TD
Toronto Dominion Bank
stock NYSE

It wouldn’t be bullish, it would be majorly negative, same for TD bank if they were to act so foolishly.

I mean... 20 billion of the 56 is coming from TD bank (canadian bank), some of it is coming from the Qatari wealth fund (al though that part is only rumors, it seems to be true if you look at what the sultan posted today on twitter). Then again their stake isn't known yet.
It genuinely is a lot cheaper for gamestop then you think.
On top of that, it gives access to the largest trading card sales platform on the planet, streamlining sales as a result, etc.
Thats excluding any other potential deals we barely payed a thing for.
Not sure how that can be perceived as negative, but LET THEM SLAM!
I'll just keep buying at a discount

TD will have to charge 5-6% interest. Which amounts to $1.4-2.0 billion per year in additional interest expenses alone (without paying down principal, without factoring other interest expenses).
TD just underwrites the loan. They don’t loan their own the money. They have to get other people/institutions to loan the money for this specific deal, hence why the offer said “highly confident" rather than what should normally be worded as "firm commitment.”
Highly confident = “If the weather stays nice”
In GAAP accounting “highly confident” doesn’t even amount to “Probable” when talking about 20B.

And still well below 125 which means investors are not taking this seriously. Which means lenders (the people who give money to TD) aren’t either.

Read for yourself:
Here is the transcript:
GameStop Makes Its Play
$56 Billion for eBay, Makes Perfect Sense
Michael Burry
May 4
Makes perfect sense.
Never confuse debt for creativity.
When hundreds of billions are on the table, bet on craven greed.
So the rumor was confirmed less than 48 hours after it was leaked.
The Wall Street Journal reports GameStop is offering to buy eBay for $56 billion.
Again, as you know, I have written extensively about GameStop, including just Saturday, when I speculated as to what the deal might look like.
The three times before that: The Big Short Squeeze, Final Stop GameStop, and in a Short Thoughts February 2nd. So much for that.
Now we have more information. The offer is $56 billion, 50% cash and 50% stock
I do not believe $56 billion is anything more than an opening bid.
I can only imagine eBay will reject GameStop’s offer out of hand and relatively soon.
Looking at the May 3 offer while it is extent, the offer shoulders more debt than I had thought was possible on eBay’s EBITDA.
Neither does this seem revolutionary or ground-breaking in nature. More dilution, or more debt – really, the capital markets strategy here could not be more pedestrian.
High leverage implies high growth, and eBay is growing again. Ryan Cohen also apparently has enough credibility to get banks to go along.
I contemplate a higher actual close, say $65 billion for eBay, and more like 60% cash. Below, I compare this to the opening offer as well as my own not-so-happening “Instant Berkshire” creation from February 2nd.
A pinch too busy, I know, but suffice it to say, Instant Berkshire did not contemplate anywhere near 5x+ leverage.
The more likely outcome at the higher price sees leverage rise to 7.7x, a level of debt that borders on distressed and tends to strip competitiveness and innovation from such-stricken companies. Wayfair lived there for years, Carvana nearly died there and still might from such a start. Bath & Body Works too. Those are the survivors. They are few.
Ryan must see low-hanging fruit, though if huge cash flow could be unlocked as if by a magic wand, one might expect eBay to have found it during its epic search for cash with which to buy back slag heaps of shares. eBay reduced its share count from 1.2 billion shares ten years ago to just 444 million shares today – one of the most prolific buyback programs markets have seen.
Ryan cannot be after fat to cut, if only because no amount of cut fat makes this deal work. Rather, Ryan is pointing to a transformation, to hundreds of billions of dollars of opportunity, and he convinced TD to give him the $20 billion committed financing, which is no small feat given the low single digit billion dollar EBITDA numbers sported by these two companies.
eBay Today
eBay has already turned things around significantly, which no doubt will be one of the arguments made by eBay’s board as it rejects GameStop’s offer.
eBay has been growing faster lately. eBay projects forward adjusted EBITDA (whatever that is) at $3.7 billion, vs $2.7 billion trailing, and revenues have broken out of decade-long doldrums, with 17% quarter-on-quarter growth 1Q2026.
eBay now has eBay Live in hypergrowth mode, and collectibles is eBay’s leading category. Of course, GameStop’s collectibles category is also growing fast, and this is where the strategies of the two seem to dovetail.
eBay is not all collectibles, though. eBay ads grew 27% last quarter, and the company, of course, is leaning into AI. Below, from the eBay’s last earnings call.
We see Agentic AI as a real structural tailwind for eBay, and it plays right into our core strengths. First, our innovations leveraging AI are already having a meaningful benefit for our business today. Take magical listing. We’ve talked about the compelling stats I just mentioned that we’re seeing and sellers have created 0.5 billion listings using our AI tools.
And our Agentic search beta, which I realize I didn’t fully answer that question, so I’ll come back to that. But what we’ve seen there is higher engagement and increased purchase behavior off of that early test. So we’re going to continue to bring the latest Agentic technologies to eBay to make it easier for sellers to list and for buyers to find the things they love.
I see the structural change in eBay’s trajectory, and believe it or not the above scenarios give credit for projected improvements in 2026 from each of GameStop and eBay.
On trailing numbers, the pro forma numbers are much worse – think of a negotiated close at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense. If one considered it, one would be among the first, because no one closes a deal at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense.
The ratings agencies will of course look to trailing numbers as a base, so the final credit rating might be in the B or B- junk range, perhaps 400 to 500 basis points over SOFR, which today is 4.35%. This speaks to floating debt expense in the range of 8-9%. Each 100 basis point rise in SOFR would boost the interest expense ~$300 million.
A $300 million boost may be automatic. eBay’s senior notes must be redeemed at 101 points if a change of control results in a ratings downgrade. This deal is virtually certain to trigger that put. In that case $6.7 billion in investment grade notes will be refinanced, perhaps to floating rate syndicated loans, but certainly with a $250-$300 million increase in total interest expense.
If Ryan miraculously gets his deal at $56 billion, it works a little better. Still, tangible book value per share gets cut by ¾, and there will be transformational execution risk while balancing on the knife edge of 5x+ leverage.
Competing with Amazon
Think about what Amazon has become for a moment. Amazon locks its retail prime buyers in with Prime Video and other benefits that none can match. 1000+ warehouses, over 525 million square feet. Amazon has 200+ million prime members paying $139/year with perks such as same day delivery, Prime Video, gaming, pharmacy, Whole Foods, etc. Over 70% of its packages are fully delivered by Amazon’s vertically integrated logistics apparatus – 150,000 delivery vans, last mile reach matched by none.
Amazon has it all and has been investing in itself at a breakneck pace for decades. Current spend is in the hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
Think about what eBay is. It has none of that and is not remotely close physically or temporally.
GameStop’s Gambit
If Ryan really wanted to compete with Amazon, he would have acquired Wayfair (70% of its own last mile deliveries and warehouses all over) along with a cash flow machine and a bunch of float. I heard someone was peddling such a deal back in early February.
So Ryan’s attempt to take over eBay cannot possess the actual honest and true intent to compete with Amazon. Rather clearly, the intention must be to dominate collectibles and used goods of all ages.
Amazon tried to do that, failed, and is not coming back.
The category is a huge addressable market. Some say as high as $100 billion.
Ryan might say hundreds of billions.
If GameStop wants to do it with billions of interest expense and all manner of covenants restricting its movements, it will not be breaking new ground. It will be trotting in well-worn ruts on the road to capitalist Hell.
No new ground has been broken yet. To truly break new ground, Ryan has to execute and succeed in this transformation from this starting position, saddled with debt.
I believe Ryan believes he can do this, and I do support the effort. As well, I do not predict failure, although it is certainly in the realm of possibilities.
Of course, as I have said, I can think of many, many other ways this could have gone easier.
The list above shows some big drops since February in some very good companies. The Big Bang ADP-W-AGO trifecta, in aggregate, would likely be $4 billion cheaper today than in early February.
To be clear, I would not have expected GameStop to buy all of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but I could see GameStop buying a good number of shares of both as an investment. The others I see as potential takeouts in various combinations of Instant Berkshires.
It is not too late. And Ryan may indeed fail at snatching eBay, and might look in the above direction.
Still, at the end of the day, this play for eBay makes perfect sense.
Wall Street does indeed mistake debt for creativity, and does so constantly.
I of all people should have known.
Charlie Munger once said, “”When a manager with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact”.
I may not last the week with my GameStop position fully intact. I will certain sell to an extent, perhaps all or some but alas, no, not none.
Until next time!

Look at what your king Burry said, or do you not care about him after he’s now out?
GameStop Makes Its Play $56 Billion for eBay, Makes Perfect Sense Michael Burry May 4 ∙ Paid
READ IN APP
Makes perfect sense.
Never confuse debt for creativity.
When hundreds of billions are on the table, bet on craven greed.
So the rumor was confirmed less than 48 hours after it was leaked.
The Wall Street Journal reports GameStop is offering to buy eBay for $56 billion.
Again, as you know, I have written extensively about GameStop, including just Saturday, when I speculated as to what the deal might look like.
The three times before that: The Big Short Squeeze, Final Stop GameStop, and in a Short Thoughts February 2nd. So much for that.
Now we have more information. The offer is $56 billion, 50% cash and 50% stock
I do not believe $56 billion is anything more than an opening bid.
I can only imagine eBay will reject GameStop’s offer out of hand and relatively soon.
Looking at the May 3 offer while it is extent, the offer shoulders more debt than I had thought was possible on eBay’s EBITDA.
Neither does this seem revolutionary or ground-breaking in nature. More dilution, or more debt – really, the capital markets strategy here could not be more pedestrian.
High leverage implies high growth, and eBay is growing again. Ryan Cohen also apparently has enough credibility to get banks to go along.
I contemplate a higher actual close, say $65 billion for eBay, and more like 60% cash. Below, I compare this to the opening offer as well as my own not-so-happening “Instant Berkshire” creation from February 2nd.
A pinch too busy, I know, but suffice it to say, Instant Berkshire did not contemplate anywhere near 5x+ leverage.
The more likely outcome at the higher price sees leverage rise to 7.7x, a level of debt that borders on distressed and tends to strip competitiveness and innovation from such-stricken companies. Wayfair lived there for years, Carvana nearly died there and still might from such a start. Bath & Body Works too. Those are the survivors. They are few.
Ryan must see low-hanging fruit, though if huge cash flow could be unlocked as if by a magic wand, one might expect eBay to have found it during its epic search for cash with which to buy back slag heaps of shares. eBay reduced its share count from 1.2 billion shares ten years ago to just 444 million shares today – one of the most prolific buyback programs markets have seen.
Ryan cannot be after fat to cut, if only because no amount of cut fat makes this deal work. Rather, Ryan is pointing to a transformation, to hundreds of billions of dollars of opportunity, and he convinced TD to give him the $20 billion committed financing, which is no small feat given the low single digit billion dollar EBITDA numbers sported by these two companies.
eBay Today eBay has already turned things around significantly, which no doubt will be one of the arguments made by eBay’s board as it rejects GameStop’s offer.
eBay has been growing faster lately. eBay projects forward adjusted EBITDA (whatever that is) at $3.7 billion, vs $2.7 billion trailing, and revenues have broken out of decade-long doldrums, with 17% quarter-on-quarter growth 1Q2026.
eBay now has eBay Live in hypergrowth mode, and collectibles is eBay’s leading category. Of course, GameStop’s collectibles category is also growing fast, and this is where the strategies of the two seem to dovetail.
eBay is not all collectibles, though. eBay ads grew 27% last quarter, and the company, of course, is leaning into AI. Below, from the eBay’s last earnings call.
We see Agentic AI as a real structural tailwind for eBay, and it plays right into our core strengths. First, our innovations leveraging AI are already having a meaningful benefit for our business today. Take magical listing. We’ve talked about the compelling stats I just mentioned that we’re seeing and sellers have created 0.5 billion listings using our AI tools.
And our Agentic search beta, which I realize I didn’t fully answer that question, so I’ll come back to that. But what we’ve seen there is higher engagement and increased purchase behavior off of that early test. So we’re going to continue to bring the latest Agentic technologies to eBay to make it easier for sellers to list and for buyers to find the things they love.
I see the structural change in eBay’s trajectory, and believe it or not the above scenarios give credit for projected improvements in 2026 from each of GameStop and eBay.
On trailing numbers, the pro forma numbers are much worse – think of a negotiated close at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense. If one considered it, one would be among the first, because no one closes a deal at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense.
The ratings agencies will of course look to trailing numbers as a base, so the final credit rating might be in the B or B- junk range, perhaps 400 to 500 basis points over SOFR, which today is 4.35%. This speaks to floating debt expense in the range of 8-9%. Each 100 basis point rise in SOFR would boost the interest expense ~$300 million.
A $300 million boost may be automatic. eBay’s senior notes must be redeemed at 101 points if a change of control results in a ratings downgrade. This deal is virtually certain to trigger that put. In that case $6.7 billion in investment grade notes will be refinanced, perhaps to floating rate syndicated loans, but certainly with a $250-$300 million increase in total interest expense.
If Ryan miraculously gets his deal at $56 billion, it works a little better. Still, tangible book value per share gets cut by ¾, and there will be transformational execution risk while balancing on the knife edge of 5x+ leverage.
Competing with Amazon Think about what Amazon has become for a moment. Amazon locks its retail prime buyers in with Prime Video and other benefits that none can match. 1000+ warehouses, over 525 million square feet. Amazon has 200+ million prime members paying $139/year with perks such as same day delivery, Prime Video, gaming, pharmacy, Whole Foods, etc. Over 70% of its packages are fully delivered by Amazon’s vertically integrated logistics apparatus – 150,000 delivery vans, last mile reach matched by none.
Amazon has it all and has been investing in itself at a breakneck pace for decades. Current spend is in the hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
Think about what eBay is. It has none of that and is not remotely close physically or temporally.
GameStop’s Gambit If Ryan really wanted to compete with Amazon, he would have acquired Wayfair (70% of its own last mile deliveries and warehouses all over) along with a cash flow machine and a bunch of float. I heard someone was peddling such a deal back in early February.
So Ryan’s attempt to take over eBay cannot possess the actual honest and true intent to compete with Amazon. Rather clearly, the intention must be to dominate collectibles and used goods of all ages.
Amazon tried to do that, failed, and is not coming back.
The category is a huge addressable market. Some say as high as $100 billion.
Ryan might say hundreds of billions.
If GameStop wants to do it with billions of interest expense and all manner of covenants restricting its movements, it will not be breaking new ground. It will be trotting in well-worn ruts on the road to capitalist Hell.
No new ground has been broken yet. To truly break new ground, Ryan has to execute and succeed in this transformation from this starting position, saddled with debt.
I believe Ryan believes he can do this, and I do support the effort. As well, I do not predict failure, although it is certainly in the realm of possibilities.
Of course, as I have said, I can think of many, many other ways this could have gone easier.
The list above shows some big drops since February in some very good companies. The Big Bang ADP-W-AGO trifecta, in aggregate, would likely be $4 billion cheaper today than in early February.
To be clear, I would not have expected GameStop to buy all of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but I could see GameStop buying a good number of shares of both as an investment. The others I see as potential takeouts in various combinations of Instant Berkshires.
It is not too late. And Ryan may indeed fail at snatching eBay, and might look in the above direction.
Still, at the end of the day, this play for eBay makes perfect sense.
Wall Street does indeed mistake debt for creativity, and does so constantly.
I of all people should have known.
Charlie Munger once said, “”When a manager with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact”.
I may not last the week with my GameStop position fully intact. I will certain sell to an extent, perhaps all or some but alas, no, not none.
Until next time!

Bank holiday? Apes will be watching the stock tickers all day.
Two important bits of news that I am not seeing. BBC News wants me to subscribe before showing me their news. Too bad. I'm not buying it. Yahoo Finance copied it anyhow and has made it free for the asking.
[https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn0p8yled1do](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn0p8yled1do)
[https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/gamestop-offers-buy-ebay-56bn-002005795.html](https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/gamestop-offers-buy-ebay-56bn-002005795.html)
"Video game retail chain GameStop has made a $55.5bn (£40.9bn) unsolicited offer to buy e-commerce firm eBay.
"The cash and stock offer values eBay at $125 a share, $20 more than the shares were valued at when New York trading ended on Friday, GameStop said [in a statement on Sunday](https://investor.gamestop.com/news-releases/news-details/2026/GameStop-Proposes-to-Acquire-eBay-at-125-00-Per-Share/)."
GameStop has confirmed this news story with its own news release:
[https://investor.gamestop.com/news-releases/news-details/2026/GameStop-Proposes-to-Acquire-eBay-at-125-00-Per-Share/](https://investor.gamestop.com/news-releases/news-details/2026/GameStop-Proposes-to-Acquire-eBay-at-125-00-Per-Share/)
"The proposed offer is $125.00 per share, comprising 50% cash and 50% GameStop common stock, with full shareholder election rights as to consideration type and pro-rata allocation. Aggregate undiluted equity value is approximately $55.5 billion, based on eBay’s most recently disclosed undiluted share count, representing a 27% premium to the 30-day VWAP and a 36% premium to the 90-day VWAP. The transaction is conditioned on customary closing conditions. The cash consideration is expected to be funded from a combination of (i) cash and liquid investments on GameStop’s balance sheet, which totaled \~$9.4 billion as of January 31, 2026, and (ii) third-party acquisition financing, in respect of which GameStop has received a highly-confident letter from TD Securities for up to $20 billion."
I'm glad that I made another BUY during the last "oversold" dip; and, it looks like all those warrants will be ITM, very soon, (adding about $1.9 billion in cash to GameStop's piggy-bank). There will be dilution of shares. Warrants EXERCIZED will add about 59 million shares. And, there's about 450 million eBay shares outstanding; so, there's probably 2 (new) GME shares used to buy 1 eBay share, (along with $62.50 in cash). I'd expect that all of the GME Notes will be soon converted into shares, too. A lot of dilution; but, GameStop would be transforming into a whale of a company, (definitely going to be added to the S&P 500 index), that could be competing with Amazon. The short-sellers are going to be crushed, (66.85% short volume on Friday, 7,089,398 shares sold short).
I'm pleased that I've saved up enough cash, since the warrants were issued as dividends, to exercise nearly all of them, (my recent TFSA account purchase, at $24.25 per share, may mean selling 3 warrants instead of EXERCIZING all of them at $32), due to account contribution restrictions.
It has been a long winter in Canada. Yesterday, I changed from winter tires to all season tires on my car. Time to watch the flowers bloom, (and GME stock rocket upwards). BUY, HODL, EXERCIZE, and DRS GME.
Good morning from Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Here is the transcript:
GameStop Makes Its Play
$56 Billion for eBay, Makes Perfect Sense
Michael Burry
May 4
∙
Paid

READ IN APP

Makes perfect sense.
Never confuse debt for creativity.
When hundreds of billions are on the table, bet on craven greed.
So the rumor was confirmed less than 48 hours after it was leaked.
The Wall Street Journal reports GameStop is offering to buy eBay for $56 billion.
Again, as you know, I have written extensively about GameStop, including just Saturday, when I speculated as to what the deal might look like.
The three times before that: The Big Short Squeeze, Final Stop GameStop, and in a Short Thoughts February 2nd. So much for that.
Now we have more information. The offer is $56 billion, 50% cash and 50% stock
I do not believe $56 billion is anything more than an opening bid.
I can only imagine eBay will reject GameStop’s offer out of hand and relatively soon.
Looking at the May 3 offer while it is extent, the offer shoulders more debt than I had thought was possible on eBay’s EBITDA.
Neither does this seem revolutionary or ground-breaking in nature. More dilution, or more debt – really, the capital markets strategy here could not be more pedestrian.
High leverage implies high growth, and eBay is growing again. Ryan Cohen also apparently has enough credibility to get banks to go along.
I contemplate a higher actual close, say $65 billion for eBay, and more like 60% cash. Below, I compare this to the opening offer as well as my own not-so-happening “Instant Berkshire” creation from February 2nd.
A pinch too busy, I know, but suffice it to say, Instant Berkshire did not contemplate anywhere near 5x+ leverage.
The more likely outcome at the higher price sees leverage rise to 7.7x, a level of debt that borders on distressed and tends to strip competitiveness and innovation from such-stricken companies. Wayfair lived there for years, Carvana nearly died there and still might from such a start. Bath & Body Works too. Those are the survivors. They are few.
Ryan must see low-hanging fruit, though if huge cash flow could be unlocked as if by a magic wand, one might expect eBay to have found it during its epic search for cash with which to buy back slag heaps of shares. eBay reduced its share count from 1.2 billion shares ten years ago to just 444 million shares today – one of the most prolific buyback programs markets have seen.
Ryan cannot be after fat to cut, if only because no amount of cut fat makes this deal work. Rather, Ryan is pointing to a transformation, to hundreds of billions of dollars of opportunity, and he convinced TD to give him the $20 billion committed financing, which is no small feat given the low single digit billion dollar EBITDA numbers sported by these two companies.
eBay Today
eBay has already turned things around significantly, which no doubt will be one of the arguments made by eBay’s board as it rejects GameStop’s offer.
eBay has been growing faster lately. eBay projects forward adjusted EBITDA (whatever that is) at $3.7 billion, vs $2.7 billion trailing, and revenues have broken out of decade-long doldrums, with 17% quarter-on-quarter growth 1Q2026.
eBay now has eBay Live in hypergrowth mode, and collectibles is eBay’s leading category. Of course, GameStop’s collectibles category is also growing fast, and this is where the strategies of the two seem to dovetail.
eBay is not all collectibles, though. eBay ads grew 27% last quarter, and the company, of course, is leaning into AI. Below, from the eBay’s last earnings call.
We see Agentic AI as a real structural tailwind for eBay, and it plays right into our core strengths. First, our innovations leveraging AI are already having a meaningful benefit for our business today. Take magical listing. We’ve talked about the compelling stats I just mentioned that we’re seeing and sellers have created 0.5 billion listings using our AI tools.
And our Agentic search beta, which I realize I didn’t fully answer that question, so I’ll come back to that. But what we’ve seen there is higher engagement and increased purchase behavior off of that early test. So we’re going to continue to bring the latest Agentic technologies to eBay to make it easier for sellers to list and for buyers to find the things they love.
I see the structural change in eBay’s trajectory, and believe it or not the above scenarios give credit for projected improvements in 2026 from each of GameStop and eBay.
On trailing numbers, the pro forma numbers are much worse – think of a negotiated close at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense. If one considered it, one would be among the first, because no one closes a deal at 1.0x EBITDA/Interest Expense.
The ratings agencies will of course look to trailing numbers as a base, so the final credit rating might be in the B or B- junk range, perhaps 400 to 500 basis points over SOFR, which today is 4.35%. This speaks to floating debt expense in the range of 8-9%. Each 100 basis point rise in SOFR would boost the interest expense ~$300 million.
A $300 million boost may be automatic. eBay’s senior notes must be redeemed at 101 points if a change of control results in a ratings downgrade. This deal is virtually certain to trigger that put. In that case $6.7 billion in investment grade notes will be refinanced, perhaps to floating rate syndicated loans, but certainly with a $250-$300 million increase in total interest expense.
If Ryan miraculously gets his deal at $56 billion, it works a little better. Still, tangible book value per share gets cut by ¾, and there will be transformational execution risk while balancing on the knife edge of 5x+ leverage.
Competing with Amazon
Think about what Amazon has become for a moment. Amazon locks its retail prime buyers in with Prime Video and other benefits that none can match. 1000+ warehouses, over 525 million square feet. Amazon has 200+ million prime members paying $139/year with perks such as same day delivery, Prime Video, gaming, pharmacy, Whole Foods, etc. Over 70% of its packages are fully delivered by Amazon’s vertically integrated logistics apparatus – 150,000 delivery vans, last mile reach matched by none.
Amazon has it all and has been investing in itself at a breakneck pace for decades. Current spend is in the hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
Think about what eBay is. It has none of that and is not remotely close physically or temporally.
GameStop’s Gambit
If Ryan really wanted to compete with Amazon, he would have acquired Wayfair (70% of its own last mile deliveries and warehouses all over) along with a cash flow machine and a bunch of float. I heard someone was peddling such a deal back in early February.
So Ryan’s attempt to take over eBay cannot possess the actual honest and true intent to compete with Amazon. Rather clearly, the intention must be to dominate collectibles and used goods of all ages.
Amazon tried to do that, failed, and is not coming back.
The category is a huge addressable market. Some say as high as $100 billion.
Ryan might say hundreds of billions.
If GameStop wants to do it with billions of interest expense and all manner of covenants restricting its movements, it will not be breaking new ground. It will be trotting in well-worn ruts on the road to capitalist Hell.
No new ground has been broken yet. To truly break new ground, Ryan has to execute and succeed in this transformation from this starting position, saddled with debt.
I believe Ryan believes he can do this, and I do support the effort. As well, I do not predict failure, although it is certainly in the realm of possibilities.
Of course, as I have said, I can think of many, many other ways this could have gone easier.
The list above shows some big drops since February in some very good companies. The Big Bang ADP-W-AGO trifecta, in aggregate, would likely be $4 billion cheaper today than in early February.
To be clear, I would not have expected GameStop to buy all of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but I could see GameStop buying a good number of shares of both as an investment. The others I see as potential takeouts in various combinations of Instant Berkshires.
It is not too late. And Ryan may indeed fail at snatching eBay, and might look in the above direction.
Still, at the end of the day, this play for eBay makes perfect sense.
Wall Street does indeed mistake debt for creativity, and does so constantly.
I of all people should have known.
Charlie Munger once said, “”When a manager with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact”.
I may not last the week with my GameStop position fully intact. I will certain sell to an extent, perhaps all or some but alas, no, not none.
Until next time!

The HCL loan is from TD Securities. Not sure what HCL means, maybe High Credit Line, idk, but its mentioned in the official offer letter to Ebay.

In fact GME is raising debt around 20B from TD , thats 40% of the deal right there

[https://youtu.be/-cqUoLZZbKQ](https://youtu.be/-cqUoLZZbKQ)

also, it was the TD Ameritrade document warehouse that burned down 84 years ago, so the bank just erased all its debts and is ready to start something fresh.
/s

20B approved by TD, 9B cash if my read is right 125 a share for a float of 408M comes to 51B meaning RC only needs 25.5B in cash and the rest comes to 50% in stock. Considering GME already owns 5% of eBay he will need to get only about 250M stock to close the deal.
Not to mention that I don’t believe this is not already negotiated with eBay, so in my eyes this is a nightmare for the short sellers that now for sure are making math on how to cover, no way out to avoid at least a technical short squeeze

No my calculation is based upon a post deal GME with the assets of the current company and those of EBay. It also has debt of $20B from TD, and a reduction in GameStop cash of 8 or $9B, and a net cash-debt from EBay of $4B debt.
So treating the value of EBay the 20% above market price of $56B, the current market cap of GME is $12B, ignoring current GME debt of $4.1B because that does not change, the market cap of the post deal company would be 56+12-20-9-4=$35B. If GME moves upward and becomes $17B market cap or $38/share, that moves the post deal market cap up to $40B.
We will be passing $28B of shares to EBay shareholders out of the $40B post deal market cap.
28/40=70% of all shares. I rounded that down to 2/3, which since the number of shares outstanding are roughly equal means the distributions would be 2 shares of GME per share of EBay.
I welcome comments in my logic, assumptions, and calculations,
If you provide your calculations for the 1 to 1 ratio you assume we may be able to figure out where we differ.

Sorry FIDELITY ... for me the NOTES feature on ATP is a DEAL breaker for me. If I lose NOTES feature, I am MOVING everything to Uncle Charlie's platform (used to be TD Ameritrade)

$20 Billion in Debt: Cohen has reportedly secured a commitment letter from TD Bank for debt financing
Where's the remaining $36B coming from? Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Saudi Arabia?
GameStop eBay

TD Bank, apparently.

Your math makes a bit more sense, but the TD loan and cash on hand makes it a bit between 1 and 2 per share.

So the other comment mentions 20b from TD Securities, and you say they have 9b in cash. That's still 27b missing from the 56b offer. I have no skin in this game; this is just interesting to me.

(I'm using the same outline here as for the piece I posted \~6 hours ago: [Harpooning the Whale: Three Ways GameStop Could Buy eBay](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1t2uuuu/harpooning_the_whale_three_ways_gamestop_could/). If something seems unclear, I've probably addressed it in that piece.)
# 🎯Update on The Hunt
And ... [RC has formalized his bid](https://investor.gamestop.com/ebay/)! $125.00 per share, $55.5B aggregate equity value, 50% cash / 50% stock, with Cohen committing to take the CEO role at no salary.
The financing relies on $9.4B of GME cash plus an $18.35B drawdown of a $20B "highly-confident" letter from TD Securities, with the balance issued as \~1,110M new GME shares.
Whether this deal creates or destroys value hinges almost entirely on whether RC's claimed **$2.0B of annualized cost reductions** actually materialize:
* **Base case:** At current operating performance, the combined entity earns $0.30 of EPS and trades to \~$23 on a 20x multiple - just below today's **$25**.
* **Bull case:** With full synergies, EPS reaches $1.26, EBITDA expands by two-thirds, and the share price clears **$49**.
Now that the harpoon is in the water, let's see if our whaler can bring it home.
# 📜 The Offer Terms
The offer is in the form of a public, non-binding proposal, and would be considered a hostile approach that bypasses private negotiation with eBay's board.
[RC's Offer](https://preview.redd.it/gfh8y5lc41zg1.png?width=786&format=png&auto=webp&s=61a547e70a7160341e64cd43b47dbbc075369cda)
GME has already accumulated a 5% economic stake (built since February 4 via derivatives and direct ownership) and is filing 13D and HSR notifications.
Pricing is anchored to the February 4 unaffected close ($85.84), producing the headline **46% premium**; from May 1's pre-rumor close, the effective premium is closer to **21%**.
# 🎯 One Whale, Two Outcomes
With the deal terms now known, we can shift our analytical focus from financing structure to operating execution.
Two scenarios bracket the realistic outcome envelope:
1. **The Base Case:** Assumes the deal closes at offered terms and combined operations continue as-is - no cost cuts achieved.
2. **The Bull Case:** Assumes RC delivers the full $2.0B of annualized synergies he has publicly committed to within twelve months of close.
[Pro forma financial metrics and share price](https://preview.redd.it/7b2um4ob51zg1.png?width=790&format=png&auto=webp&s=2968e60f92da208bff9fc32ca3ec54fe3f0c4050)
Evidently, the synergy thesis is the entire deal.
Without it, GME has paid a 46% premium to load up nearly $24B of net debt against an asset whose pro forma earnings cover interest expense by only \~1x. With it, the combined entity earns nearly enough to justify a multiple expansion that doubles the share price.
The **gap between $0.30 EPS and $1.26 EPS** \- a 4x swing on the same revenue base - demonstrates how completely this deal's economics depend on RC's operating thesis playing out!
# 🔍 The Cost Thesis: Clean Strike or Glancing Blow?
RC's $2.0B cost reduction breaks down as $1.2B from Sales & Marketing (halving eBay's $2.4B FY2025 spend), $0.5B from G&A (-42%), and $0.3B from Product Development (-19%). His supporting argument is, eBay's $2.4B in S&M produced just one million net new active buyers in FY2025 (134M → 135M), implying a marginal acquisition cost of $2,400 per buyer. That figure is genuinely poor.
But the framing **conflates customer acquisition with customer retention**. I bet most of eBay's S&M spend keeps the existing 134M buyers active, not just acquires new ones. Halving the budget likely accelerates **churn of marginal users**, which compounds over time.
Also, the $0.5B G&A cut (-42%) assumes a level of corporate fat that may not exist at a company that has already **executed multiple cost programs**. GME's own track record - SG&A reduction of $800M (47%) since FY2021 - is the comparable RC cites, but GME did that by closing stores and shrinking the business. eBay's structure is different...
Frankly, I have my doubts that RC will be able to achieve anything close to what he is claiming, without gutting eBay.
# 🎭 All Hands' Calculus
eBay's board will likely reject the initial offer outright, labeling it as **"unserious"** based on the cost-cutting claims alone. They will also likely dismiss the using of 1,600 stores as broadcasting studios for live commerce - it works at scale in China, but is unproven in the US.
Less likely, they will seek a higher price - the 21% effective premium to recent trading and the structurally weaker financing commitment give them grounds to push back. A revised bid at $135-140 with committed financing is plausible, which would push the deal closer to $60B and worsen the status-quo math.
For existing GME holders, the bet is binary: this is a vote on whether RC can execute eBay-scale cost reductions while preserving the marketplace's customer base. The truth is probably in between - perhaps $1.0-1.4B of synergies materializing rather than the full $2.0B, which would land EPS around $0.75-1.00 and a share price in the **$34-42 range**. That's still creative-not-destructive territory, but a long way from the $7.79 EPS headline.
# 🔮 My Read
I don't think this deal closes in its current form, but something gets done. Likely a renegotiated transaction at a higher price with different financing, or eBay finding a white knight.
I'd put the probabilities (pulled out of my 🧠 and 🍑 in equal proportions) roughly as:
* **Deal closes as proposed (\~15%)**: RC would need eBay's board to fold quickly, debt markets to firm up the financing, and no competing bidder to emerge. Possible but unlikely.
* **Deal closes at revised terms (\~35%)**: eBay engages, negotiates the price up to $135-145, demands committed financing rather than the HCL, and possibly gets better governance protections. This is the modal outcome.
* **eBay rejects, RC walks (\~25%)**: Board determines the offer is inadequate and the financing too soft. RC has signaled willingness to go hostile but may not have the financing depth to actually do it. Stock falls back, RC exits the eBay position over time.
* **Competing bidder emerges (\~15%)**: A strategic (Amazon, Shopify, even a sovereign wealth fund) or a PE consortium counters at $140+ all-cash. eBay's Board would probably prefer this.
* **Financing or other collapse (\~10%)**: Credit markets seize up, the SEC challenges the derivatives-built stake, or deal fails on something other than price.
**The strongest reason to think it closes:** RC has been planning this for at least three months (started accumulating Feb 4), GME's board has unanimously approved (though it is a rubber stamp Board), and the structural argument (eBay underspending on growth, overspending on retention) has merit. He has skin in the game.
**The strongest reasons to think it doesn't:** The financing is unusually weak for a deal this size - a single-bank HCL versus a typical 5-7 bank committed package. The 21% effective premium to recent trading isn't generous. And eBay's board has clear grounds and time to push back - they can simply ask for committed financing as a condition of engagement, which alone could derail the timeline.
What I'd keep an eye on:
* eBay's first response and tone,
* whether other banks join the financing syndicate,
* whether any large eBay holder publicly comments,
* any noise from Amazon or other strategics, and
* whether GME stock rises or falls on the proposal; if it rises meaningfully, RC's stock currency strengthens and his bargaining position improves; if it falls, the whole thing gets harder.
This is a fascinating deal in the making, and any informed observers could reasonably land anywhere from "this is happening" to "this is theater."
Curious to see if RC snags a sperm whale, or an orca!🍿
https://preview.redd.it/4eoljftge1zg1.jpg?width=880&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=5c5cdcdb2373d42857a35e210c34aa6f8dc2b5a8
(Published simultaneously on X: https://x.com/NitherDither/status/2051137152822489502)

TD securities providing $20b as debt