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PBT
Permian Basin Royalty Trust
stock NYSE

At Close
Jul 2, 2026 3:42:31 PM EDT
25.00USD+0.523%(+0.13)77,531
0.00Bid   0.00Ask   0.00Spread
Pre-market
0.00USD-100.000%(-24.87)0
After-hours
Jul 2, 2026 4:10:30 PM EDT
24.80USD-0.800%(-0.20)2,034
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We have sentiment values and mention counts going back to 2017. The complete data set is available via the API.
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PBT Specific Mentions
As of Jul 5, 2026 7:06:27 AM EDT (1 min. ago)
Includes all comments and posts. Mentions per user per ticker capped at one per hour.
5 hr ago • u/Avishek_Singh • r/IndianStockMarket • bharatcoal_media_reports_allege_armed_coal • News • B
**Public-source BCCL / BHARATCOAL investor update.**
This is not a routine “coal removal” report.
As reported by ***Hindustan, Dainik Jagran and Prabhat Khabar*** **on 04 July 2026, armed men allegedly reached the Gazlitand coal dump in the Angarpathra/Katras area at around 11:30 PM in** black Scorpio vehicles, threatened security personnel with pistols, assaulted them, snatched mobile phones, locked security personnel in a container, fired in the air, opened the main gate, and used **15–20 Hyva trucks and three JCB machines** to lift around **450 tonnes of coal** by about 4:30 AM. The reported value is around **₹45 lakh**.
The report also says live cartridges were found at the site and police said investigation was underway.
The important investor point is that this was reportedly **mined and stocked coal from a coal dump/stockyard**, not coal extracted by outsiders from an unmeasured seam.
If the report is accurate, this was an armed, organised, vehicle-assisted, multi-hour stockyard breach involving heavy equipment and multiple trucks.
I have not found any checked public report confirming that the armed persons were apprehended, that the JCBs/Hyvas were seized, or that the coal was recovered. That point should be treated carefully: **recovery, seizure and arrests are not confirmed in the checked public sources available to me.**
**Why should BHARATCOAL shareholders care?**
Because BCCL’s own prospectus positions the company as India’s largest coking coal producer in FY25, accounting for **58.50% of domestic coking coal production**, and says BCCL is the only source of prime coking coal in India. **When the listed company’s core product is reportedly taken from a stockyard after an armed breach, the issue is not only the ₹45 lakh value.** The issue is **inventory custody, stockyard security, dispatch control, contractor oversight, customer confidence and disclosure adequacy**.
The direct amount is small in financial-statement terms. ₹45 lakh = ₹0.45 crore. Against BCCL’s FY26 numbers, this is approximately:
**0.0033%** of FY26 revenue from operations of **₹13,644.78 crore**
**0.057%** of FY26 EBITDA of **₹785.38 crore**
**0.30%** of FY26 PBT of **₹149.18 crore**
**0.35%** of FY26 PAT of **₹128.28 crore**
**0.0025%** of market cap of about **₹18,246 crore** as per Screener’s 03 July close data.
On production quantity also, 450 tonnes is small by itself. It is **0.0013%** of FY26 production of **35.52 MT**, **0.0014%** of FY26 offtake of **33.05 MT**, and about **0.0048%** of FY26 closing raw coal stock of **9.41 MT**.
But the reported valuation is worth asking about. ₹45 lakh for 450 tonnes implies **₹10,000 per tonne**. BCCL’s FY26 average sales per tonne was **₹3,085.76**. Its FY26 raw coal average realisation was **₹2,809.61/tonne**, while washed coking coal realisation was **₹9,760.19/tonne**, with PCC at **₹10,666.90/tonne** and MCC at **₹8,649.15/tonne**. This does **not** prove the grade of the reported coal, because the checked news report does not clearly identify the coal grade. But the implied value makes grade, custody and reconciliation important questions.
**The operating backdrop is also not strong**. BCCL’s FY26 production fell from **40.50 MT to 35.52 MT**, down **12.30%**. Offtake fell from **38.26 MT to 33.05 MT**, down **13.62%**. Profit per tonne fell from **₹446.84 to ₹46.12**. Trade receivables days increased from **34 to 67**, and gross debtors rose from **₹2,218.10 crore to ₹3,024.97 crore**.
Q1 FY27 production disclosures also show weakness.
BCCL’s June 2026 exchange disclosure says June raw coal production was **2.29 MT**, down **11.8% YoY**, and April–June raw coal production was **6.56 MT**, down **27.5% YoY**. Coking coal production for April–June was **6.21 MT**, down **27.9% YoY**.
So I am not saying this ₹45 lakh incident alone changes earnings. It probably does not.
**The shareholder question is sharper:**
**How did armed persons** reportedly enter a coal dump, overpower security, bring in multiple Hyvas and JCBs, load coal for nearly five hours, and leave — with no checked public confirmation yet of recovery, seizure or arrests?
**The disclosure angle is also relevant.** BCCL’s materiality policy says the company must assess events under Regulation 30 and consider whether omission may cause discontinuity of public information, significant market reaction if later disclosed, or crosses value thresholds; the policy also refers to disclosures being appropriate and consistent with the facts of each event. I did not find a specific NSE/BSE/BCCL disclosure on the Gazlitand 450-tonne incident in the checked sources as of 05 July 2026, subject to further verification. BCCL’s IR page shows other Regulation 30 disclosures and production disclosures, but I did not find this incident listed there.
**For investors, the due-diligence questions are:**
1) Was the coal BCCL-owned stock, contractor-custody stock, or customer-linked stock?
2) What was the exact grade and reconciled quantity?
3) Was any coal recovered?
4) Were the Hyvas/JCBs identified or seized?
5) Were any accused persons arrested?
6) Was insurance or contractor liability invoked?
7) Did the incident affect dispatch, billing, customer supply, inventory, EBITDA, PAT or cash flow?
8) Has BCCL made, or does it plan to make, any exchange clarification?
This post is not making an independent finding beyond the newspaper report. Where the report alleges criminal conduct, I am treating it as a reported allegation only. The investor issue is limited to stockyard controls, inventory custody, security, materiality and disclosure.
Source line: *Hindustan*, 04 July 2026; attached Prabhat Khabar / Dainik Jagran / Hindustan / Dainik Bhaskar clippings; BCCL prospectus, FY26 performance presentation, June 2026 production disclosure, BCCL IR page and BCCL materiality policy.
Disclaimer: Not investment advice. No buy, sell, hold, short, entry, exit or averaging view. This is a public-source investor update for discussion among shareholders and market participants.
sentiment -0.94
2 days ago • u/selfsideUK • r/ValueInvesting • cmc_markets_cmcxl_a_245_rally_is_pricing_a • Detailed Investment Analysis • B
CMC Markets traded at 203p on 10 November 2025. As of the valuation date it sits at 700p, an all-time high, after a 56% one-week surge triggered by a guidance upgrade on 1 July. What was a cyclical retail CFD and spread-betting broker is now being priced as a B2B platform company. The operating-leverage step-change that price assumes is guided, not yet delivered, and the audited cash flow is pointing the other way.
**Headline numbers** (FY26, year ended 31 March 2026)
- Trailing P/E: 26.3x, the highest in the company's listed history; roughly 12x forward on FY27 guidance
- Forward EV/EBITDA: 6.7x on £250m FY27 EBITDA guidance; trailing 13.4x
- Operating margin: 27.0%, up from 18.2% in FY24
- Net cash: £163.8m, which includes a €300m commercial paper programme draw
- Operating cash flow / net income: 0.66x, the worst in seven years, on a £192m receivables build
- Dividend yield: 1.9% (13.8p DPS, 50% payout, 1.23x FCF cover)
**The guidance that moved the stock**
The FY26 preliminary results on 4 June guided FY27 net operating income to £460-480m with operating expenses of roughly £280m. Twenty-seven days later, the 1 July trading update raised that to "at least £550 million" with £250m of EBITDA. The arithmetic implies about £270m of operating profit before variable remuneration, which is 2.4x FY26's £111.1m operating income, and the entire upgrade flows through to EBITDA because the cost base is held flat.
The engine is a Westpac partnership extension that will migrate A$39bn of assets and roughly 500,000 share-trading accounts onto CMC's platform over a 12-month window, on top of an Australian stockbroking business that grew NOI 32% to A$140.3m in FY26. The B2B turnaround is genuine: the Investing segment went from a £19.4m operating loss in FY24 to £18.1m of profit before tax in FY26. But that £18.1m is 18% of group PBT. For FY27 EBITDA to double as guided, Investing has to become the dominant profit driver in a single year, or the Trading segment needs another favourable client-outcome year. Neither outcome is audited.
**What the accounts flag**
Gross margin expanded from 59.6% to 87.0% in two years. In a CFD model that swing is dominated by client trading outcomes (when clients lose, CMC's cost of revenue falls), not by the B2B pivot or the 2024 cost reset, and it may not repeat.
Cash conversion collapsed to 0.66x. Net receivables jumped from £269.1m to £455.0m, which is 110.7% of annual revenue, and the composition of that balance is not disclosed in any RNS filing. The prior year showed the opposite extreme, 2.82x conversion on a £94.1m working-capital release, so neither year is a clean read on run-rate cash generation.
The balance sheet has also changed shape. A firm that carried near-zero leverage for a decade set up an up to €300m commercial paper programme in November 2025; short-term debt went from £3.1m to £95.2m and interest expense rose 5.3x to £10.1m against roughly £5.5m of treasury-related trading income, so the treasury operations were net value-destructive at the PBT level in year one. Meanwhile reported capex was just £3.3m, with Westpac integration costs being capitalised instead. The same mechanism produced a £12.3m platform write-off in FY24.
**Valuation against the peer set**
At the 2 July snapshot, CMCX carried the highest trailing P/E in its peer group (26.3x vs 13.4x for IG Group and 17.2x for Plus500) alongside the lowest ROE (16.3% vs 26.1% and 50.5%). If the FY27 guidance is delivered, the forward multiples compress below both peers' trailing levels. If it slips, this is the most expensive stock in the group with the worst cash conversion and the lowest returns. The stock also sits 67% above its 50-day moving average, so the position is mechanically fragile if the next print disappoints.
**Bottom line**
The note's view is that the risk-reward at 700p is balanced but binary. Roughly 12x forward earnings is undemanding for a business guiding to 100% EBITDA growth, while the trailing 26.3x has no cushion if that guidance slips. The H1 FY27 interims in November 2026 are the single data point that resolves it: an NOI print at or above £275m validates the operating-leverage thesis, and anything materially below exposes the premium.
**What to watch**
- H1 FY27 NOI (November 2026): below £260m signals the £550m full-year guidance is back-end loaded and unproven
- Westpac integration milestones before March 2027: any RNS disclosing slippage removes the largest B2B revenue engine from the FY27 bridge
- FY27 receivables-to-revenue: staying above 100% suggests the working-capital absorption is structural to the B2B model, not transitional
**Sources**
- FY26 Preliminary Results, 4 Jun 2026 (RNS)
- Trading Update, 1 Jul 2026 (RNS)
- Westpac Partnership Extension, 29 Sep 2025 (RNS)
- H1 FY26 Interim Results, 20 Nov 2025 (RNS)
- Selfside data: income statement, balance sheet, cash flow and peer snapshot, FY2020-FY2026
*For information purposes only, not investment advice - independent research, originally published in full at Selfside.*
sentiment -0.88


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