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You are mixing up two completely different threat models: everyday internet security vs. active, targeted government subpoenas.
* Cloud Sync (Point A): Providers like Apple, Google, and major password managers end-to-end encrypt synced passkeys. A subpoena gets an unreadable blob without your device PIN or master recovery key.
* Passwords in your head (Point B): Unrealistic for 99% of people. People either reuse weak passwords or use a password manager, which creates the exact same digital footprint. If law enforcement has a warrant, they subpoena the service provider (like Fidelity or Google) directly, not your device's passkey ledger.
* Compelled Biometrics (Point C): Valid legal point, but WebAuthn allows PIN/passcode fallback. You don't have to use biometrics to authenticate a passkey.
* Pass-ta-key & Malware (Point D): If unprivileged malware is actively running on your system, standard passwords are infinitely easier to steal with basic keyloggers or memory dumpers. Passkeys still eliminate phishing and credential stuffing, which cause the vast majority of real-world account takeovers.
If your threat model genuinely includes FISA warrants, just use a hardware security key (like a YubiKey) instead of syncing to the cloud. A hardware key is a passkey, it just never leaves the physical device. Calling them a "security nightmare" completely ignores the phishing epidemic they actually solve. And it ignores the fact passwords are more security lacking than passkey.

You are mixing up two completely different threat models: everyday internet security vs. active, targeted government subpoenas.
* Cloud Sync (Point A): Providers like Apple, Google, and major password managers end-to-end encrypt synced passkeys. A subpoena gets an unreadable blob without your device PIN or master recovery key.
* Passwords in your head (Point B): Unrealistic for 99% of people. People either reuse weak passwords or use a password manager, which creates the exact same digital footprint. If law enforcement has a warrant, they subpoena the service provider (like Fidelity or Google) directly, not your device's passkey ledger.
* Compelled Biometrics (Point C): Valid legal point, but WebAuthn allows PIN/passcode fallback. You don't have to use biometrics to authenticate a passkey.
* Pass-ta-key & Malware (Point D): If unprivileged malware is actively running on your system, standard passwords are infinitely easier to steal with basic keyloggers or memory dumpers. Passkeys still eliminate phishing and credential stuffing, which cause the vast majority of real-world account takeovers.
If your threat model genuinely includes FISA warrants, just use a hardware security key (like a YubiKey) instead of syncing to the cloud. A hardware key is a passkey, it just never leaves the physical device. Calling them a "security nightmare" completely ignores the phishing epidemic they actually solve. And it ignores the fact passwords are more security lacking than passkey.

It couldn't be simpler. In IBKR, click "Add," plug your YubiKey into your computer, select it (to ensure it isn't saved to Windows, for example), enter your PIN, and it's added. You can still use IBkey or TOTP - you simply choose your preferred authentication method each time: IBkey, TOTP, or YubiKey.