TD
Toronto Dominion Bank
stock NYSE

why not just slowly build a 50% stake in EBAY through the TD loan and some other partner investors to then take it over with 50%+ stake?

It kinda sounds like the TD letter is not only a debt portion but an equity issuance as well. The letter stated that equity could be issued to come up with the funds and in this interview RC users the words “raise” in regards to TD portion. Are TD just underwriting an equity offering?

No it does not. The letter from TD is worthless. 

RC already has a letter from TD that they'd lend him 20B.... It's on the website

*Gus Carlson is a U.S.-based columnist for The Globe and Mail.*
Some people are calling GameStop chief executive officer Ryan Cohen’s US$56-billion [takeover bid for eBay](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-gamestop-makes-takeover-offer-to-buy-ebay/) audacious. Others are calling it delusional.
On close examination, it seems to be a bit of both.
Mr. Cohen, the billionaire Montreal activist investor best known as the founder of pet food supplier Chewy, launched the bid for eBay last week, offering US$125 a share in cash and stock for the giant online marketplace.
Market analysts and observers were mystified. Questions swirled about how the much-smaller video game retailer would finance the deal and, as important, the strategic logic of the combination.
[Analysis: There was little confidence in TD’s ‘highly confident’ support for GameStop’s eBay bid](https://apple.news/AnfSr6pYXRBqyApgM7NNwMQ)
The David-versus-Goliath unsolicited offer was audacious. GameStop’s market cap is about US$10-billion, compared with eBay’s valuation of more than US$48-billion.
Earlier this week, [eBay’s board rejected the bid](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/international-business/us-business/article-ebay-rejects-gamestops-56-billion-takeover-bid/). In a statement, the board echoed analysts’ concerns, saying the unsolicited offer was “neither credible nor attractive.”
In its decision, eBay called out several concerns with the offer, including “the uncertainty regarding your financing proposal,” as well as operational risk and a back-breaking debt load that would be a by-product of the combination.And this is where the delusional part kicks in. Mr. Cohen said GameStop had lined up a US$20-billion financing commitment from TD Securities and had about US$9-billion in cash on hand. 
Here, the math gets fuzzy. He said the deal would be half cash, half stock – neither of which adds up – and GameStop could issue more stock to get the deal done. 
But the delusion doesn’t stop with the numbers. The TD Securities commitment letter, made public by eBay earlier this week, said the bank’s confidence in the deal hinged on the assumption that the combined company could maintain an investment-grade credit profile from at least two of the top three ratings agencies. 
That is a significant condition to the financing deal and, like Mr. Cohen’s math, is questionable.
In examining the GameStop bid, Moody’s Ratings said last week that the proposed acquisition would be “credit negative” for eBay because of the significant increase in leverage generated by the deal structure. 
[Corporate takeovers fell in first quarter as geopolitics affected deal-making](https://apple.news/PQiDxvvZyZoauiR43CyfV_z)
Mr. Cohen’s behaviour in defending GameStop’s ability to do the deal didn’t help his cause. In a cringe-worthy appearance on CNBC’s *Squawk Box, he became agitated and combative when pressed to provide details about how the deal would be financed.*
*Where’s the rest of the money coming from?” anchor Becky Quick asked twice, with a chuckle at his evasiveness, suggesting it was a straightforward question.*
*“I don’t understand your question,” Mr. Cohen replied, followed by awkward silences.*
*“We are offering half cash, half stock, and we have the ability to issue stock in order to get the deal done,” Mr. Cohen said. “But the full details of the offer are on our website. We’ll see what happens.”*
*Note to Mr. Cohen’s and his handlers: Don’t propose a US$56-billion hostile takeover, agree to an on-air television interview to promote the deal, and then play dumb when asked how you’re going to pay for it.*
*And then there’s the industrial logic thing. In his proposal, Mr. Cohen pledged to operate eBay “a lot more efficiently” through layoffs and marketing cuts. He criticized eBay CEO Jamie Iannone for overspending without showing meaningful growth.*
*To be sure, eBay has been in the throes of a turnaround, focusing on specialty areas such as collectibles and used luxury goods as competitive differentiators to larger rivals such as Amazon. But it is seeing positive results. Its shares are up 24 per cent year-to-date.*
*Mr. Cohen also said GameStop’s 1,600 U.S. retail stores could be used to fulfill eBay orders. Again, Wall Street showed a remarkable lack of excitement about the potential strategic and operational synergies of the combined company.*[Pershing Square makes $64-billion takeover offer for Universal Music](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/international-business/article-pershing-square-makes-64-billion-takeover-offer-for-universal-music/)
After all, eBay revolutionized online retailing. A step back to bricks and mortar would seem a peculiar strategic move.
Mr. Cohen is nothing if not persistent. As if he anticipated rejection, he pledged to take his offer directly to eBay shareholders if the board said no to his offer.Audacious? Yes. But also a bit delusional.
Unless he can answer the most basic question and provide more solid financial footing for his proposal – as in math that actually adds up – it seems unlikely that eBay shareholders will bite. 
And he had better hope they don’t watch his CNBC television interview. No amount of money could make them unsee what leadership of the combined company might look like.

Hey, I get the urge to want faster returns, especially when you've seen steady growth. But I want to be real with you for a sec.
What you're doing right now (investing) and day trading are completely different games. Investing is slow, boring, and works over time. Day trading is fast, stressful, and most people lose money. Like, statistically, over 90% of day traders lose in the long run.
You turned 3kinto3*kinto*4,330 in 6 months. That's actually really good. That's about a 44% return. Professional investors would kill for that. So first, don't rush away from something that's working just because it feels slow.
If you really want to try day trading, here's what I'd suggest.
Don't use your whole account. Take a small portion, maybe $500, and use that to learn. Expect to lose it. That's not being negative, that's just reality. Day trading has a steep learning curve and you will make mistakes.
As for WellsTrade, it's fine for investing but not really built for day trading. Most day traders use platforms like Thinkorswim (TD Ameritrade), Webull, or Interactive Brokers. They have better charting tools, faster execution, and lower fees for frequent trading. But don't switch just yet. Learn first, then pick the right tool.
Also, going "all in" on anything is dangerous for day trading. You need strict risk management. Most day traders risk only 1-2% of their account per trade. That means on a 3kaccount,you′drisk3*kaccount*,*you*′*drisk*30 to 60pertrade,not60*pertrade*,*not*3k.
My advice? Keep doing what's working with most of your money. Take a small chunk to learn day trading if you're curious. But don't quit investing. The slow boring money is what actually builds wealth over time. The fast exciting money is what blows up accounts.
What makes you want faster returns anyway? Is there a specific goal you're trying to hit?

Would it?
>Section 203 is an antitakeover statute in Delaware which provides that if a person or entity (an “interested stockholder”) acquires 15% or more of the voting stock of a Delaware corporation (the “target”) without prior approval of the target's board, then the interested stockholder may not engage in a business...
given that these are cash settled swaps and do not have any voting power or beneficial interest yet, they don't contribute to that threshold, no?
I can see in the 13-D they mention swaps account for 12M shares but in the Item 6 section total it says 22M, so that means 10M in swaps were purchased at some point before the 60 day lookback?
What's stopping them from simply loading up on the derivatives and not acquiring any actual stock to not trigger another 13-D filing?
Maybe the $20B loan commitment from TD is used to fund/exercise the derivatives, not the acquisition bid? He never said the purpose of that loan only that they "have" it.

The cash he was offering was a mirage anyway.
it depended on borrowing as ebay. TD's letter was for lending to the final, merged company, assuming the loan would be investment grade. Only then would they be confident they could do the loan.
It wouldn't be investment grade if it was that much. And without Ebay, Cohen couldn't borrow nearly that much money.

They don't have the cash to begin with lol. They could just get TD to change the 20 to a 25 and it's the same thing.

Canada does a LOT of resource extraction. Many global mining, oil and gas, and energy stocks are listed on the TSX and makes up a huge portion of the market cap of the Canadian market. The banking and insurance sector in Canada is also quite strong with large portions of the business doing business in the USA, which is a massive market. Canadian banks like TD, BMO, and RBC have a decent amount of US business. You can’t say the same for British banks and companies.

To all the long-time contributors to this group - I hope this adds some value to your journey.
\*Not financial advice. Do your own research.\*
\-----
\*\*Current price: \~$11 (up 17% today post-earnings) | 52-week low: $2.25\*\*
An expectation of a $35-$45 share price 12 months post commercialization seems very reasonable.
\-----
\## POINT 1: COMP360 MAKES CLINICS MORE MONEY PER HOUR THAN SPRAVATO
Spravato’s model: patients come in \*\*21 times over 6 months\*\*, each visit is \~2 hours, clinics bill a flat rate per session. Revenue per clinic hour is roughly \*\*$650–$690\*\*.
COMP360’s model: patients come in \*\*1–2 times total\*\*, each session is 6–8 hours, clinics bill \*\*by the hour\*\* under newly secured psychedelic-specific CPT billing codes. Revenue per clinic hour is roughly \*\*$1,600–$9,000\*\* depending on drug pricing.
That’s 2.5x to 13x more revenue per hour of chair time.
And it gets better — because Spravato requires maintenance dosing indefinitely to sustain the effect. COMP360 showed durable response through 26 weeks after just 1–2 doses. So clinics aren’t just earning more per hour — they’re freeing up capacity to take on new patients instead of running the same ones through 21-session marathons.
\*\*The financial picture per patient episode:\*\*
| |COMP360 |Spravato |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------|
|Sessions |1–2 |21 |
|Hours per session |6–8 |\~2 |
|Total clinic hours |\~8–16 |\~42 |
|Estimated total revenue|\~$26K–$74K |\~$27K–$29K|
|Revenue per clinic hour|\~$1,600–$9,000|\~$650–$690|
\*Drug pricing is estimated (no official WAC disclosed yet). COMP360 WAC assumed $25K–$35K per dose based on analyst benchmarks.\*
The 7,500 clinics already certified to give Spravato are CMPS’s launch targets. They have an immediate economic incentive to convert referrals.
\-----
\## POINT 2: THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN DIFFERENCE IS MASSIVE
This one doesn’t get enough attention.
Every Spravato session requires: vital signs, dissociation assessment, 2-hour monitored observation, discharge documentation — times 21 sessions per patient. Indefinitely for maintenance. Payers require re-authorization every 4–12 weeks. The admin overhead per patient per year is estimated at \*\*$3,000–$6,600\*\* in staff time.
COMP360: 1–2 doses, 1–2 authorization cycles, 1–2 REMS documentation events. Admin cost per patient estimated at \*\*$500–$1,000\*\*.
For a clinic treating 100 TRD patients:
\- Spravato admin overhead: \~$300K–$660K/year
\- COMP360 admin overhead: \~$50K–$100K/year
\- \*\*Savings: \~$200K–$560K per 100 patients\*\*
That’s before accounting for the higher hourly billing rates.
Also worth noting: payers are increasingly pushing back on indefinite Spravato maintenance dosing and imposing session caps. COMP360’s limited-dose model is structurally insulated from that risk.
\-----
\## POINT 3: THE COMMERCIAL RAMP SHOULD BE FASTER THAN SPRAVATO’S
Spravato launched in 2019 into nothing:
\- Zero pre-trained sites
\- No state rescheduling prep
\- No psychedelic billing codes
\- COVID hit the next year
COMP360 launches into:
\- \*\*7,500 Spravato-certified clinics\*\* already trained, already credentialed, already seeing TRD patients
\- \*\*\~90% of the US population\*\* lives in states that have committed to reschedule COMP360 within 30 days of FDA + DEA approval — 2 years of lobbying already done
\- \*\*CPT3 hourly billing codes\*\* already secured before approval
\- \*\*Payer discussions already underway\*\* per the Q1 2026 call
\- \*\*1–2 month FDA review window\*\* via the Commissioner’s National Priority Voucher (CNPV) — unprecedented speed
Illustrative revenue ramp (assumes $30K WAC per dose, 2 doses avg per patient):
|Year |Active Sites |Patients Treated|Revenue Estimate|
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|Year 1 (2027, partial)|375 (5% of base)|\~3,000 |\~$180M–$270M |
|Year 2 (2028) |750 (10%) |\~11,250 |\~$675M–$900M |
|Year 3 (2029) |1,500 (20%) |\~30,000 |\~$1.5B–$2.0B |
For context: GlobalData modeled COMP360 at $879M by 2031 — and that was built before both Phase III trials were positive, before the CNPV was awarded, and before 90% state rescheduling coverage was achieved. The number is probably low.
Spravato comparison: took 4–5 years to approach $1B in annual revenue, with none of the structural tailwinds COMP360 has.
\-----
\## ADDITIONAL THINGS THAT BUILD THE CASE
\*\*PTSD pipeline (13 million patients)\*\*
Same drug, same infrastructure, new indication. Phase 2b/3 trial underway with VA collaboration sites. Phase 2 data already showed a 29.5-point CAPS-5 reduction at Week 12 from a single 25mg dose. If PTSD works, the addressable market is 3.25x larger than TRD. Approval probably 2029–2030 but the optionality is real.
\*\*3-for-3 in clinical trials\*\*
Phase 2b + COMP005 + COMP006 — all positive in controlled trials. Spravato had a mixed trial history before approval. Jefferies assigns 75–85% probability of FDA approval. TD Cowen described “strong conviction” it gets approved and has “robust market uptake.”
\*\*White House executive order\*\*
An executive order explicitly prioritizing timely rescheduling of FDA-approved psychedelic treatments was issued in April 2026. Direct tailwind for DEA rescheduling speed.
\*\*M&A optionality\*\*
BioPharma Dive reported AbbVie M&A speculation in July 2025. A company with two positive Phase III trials, first-mover status in a new drug class, and a \~$1.5B market cap is a reasonable acquisition target. Any deal would price well above current analyst targets.
\*\*$466M cash, no dilution needed\*\*
They don’t need to raise money through launch and into 2028. A lot of pre-commercial biotechs raise dilutive rounds right before launch. CMPS doesn’t have to.
\*\*First classic psychedelic ever approved in the US\*\*
If approved, COMP360 is the first psilocybin-based medicine in American history. First-mover advantage in a new drug class is durable — Spravato still has 100% of the psychedelic TRD market years later.
\-----
\## RISKS
\- \*\*Payer coverage in Year 1\*\* — formulary decisions not finalized; broad commercial coverage isn’t guaranteed at launch
\- \*\*CPT3 → Category I conversion\*\* — until codes upgrade, payers have more discretion to deny; could take 1–2 years post-launch
\- \*\*REMS requirements\*\* — not yet finalized; an onerous REMS could slow site certification
\- \*\*COMP006 Part B data (early Q3 2026)\*\* — final 26-week durability data needed to complete NDA; if something goes sideways here the timeline moves
\- \*\*Pricing pressure\*\* — payers will negotiate rebates; net pricing could come in below WAC estimates
\- \*\*No revenue yet\*\* — this is still a pre-commercial biotech; there is real execution risk
\-----
\## WHERE DOES THE STOCK GO?
Current price: \~$11. Shares outstanding: \~135M. Market cap: \~$1.5B.
|Scenario |12-Month Post-Commercialization Price|Probability|What Has to Go Right |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
|Bear |$12–$18 |\~20% |Approval but slow payer coverage, REMS friction |
|Base |$25–$40 |\~45% |On-track ramp, CPT3 functioning, PTSD optionality priced in|
|Bull |$45–$70 |\~25% |Fast ramp, broad payer coverage, PTSD data positive |
|M&A |$70–$120 |\~10% |Acquisition at premium |
|\*\*Probability-weighted midpoint\*\*|\*\*\~$32–$42\*\* | |\~3x–4x from today |
Analyst consensus: 11 Buy, 1 Hold, 0 Sell. Range: $8–$70. Median: \~$18–$25 \*before\* approval — which would expand significantly post-approval.
\-----
\## SUMMARY
Compass Pathways has a psilocybin drug that worked in every trial they ran, a business model that pays clinics more money per hour than the only drug it’s competing with, 7,500 ready sites, a 90% state rescheduling runway, a 1–2 month FDA review voucher, $466M in cash, and a PTSD pipeline that’s 3x the TRD market. The stock is at $11 with a probability-weighted analyst target of $32–$42 twelve months after commercialization. The question isn’t really whether the drug works — it’s whether the payer and execution machinery moves fast enough. Based on how much work has already been done on that front, there’s a reasonable case it does.
\-----
\*Sources: COMPASS Pathways Q1 2026 Earnings Call (May 13, 2026), COMP005/006 Phase III data, Jefferies/Stifel/Morgan Stanley/LifeSci analyst notes, GlobalData COMP360 market forecast, Morningstar/Google Finance market data, Spravato prescribing information (Janssen, 2025), BioPharma Dive, Clinical Trials Arena.\*
\*Again — not financial advice. I hold a position. Do your own research.\*

This particular board has a BAD habit of selling their shares as soon as they vest. So there is very little payout for them if they agreed. Ryan publicly stated he would fire them all. Why would those board members sell their own shares as low as $72 within the last year, but claim that Ryan’s offer is “unattractive” at $125.
I think GameStop price runs on volume for swaps sometime in the next couple of months. Ryan pulls in more cash at much higher valuations. Issues more bonds at higher valuations and similar terms to previous bonds. Then uses cash on hand plus the TD bank loan to buy eBay for all cash. He might wait for the bottom to drop out on eBay first.
I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if he pulled off another acquisition or two in the mean time. Could be that he remains true to the original offer half cash half stock, but now the stock includes a couple of additions acquisitions the next time he offers.

Interesting that people think you're going to get a good interest rate for a deal that Moody's has already called "credit negative". 9-10% would be more reasonable. If you adjust from 5.5% to a more realistic 9-10%, it basically drowns this thing in interest expense. Which all that to say, this is a bit amusing to me. Since this is basically an LBO and "PE bad" has been a rallying crowd of this group. Which I don't disagree, but come on. What are we doing here.
Also, if Gamestop has to put all its cash into the deal, then what do we think happens to all that interest income.
Doesn't really matter. The TD letter has an escape clause and Moody's already gave them one no. Just one more and it's done. The $20b was never a real commitment.
Would be nice to see them buy something adjacent to Gamestop and try to grow this thing more naturally. Doesn't really jive with that bonus letter.

It will never cease to amaze me how this community is full of itself. No, no one here explained anything because there’s nothing to explain. If there is a plan, very few people know it. So far this plan looks a lot like playing 3d chess. And I am yet to witness a game of 3d chess that was intended a game of 3d chess instead of people filling in blanks in justifying actions of the “player”. What we know for a fact right now is that RC wants to buy eBay, he is not passionate about GameStop and that the very secret letter from TD is a worthless piece of paper. The last part is important because it means that the math indeed doesn’t math.

I don't have an issue with you not liking the deal, that's fine.
I'm seeing the $217M increasing rapidly once we shed the EU stores. This past year we had Canada and EU dragging that $200M down for most of it.
eBay rejecting this is interesting and I love to see where it goes. I didn't expect this offer but I also didn't expect RC to secure $20B form TD either.

No it doesnt.
the rollover scenario... notice theres zero gme shares sold at market.
rather there is an issuance at a rate of 1.5 gme shares per ebay share... its an **equity stake** that the ebay folks roll into the new entity.
the cash outlay is simply half cash...
the other half is half stock... and that's ebay equity, not an ATM.
the cash portion is the pile we have + TD financing.

I've seen some asking why eBay? I can see how that may be an actual question vs just the nonstop, unfounded and easily disproven bot FUD about dilution and gaming compensation so I will give a quick, light overview.
Instead of stalking about the incompetence of the eBay board and misaligned incentives, or bots hating on RC to foster contempt, let's talk about this great company.
The secondary market has a massive TAM and is underutilized, often due to high shipping overheads.
It's a market that Amazon also does not have absolute dominance in, and in fact, completely neglects. Just like how RC created <doggycompany> and took a (small) slice of the market (pets) from Amazon, he's now going for round 2 with a much much larger market.
Just like RC said, eCommerce is his competency. Not only that, he has the connections, the hard-earned learnings you can only get from failures, and everything else from creating <doggycompany> as his first go around. Now we add in GameStop with its collectibles and physical presence for taking in and verifying goods, you unlock many new growth levers ((as well as significant margins) previously not accessible to eBay.
Quick recap for any investors not up to date with recent progress on the GameStop front:
* PowerPacks (for more info on that look at DD from others) have significant margins built in on the fully digital flow of opening the packs, putting them in the vault, and reselling them. More clearly: FAT margins.
* An infinite number of resales can occur, all without any shipping costs which are traditionally massive overheads.
* GameStop gets margin from every single pack opening, and every single sale.
* The ease and convenience greatly increases the transactions, on which GameStop gets a slice.
* This same concept can be applied to quite literally any good or merchandise, with the caveat that cards are much more valuable and take much less physical space than other merch and makes more sense to not need to take physical ownership of.
* The retail footprint allows shipping costs to be either eliminated or significantly reduced both on the consumer and GameStop ends.
* For the trading cards, there is no lack of supply despite the more frequent transactions, due to the "recycling" incentives built into the system.
Blockchain or not, tokenization or not, I don't see much talk about the fact that this is, in essence, a whole new category which can be applied to *ANY AND ALL COLLECTIBLES* on the aforementioned FAT margins. With an extra 100 million customers thanks to eBay.
eBay has 2 significant problems that are impossible to solve as they currently exist: large amounts of fraud between buyers and sellers which is well documented, as well as massive shipping overheads, twice on each transaction.
GameStop solves both of these:
* The physical presence allows for authentication and verification, which will cut down on the most obvious/blatant fraud of packing a completely different item than was advertised. Fraud will never be solved, but this puts a huge dent in it, increasing consumer confidence, and in turn, profits.
* The eliminated shipping costs for sellers also increase the TAM of the secondary market as many items did not previously make sense to sell after shipping costs. These items can now transact and find fair market pricing, increasing their values and overall to the margins eBay receives.
So anyone who tries to peddle that there are no synergies and it makes no sense is plain and flat out wrong (and likely has an ulterior motive \*cough\*). The synergies are plenty, the profit potential and margin increase is significant, even beyond the most obvious ones.
The nice part is there is hardly a better suitor for eBay than GameStop, hence few others can make enough sense of purchasing eBay to make it worth their time, aside from preventing GameStop from taking it.
Common arguments/counterpoints and perceived risks:
* $20B TD debt. Assuming a ballpark 5.5% corporate interest rate, annual carry is $1.1B. eBay spits out more than that, and GameStop leadership has already said large costs cuts are planned in the first 12 months. Debt carry likely drops by \~$300M by year 2, and faster as less cash flow goes to interest.
* Debt pay down. GameStop leadership has already said aggressive debt pay down is the priority. Cost cuts
* Dividends. I believe this will be the first thing to go, probably within 1st quarter post acquisition. That capital will go towards aggressive debt pay down.
* Reduced revenue from cost cuts. This should be expected to some degree. Obviously leadership isn't going to kill the golden goose, but cuts will invariably cause a short term revenue drop. Many growth levers to be pulled will dampen the impact and increase margins.
* <thebigshortguy> exit shortly after purchasing millions of dollars in shares. <thebigshortguy> is a value investor, he built his whole net worth and acquired his fund customers doing value investing. $20B in debt doesn't align with that methodology, no matter how brief, so he's out. Maybe one day he'll buy back, I don't care and neither should you. Your capital, you decide.
RC and GameStop leadership bringing GameStop from losing hundreds of millions a year to positive cashflow is not simply a talking point, it is key to the prospects and expectations of this acquisition. A successful and dare I say *accretive* acquisition of eBay involves 3 major things:
* Costs reduction
* Margin expansion
* Debt reduction (a necessary but previously non-existent pain)
All 3 have been done, successfully despite much hate and pushback from the mass media, and massive short selling, over the last 5 years.
Is this largely speculative? Sure, but the lego blocks are all there and the gains are obvious. This same leadership also has a proven track record of executing the exact same playbook on the GME turnaround. Also much of what I've covered isn't wild speculation, they're either facts or recent statements from GME/RC with a small sprinkle of forward looking projection. Certainly an infinitely more likely outcome than the narratives being painted by malicious actors.
Both GameStop and eBay investors have a LOT to gain and little to lose and would greatly benefit from a successful acquisition.
Ultimately I believe the result of this will be many billions a year in cashflow for the combined entity, in the order of multiples of the current cashflow, likely in as early as 3 years.
I am voting YES with my x,xxx,xxx shares purchased in Nov 2020 and encourage any other eBay and GameStop investors to do the same. Godspeed and god bless, let's get on with it!

**Disclaimer**: I've held XXX shares since 2022 (100% DRS'd via Computershare). My entire net worth sits in this company. I have been out of the loop lately, so please call out any errors so I can correct them.
From my understanding, the board is asking to increase the total authorized share count from 1B to 2.5B. Ryan Cohen offered (and was rejected) to purchase eBay for $56B at $125 per-share, with 50% being in cash and the other 50% in stock. Given that GameStop has \~$9B in liquidity and $20B committed from TD, we'd still need to come up with \~$27B in stock under the **condition** that TD grants the loan. In my opinion, this increase in authorized share count is an absolute requirement if we want to acquire Ebay, barring we find more leverage or if the ticker price increases. If TD doesn't follow through on the loan or provides a lower amount, then we would need to issue even more stock to support the deal, which to me, justifies the 1.5B increase.
Let's assume shareholders approve the share increase and the acquisition ends up highly successful. Is it reasonable to believe GameStop would buy back shares using surplus profits to reverse the dilution? Everyone talks about how bad dilution is, but what if the acquisition drastically increases the long-term value of the company? If it yields massive profits, why wouldn't management shrink the float later? Ryan Cohen has expressed multiple times that he favors buyback programs when they increase shareholder value. Why isn't the community considering this a strong possibility?
**TL;DR:** If Ryan Cohen bypasses the board for a hostile takeover and successfully buys eBay for $56B, can we reasonably expect future share buybacks using joint profits to reverse the massive shareholder dilution? Let's discuss

One small addition that strengthens your argument here is that cash the combined company would have after the acquisition. Assuming GME accesses the full 20B from TD, they save a bit of their cash and it gets combined with the cash eBay has on hand too leading to a relatively healthy ~10% of accretive market cap in cash after the acquisition of around 4-5 billion or so. Minus of course whatever they spent on the initial eBay position.

traditional (automated via algos) merger arb is to short the buyer and buy the seller.
thats what you saw once the news dropped... you'll likely see more of it as things progress...
https://preview.redd.it/7fnlhtv9fy0h1.png?width=1118&format=png&auto=webp&s=4c8e4f1d5b57d57d0bf0d934307cc7d14104bba1
this one's interesting though because of how low GME is right now in respect to cash value... not much room to the downside (as even burry has shown)... that said, it looks like the market is shorting gme to an all cash (via dilution) buyout scenario... which is hilarious to me because even that scenario is accretive AF to GME shareholders... it would be a large debt load, which is dangerous to company health/longevity (so i dont think that's what is going to happen here...)
I think RC is going to trade 20B leverage from TD at roughly 5.5% to get control of a 55B cash generating MONSTER and then tun up its generation potential.
Look at WACC... thats the cost of cash.. so it says, under that all dilution buyout scenario (which i allocated to just loading up the debt and keeping the 9.5b war chest (for some reasons i can explain)... as long as the conglomerate can generate over 9.11% net, they win in the numbers game.
for reference, target margins are 30-40% in all takeover scenarios.
I just posted this that goes into more detail if it helps you
[https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1tc9bxk/swallowing\_the\_whale\_why\_the\_gamestop\_acquisition/](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1tc9bxk/swallowing_the_whale_why_the_gamestop_acquisition/)