CCEP
Coca-Cola Europacific Partners plc
stock NASDAQ

Hey, just took a quick look through the model. Overall, I think it’s a solid foundation, but there are a few things I would probably consider revisiting in the next iteration 😊
I would probably model invested capital explicitly and introduce a terminal RONIC assumption rather than letting terminal FCF just fall out of the final-year capex, D&A and NWC numbers.
Based on the current 2030 numbers, I get net reinvestment of only around USD 0.9bn on c. USD 13.1bn of NOPAT. With 2.75% terminal growth, that seems to imply a RONIC of roughly 40%. That feels pretty high to me (however, happy to be corrected on that).
I suggest using the value-driver framework here, i.e. reinvestment rate = g / RONIC, and then solve for the reinvestment/capex needed in the terminal year. Otherwise you can quite easily end up with a terminal year where the company is growing without really reinvesting enough to support that growth (quite common mistake in DCF’s in my experience).
I would also revisit the PP&E schedule and the constant 11.1% D&A as a % of beginning PP&E. It works as a shortcut, but once capex starts moving around it can look a bit odd. If you want a nice modelling exercise you could build a separate D&A schedule based on existing PP&E + new annual capex. Painful the first time you do it haha, but rewarding when it is done (and can be copied to other models easily)
On NWC, The DPO calculation currently uses the full “accounts payable and accrued expenses” balance against COGS. Coca Cola’s 2025 balance was c. USD 14.8bn, but only c. USD 5.6bn of that was actual accounts payable. The rest includes things like marketing accruals, compensation accruals, lease liabilities etc. So… I’m not really sure the resulting 300+ day DPO is telling you much about supplier payment terms or how working capital will develop going forward.
I suggest to either 1) isolate actual AP and model the other accruals separately, or 2) just forecast normalized operating NWC as a % of sales for simplicity.
I initially wondered if leases were causing a cash flow issue, because that’s a pretty common DCF mistake, but having checked the 10-K I actually think you’re broadly fine there. Coca Cola had c. USD 405m of operating lease expense and c. USD 404m of operating lease cash payments in 2025, so there doesn’t seem to be a meaningful cash leakage missing from FCF. As long as you keep treating leases as operating expenses and don’t then also deduct the operating lease liability as debt, I think that part is internally consistent.
I would spend some time normalizing “other operating charges” though. The historical numbers include a lot of stuff that is clearly not normal recurring operating expense, for instance: BodyArmor impairments, fairlife contingent consideration remeasurement etc. If you want to improve the credibility of your baseline, I suggest to not just extrapolate the historical GAAP line. In fact, the current forecast at c. 2.55% of revenue gives you roughly USD 1.3bn of other operating charges every year, whereas Coca Cola only recorded USD 44m in H1 2026. Truth be told, this is always subjective, and I just wanted to flag that one-offs and special items are a black box which are incredibly difficult, and make Big4 Transacation Services departments a lot of money in M&A 😊
A few WACC / bridge points as well:
1)    The WACC uses USD 300.7bn of equity value, while the DCF sheet shows a current share price of USD 87.05. At USD 87.05 the market cap should be closer to USD 375bn, so I think you’re mixing valuation dates somewhere (unless my calculations are off). I also couldn’t see an explicit valuation date in the model, which would be useful to add.
2)    I would use market value of debt rather than book value where you can. Coca Cola discloses c. USD 43.9bn carrying value of long-term debt but only c. USD 39.4bn fair value. Adding the short-term debt gets you to around USD 40.9bn versus the USD 45.5bn currently used.
3)    In general it is best practice to add the source/methodology, for instance, it would be nice to understand how you retrieved the 0.35 beta and ERP. A 5.81% WACC feels… low? I don’t know, my experience within the consumer segment is extremely limited. But, with 2.75% terminal growth, you only have about a 3.1% WACC-g spread, so relatively small changes have a huge impact on value.
4)    On the same point, around 87% of the core EV seems to come from the terminal value. That’s not necessarily “wrong” for a company like Coca Cola, but it is definitely on the high side and means I would want to be very comfortable with the WACC, terminal growth and RONIC assumptions. Alternatively, you could model out 10 years instead of 5? Perhaps that won’t add much value seeing as Coca Cola is at its mature steady state stage already haha.
5)    I would also use mid-year discounting, or ideally exact stub-period discounting if this is supposed to be a current valuation. Your FY2026 is discounted as though all the cash arrives at the end of the year. Unless Coca Cola collects every dollar on December 31st, that’s unnecessarily harsh on the valuation.
Finally, I also noticed some stuff on the EV-EqV bridge:
You’re adding the c. USD 20.2bn of equity-method investments at book value, but Coca Cola actually discloses market values for a lot of the listed stakes. Monster, CCEP, KOF, CCHBC and CCBJ alone were worth around USD 19.6bn more than their accounting carrying values at FY2025 (with some tax leakage adjustments ofc.). And on NCI, I think the c. USD 2.1bn of non-controlling interests should be deducted in the EV-to-equity bridge, since the consolidated operating cash flows include subsidiaries that aren’t 100% owned by Coca Cola.
Overall though, I think it is a quality DCF with clean formatting. The main things I would consider revisiting for a next iteration are probably the terminal reinvestment framework, working capital build, valuation-date consistency and the EV-to-equity bridge.
 

Hey, just took a quick look through the model. Overall, I think it’s a solid foundation, but there are a few things I would probably consider revisiting in the next iteration 😊
I would probably model invested capital explicitly and introduce a terminal RONIC assumption rather than letting terminal FCF just fall out of the final-year capex, D&A and NWC numbers.
Based on the current 2030 numbers, I get net reinvestment of only around USD 0.9bn on c. USD 13.1bn of NOPAT. With 2.75% terminal growth, that seems to imply a RONIC of roughly 40%. That feels pretty high to me (however, happy to be corrected on that).
I suggest using the value-driver framework here, i.e. reinvestment rate = g / RONIC, and then solve for the reinvestment/capex needed in the terminal year. Otherwise you can quite easily end up with a terminal year where the company is growing without really reinvesting enough to support that growth (quite common mistake in DCF’s in my experience).
I would also revisit the PP&E schedule and the constant 11.1% D&A as a % of beginning PP&E. It works as a shortcut, but once capex starts moving around it can look a bit odd. If you want a nice modelling exercise you could build a separate D&A schedule based on existing PP&E + new annual capex. Painful the first time you do it haha, but rewarding when it is done (and can be copied to other models easily)
On NWC, The DPO calculation currently uses the full “accounts payable and accrued expenses” balance against COGS. Coca Cola’s 2025 balance was c. USD 14.8bn, but only c. USD 5.6bn of that was actual accounts payable. The rest includes things like marketing accruals, compensation accruals, lease liabilities etc. So… I’m not really sure the resulting 300+ day DPO is telling you much about supplier payment terms or how working capital will develop going forward.
I suggest to either 1) isolate actual AP and model the other accruals separately, or 2) just forecast normalized operating NWC as a % of sales for simplicity.
I initially wondered if leases were causing a cash flow issue, because that’s a pretty common DCF mistake, but having checked the 10-K I actually think you’re broadly fine there. Coca Cola had c. USD 405m of operating lease expense and c. USD 404m of operating lease cash payments in 2025, so there doesn’t seem to be a meaningful cash leakage missing from FCF. As long as you keep treating leases as operating expenses and don’t then also deduct the operating lease liability as debt, I think that part is internally consistent.
I would spend some time normalizing “other operating charges” though. The historical numbers include a lot of stuff that is clearly not normal recurring operating expense, for instance: BodyArmor impairments, fairlife contingent consideration remeasurement etc. If you want to improve the credibility of your baseline, I suggest to not just extrapolate the historical GAAP line. In fact, the current forecast at c. 2.55% of revenue gives you roughly USD 1.3bn of other operating charges every year, whereas Coca Cola only recorded USD 44m in H1 2026. Truth be told, this is always subjective, and I just wanted to flag that one-offs and special items are a black box which are incredibly difficult, and make Big4 Transacation Services departments a lot of money in M&A 😊
A few WACC / bridge points as well:
1)    The WACC uses USD 300.7bn of equity value, while the DCF sheet shows a current share price of USD 87.05. At USD 87.05 the market cap should be closer to USD 375bn, so I think you’re mixing valuation dates somewhere (unless my calculations are off). I also couldn’t see an explicit valuation date in the model, which would be useful to add.
2)    I would use market value of debt rather than book value where you can. Coca Cola discloses c. USD 43.9bn carrying value of long-term debt but only c. USD 39.4bn fair value. Adding the short-term debt gets you to around USD 40.9bn versus the USD 45.5bn currently used.
3)    In general it is best practice to add the source/methodology, for instance, it would be nice to understand how you retrieved the 0.35 beta and ERP. A 5.81% WACC feels… low? I don’t know, my experience within the consumer segment is extremely limited. But, with 2.75% terminal growth, you only have about a 3.1% WACC-g spread, so relatively small changes have a huge impact on value.
4)    On the same point, around 87% of the core EV seems to come from the terminal value. That’s not necessarily “wrong” for a company like Coca Cola, but it is definitely on the high side and means I would want to be very comfortable with the WACC, terminal growth and RONIC assumptions. Alternatively, you could model out 10 years instead of 5? Perhaps that won’t add much value seeing as Coca Cola is at its mature steady state stage already haha.
5)    I would also use mid-year discounting, or ideally exact stub-period discounting if this is supposed to be a current valuation. Your FY2026 is discounted as though all the cash arrives at the end of the year. Unless Coca Cola collects every dollar on December 31st, that’s unnecessarily harsh on the valuation.
Finally, I also noticed some stuff on the EV-EqV bridge:
You’re adding the c. USD 20.2bn of equity-method investments at book value, but Coca Cola actually discloses market values for a lot of the listed stakes. Monster, CCEP, KOF, CCHBC and CCBJ alone were worth around USD 19.6bn more than their accounting carrying values at FY2025 (with some tax leakage adjustments ofc.). And on NCI, I think the c. USD 2.1bn of non-controlling interests should be deducted in the EV-to-equity bridge, since the consolidated operating cash flows include subsidiaries that aren’t 100% owned by Coca Cola.
Overall though, I think it is a quality DCF with clean formatting. The main things I would consider revisiting for a next iteration are probably the terminal reinvestment framework, working capital build, valuation-date consistency and the EV-to-equity bridge.