreimbursed business expenses. The awarded shares are subject to a **Lock-Up Agreement**, restricting sales until the company reports at least **$40 million** in consolidated gross revenue for any reported period, or its market capitalization exceeds **$300 million**, or there is a change in control. After these transactions, he directly owns **11,058,108** shares, which include **1,528,695** shares held indirectly through a limited liability company he owns and controls.
**Ticker: $BLGO**
**Share Price: .11**
**Market Cap: below $40 Million**
* BioLargo executives are receiving stock **instead of cash** for unpaid salary and expenses, and those shares are bound by a Lock‑Up Agreement: no sale until BioLargo reports at least **$40M** in gross revenue in any period, hits a **$300M** market cap, or there’s a change in control.
* At current levels that lock‑up effectively requires around **10x higher revenue** or roughly **7x higher market cap** before these insider shares can become liquid.
* Recent Form 4 and lock‑up disclosures show executives converting six‑figure sums of salary and business‑expense IOUs into common shares that are fully subject to this $40M / $300M lock‑up, tying their compensation directly to long‑term business scale.
* This isn’t just one person: multiple insiders (including senior leadership and science/engineering leadership) now hold very large, locked‑up positions, with ownership measured in **tens of millions of shares**, all structurally rewarded **only if BioLargo becomes a much bigger company.**
* On the operating side, engineering services revenues from third‑party customers almost **doubled** in 2025, increasing from **$1,017,000 to $1,998,000**, even while total company revenue dropped due to the Pooph license termination.
* Management has repeatedly highlighted **BLEST (BioLargo Engineering, Science & Technologies)** as a **growth engine: a profitable, cash‑generating subsidiary** that both supports technology commercialization and drives independent service revenue.
* In 2026, BLEST has already secured more than **$1.4M** in U.S. Air Force environmental contract renewals over 12 months, building a durable base of recurring federal work
* BLEST also won a **$1.2M** contract to design a pilot‑scale minerals processing facility that converts legacy mineral waste into valuable commercial products, with a **2–3 year** roadmap to a full commercial plant **(dozens of $ million)** if the pilot succeeds.
* BioLargo has **engaged Darrow Associates (DarrowIR), an award‑winning micro/small‑cap IR firm** with about 250 years of combined Wall Street and IR experience, to help put this under‑followed execution story in front of more institutional and retail investors.
* **Put it together: After these insider lock‑ups and a string of value‑generating milestones (AEC municipal PFAS install, ViaCLYR stocking order, Al‑Hikma MENA deal, minerals contract, Aquatech MOU, Air Force renewals), a sub‑$40M valuation looks more like a price/value disconnect than a fair reflection of the underlying business.**
**On top of that, revenues are rebounding from last year’s lows, including an \~81% quarter‑over‑quarter revenue jump in Q1 2026 as the business pivots from Pooph dependence to engineering, PFAS, and Clyra‑driven growth.**
**I continue to take advantage of the Price/Value disconnect.**
**Do your own DD.**

They hopefully will but not entirely certain given that Musk is advocating for a form of UBI. Not clear whether he views this as a transition period support or structural long term change to human contribution. The issue is more the transition period for the human economy to retool. How quickly it occurs, how many simultaneously and how long it takes to find new jobs for them. During the IR there was mass unemployment and towns that were reliant upon a single factory or business were largely vacated. We have seen technology affect single businesses but not multiple industries simultaneously. Hopefully things are not pushed forward too quickly so the market can adjust incrementally.