NET
Cloudflare, Inc. Class A common stock, par value $0.001 per share
stock NYSE

DGXX, NET, PL, RKLB

For MSFT and NET its decently low, but for SOFI I messed up and bought at like 26. Not a lot tho luckily.

Of course I sold AKAM last minute and bought NET which dropped 23%
Anyway, I think AKAM is worth adding to watchlist as companies may see them as AI play

Why NET drop when layoffs good?

That NET OPERATING LOSS OF $405,000,000.00 IN ONE QUARTER could have built a ballroom

if NET were to dump another 20 percent, maybe that. Maybe Z Scaler if it drops some more

I've been doing P2P USDT trades on Tron and got tired of refreshing TronScan, so I spent a weekend building a TRC20 transfer watcher and learned a few things worth sharing for anyone considering the same.
**Setup**
- TronGrid HTTP API (`/v1/accounts/{address}/transactions/trc20`) as the data source
- ASP.NET Core background worker, polls every wallet every 30s, diffs against last seen tx hash
- Postgres for state + transaction history
- Telegram bot for alerts (push within ~30s of confirmation)
**TronGrid notes (the actual point of the post)**
1. **Free tier limits.** Without an API key you get ~5 req/s shared. Easy to hit if you have many wallets. With a free API key from trongrid.io it goes up to ~15 req/s, more than enough for hobbyist scale.
2. **Latency.** Polling at 30s is the practical sweet spot. 10s gives you almost no benefit because TronGrid itself indexes blocks with ~3-6s lag, and the bot delivery adds ~1s. The real gain at <30s is mostly burning your rate limit.
3. **`only_to=true` filter.** Useful if you only care about incoming transfers. Halves the response size on busy addresses.
4. **No websockets.** TronGrid doesn't push, you have to poll. That's a huge architectural difference vs Ethereum's `eth_subscribe`. Worth knowing if you're porting an EVM design.
5. **Reorgs.** Tron rarely reorgs (3 SR-confirmations = final), so you can be aggressive with marking transfers as "delivered" once they appear.
**Open question for the sub**
For the people watching their wallets:
- is 30s push acceptable for P2P scenarios, or do you want sub-10s?
- TRX / USDD / JST native transfers — does anyone actually need alerts on those, or is USDT the 95% case?
I open-sourced what I built so anyone hitting the same problems can copy/learn — link is in my profile if a mod allows it. Mostly curious about people's real workflows for monitoring TRC20 activity.

This is a top tier post. I agree with the smaller names, own IOT, DDOG, BRZE, APP, U and still like cyber names like rbrk and even NTSK. Watching NET for a better entry.

I think I missed out on MU, but SNDK and NVDA have still been really nice. I can't complain. I snagged a NET long call today, too. Dirt cheap

GME VS EBAY - COMPLETE DUE DILIGENCE
FOUR YEAR FUNDAMENTAL COMPARISON
CAPITAL ALLOCATION TANGIBLE BOOK VALUE AND STRATEGIC OPTIONALITY
A NORMALIZED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EBAY ACQUISITION THESIS
COMPANION ANALYSIS TO THE GAMESTOP TRILOGY
MAY 2026
EXECUTIVE FRAMING
Most observers comparing GameStop and eBay over the last four years see two diverging stocks. eBay up 55 percent and GameStop down 17 percent. That comparison is misleading because the two companies have moved in opposite directions on capital allocation and the headline per share numbers are heavily distorted by share count engineering.
eBay returned approximately 12.75 billion dollars to shareholders through buybacks over four years reducing share count from roughly 700 million to 444 million. GameStop raised approximately 6.75 billion dollars in fresh capital through equity issuance and convertible notes increasing share count from approximately 305 million to 447 million. That is a 19.5 billion dollar swing in opposite directions over the same time period.
When you normalize the comparison for that capital allocation divergence the analytical conclusion inverts entirely. eBay produced negative 1.5 percent enterprise value performance over four years. GameStop produced positive 21 percent. eBay tangible book value per share is persistently negative. GameStop rose 257 percent. eBay management owns less than 1 percent combined and has bought essentially zero shares in the open market. GameStop CEO has deployed over 200 million dollars of personal capital and owns roughly 9 percent of the company.
The market has not repriced either company for the strategic transformation in front of them. Neither stock reflects what the post merger combined entity actually represents. The thesis of this document is that the disproportionate strategic optionality sits with GameStop as the acquirer and platform not with eBay as the absorbed marketplace infrastructure.
SECTION 1 REVENUE TRAJECTORY
The most direct top line comparison. No normalization required because revenue is reported uniformly under GAAP and both companies report quarterly.
eBay grew revenue modestly from 10.42 billion dollars to approximately 11.20 billion dollars over four years a 7.5 percent increase that reflects mature marketplace dynamics. GameStop revenue declined from 6.01 billion dollars to approximately 3.08 billion dollars a 49 percent decrease.
Important context for the GameStop decline. The revenue decline was deliberate. GameStop closed unprofitable stores aggressively under Cohen leadership starting in 2022. The store count went from approximately 4 500 to roughly 1 600 over the period while gross margin expanded from 22 percent to over 30 percent. Revenue contracted while profitability improved.
The strategic question is not whether revenue grew it is whether the revenue that remains is more valuable per dollar than the revenue that was shed. GameStop remaining stores generate higher gross margins lower SG and A burden and more favorable inventory turnover. The shrinkage was a deliberate optimization not a symptom of decline.
SECTION 2 NET INCOME TRAJECTORY
eBay reported FY2021 net income was 13.61 billion dollars but 11 billion of that came from gains on the Adevinta investment and other non recurring items.
GameStop executed an 800 million dollar operating turnaround over four years moving from a 381 million dollar loss to a 418 million dollar profit. eBay generated profitable mature business earnings that have remained roughly flat at the 1.5 billion to 2.7 billion dollar range without showing meaningful operating growth.
The trajectory direction matters more than the absolute level for forward looking valuation. A company moving from negative 381 million dollars to positive 418 million dollars is on a different growth curve than a company that has been generating 2 billion dollars in net income for a decade. Mature companies trade at lower multiples than transformation candidates because the upside path is constrained by the size of the existing business.
The MB counterpoint. MB argues correctly that eBay mature operations have been engineered through aggressive share buybacks rather than organic growth. eBay per share metrics look better than the underlying business because the share count keeps shrinking. The trajectory question is not is eBay profitable it is is the profitability growing or static. The data suggests static with buybacks providing the per share illusion of growth.
SECTION 3 BALANCE SHEET STRENGTH
GameStop holds 9.4 billion dollars in cash and liquid investments with 4.2 billion dollars in convertible debt at 0.00 percent coupon generating zero annual interest expense. The net cash position is positive 5.2 billion dollars. As a percentage of market capitalization GameStop cash represents 80 percent of its 11.8 billion dollar market cap meaning the market is valuing GameStop operating business plus all strategic optionality at roughly 2.4 billion dollars.
eBay carries approximately 5 billion dollars in cash against 7.5 to 8 billion dollars in senior unsecured debt at coupons ranging from 1.4 percent to 6.0 percent with weighted average annual interest expense of approximately 250 million dollars. The net debt position is negative 2.5 to 3.0 billion dollars. As a percentage of market cap eBay cash represents 11 percent of its 46 billion dollar market cap.
The balance sheet capacity differential. GameStop has 9.4 billion dollars in deployable cash plus a 20 billion dollar TD Securities highly confident letter totaling 29.4 billion dollars in capital available for the eBay acquisition. eBay has 5 billion dollars in cash that is largely encumbered by working capital requirements. For acquiring or being acquired GameStop has overwhelming balance sheet flexibility. eBay does not.
SECTION 4 TANGIBLE BOOK VALUE PER SHARE
This is the metric where the contrast is starkest and the one almost no one is paying attention to. Tangible book value per share strips out goodwill and intangibles to show what shareholders would receive in liquidation if all operations ceased.
GameStop tangible book value per share rose from 3.45 dollars to approximately 12.30 dollars over four years a 257 percent increase. The increase came from raising capital through equity and convertible debt issuance accumulating that capital as cash on the balance sheet and reducing legacy debt obligations.
eBay tangible book value per share has been persistently negative throughout the four year period ranging from approximately negative 5.50 dollars in FY2021 to approximately negative 2.00 dollars currently. The negative tangible book value is a direct result of two structural factors. Goodwill and intangibles of approximately 4.5 billion dollars plus from past acquisitions sit on the balance sheet and reduce tangible equity. Share buybacks executed at prices significantly above book value reduce shareholder equity faster than retained earnings can rebuild it.
When eBay buys back stock at 50 dollars 80 dollars or 100 dollars per share against a book value far below that the difference is charged against equity. Over a 12.75 billion dollar buyback program that destruction of book equity compounds. The result is a company with strong reported earnings per share but no underlying tangible asset cushion.
The strategic implication. A tangible book value of 12.30 dollars per share against a current GameStop share price of 26.50 dollars means roughly 46 percent of the share price is backed by hard assets cash inventory equipment. For eBay at 104 dollars per share against negative tangible book value the entire share price is backed by goodwill intangibles and projected future cash flows. In a stress scenario GameStop has substantially more downside protection.
SECTION 5 CAPITAL ALLOCATION THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FRAME
Before any per share metric can be compared cleanly you have to understand that these two companies have done the exact opposite thing with shareholder capital over the last four years.
eBay returned 12.75 billion dollars to shareholders through buybacks. GameStop raised 6.75 billion dollars in fresh capital. The two companies moved 19.5 billion dollars in opposite directions over the same time window.
eBay buybacks reduced share count from approximately 700 million to 444 million a 37 percent reduction. The buyback program was funded by operating cash flow plus modest debt. The strategic purpose was EPS engineering by reducing share count eBay reported EPS grows mechanically even when net income is flat.
GameStop capital raises increased share count from approximately 305 million to 447 million a 47 percent increase. The raises came through ATM equity offerings 3.5 billion dollars across May June September 2024 and convertible notes 1.5 billion dollars 2030 series and 1.75 billion dollars 2032 series. The strategic purpose was war chest accumulation building deployable capital for transformational M and A.
Why the direction matters. Buybacks return capital to existing shareholders by giving them larger ownership stakes in a static or shrinking business. They preserve nothing for future strategic moves. Once buybacks are executed the cash is gone and cannot be redeployed.
Equity issuance dilutes existing shareholders but creates capital that can be deployed strategically. If the deployment generates returns above the cost of dilution the issuance is value creating despite the per share dilution. If it does not the issuance is value destructive.
GameStop is making the strategic bet that 6.75 billion dollars raised plus transformational acquisition will create more value than 6.75 billion dollars not raised. eBay made the bet that 12.75 billion dollars returned via buybacks created more shareholder value than 12.75 billion dollars retained for strategic deployment. Time will arbitrate which capital allocation framework was correct.
SECTION 6 SHARE PRICE RAW VS CAPITAL ALLOCATION ADJUSTED
This is where the analytical inversion happens. The raw share price comparison favors eBay dramatically. The capital allocation adjusted comparison flips the result.
Raw share price. GameStop negative 17 percent eBay positive 55 percent. eBay appears to have outperformed by 72 percentage points over four years.
Enterprise value. GameStop positive 21 percent eBay negative 1.5 percent. GameStop has outperformed by 22.5 percentage points at the level that matters for the underlying business value.
Same companies. Same time period. Opposite conclusion.
The reason the conclusions differ is that eBay buyback program reduced share count by 37 percent while GameStop capital raises increased share count by 47 percent. Per share metrics are dominated by share count direction. Total enterprise value is not. When you measure what the market is actually saying about each company underlying business GameStop has been more highly valued at the enterprise level despite the lower per share price action.
This analytical inversion is not an artifact or a trick. It is the direct mathematical consequence of comparing two companies that have made opposite capital allocation choices. Any valuation framework that does not normalize for these choices will systematically misstate the relative business performance.
SECTION 7 NORMALIZED EARNINGS PER SHARE
To make EPS apples to apples you ask a simple question. What would EPS be if both companies had the same share count today as they had four years ago.
Reported EPS comparison. eBay 4.26 dollars vs GameStop 0.94 dollars. eBay appears 4.5 times more profitable per share.
Capital honest EPS comparison. eBay 2.70 dollars using FY2025 net income divided by FY2021 share count vs GameStop 1.37 dollars same calculation. eBay is 2.0 times more profitable per share when both are measured at stable share counts.
The gap between reported and capital honest EPS is striking on both sides. eBay reported EPS overstates the underlying profitability advantage by approximately 37 percent from 2.70 dollars normalized to 4.26 dollars reported. GameStop reported EPS understates the underlying profitability by approximately 46 percent from 1.37 dollars normalized to 0.94 dollars reported.
The interpretation. Half of eBay apparent EPS advantage over GameStop is a function of buyback engineering not underlying business performance. The companies are still meaningfully different in absolute earnings power but the gap is smaller than reported metrics suggest. As GameStop share count stabilizes no recent ATM issuance and as combined entity EPS reflects the eBay cost reductions the per share comparison should compress further.
SECTION 8 INSIDER CONVICTION GAP
Insider purchases in the open market with personal capital are one of the cleanest signals of management confidence in the business. The contrast between GameStop and eBay is among the most extreme in US public markets.
GameStop. Ryan Cohen owns approximately 9 percent of GameStop directly holding roughly 37.3 million shares. He has cumulatively deployed over 200 million dollars of personal capital into open market GameStop purchases since 2020. His most recent purchase was 500 thousand shares in April 2025 for approximately 11 million dollars. Multiple other directors Daniel Moore Mark Robinson Alain Attal Lawrence Cheng have also bought shares in the open market over the 2024 2025 period.
Cohen January 2026 performance award structure adds approximately 35 billion dollars in potential upside keyed to combined entity performance milestones from 20 billion dollars to 100 billion dollars market cap. He receives no salary no cash bonuses and no golden parachute. His personal financial outcome is entirely dependent on the success of the strategic transformation.
eBay. Per the 2026 proxy statement all eBay directors and executive officers as a group own less than 1 percent of eBay common stock. Insider transactions over the 4 year period have been almost entirely RSU vesting and option exercises typically followed by immediate sales to cover taxes and diversify holdings. There is no documented pattern of executives or directors buying eBay shares in the open market with personal capital.
eBay management compensation structure is the standard salary bonus and equity grant model with golden parachute provisions in the event of change of control.
The signal. When the people running a business will not buy their own stock with personal capital while the people running another business have invested hundreds of millions of personal capital that asymmetry is information. Cohen alignment is one of the most extreme insider conviction signals in US public markets. The eBay management team lack of buying pattern is the opposite signal.
SECTION 9 STRATEGIC OPTIONALITY THE PLATFORM VS THE INFRASTRUCTURE
The most important question for forward looking valuation is which company brings more strategic optionality to the merged entity. The deal structure provides the answer.
GameStop is the platform. Cohen will serve as CEO of the combined company. GameStop is the surviving corporate entity. The combined business will be structured around GameStop strategic vision vertical integration of authenticated collectibles capital structure capacity for additional acquisitions and operational infrastructure for tokenization rails.
eBay is the infrastructure. eBay becomes a wholly owned operational subsidiary providing marketplace plumbing mature buyer base payment processing and brand recognition. eBay does not absorb GameStop. GameStop absorbs eBay.
The asymmetry of strategic optionality. GameStop brings 9.4 billion dollar war chest 1 600 retail locations the POWER PACKS PSA partnership the convertible note expandable platform the 700 million dollar derivative platform the warrant cascade structure Cohen as CEO and the 35 billion dollar comp award alignment. eBay brings 134 million active buyers 80 billion dollars GMV mature payment infrastructure the Goldin auction subsidiary AI powered listing tools eBay Live livestream commerce and three decades of brand recognition.
eBay assets are more valuable to the combined entity than GameStop assets are in absolute terms eBay has more revenue more users more brand recognition. But eBay assets are mature and largely already monetized. GameStop assets are early stage strategic positioning that requires the eBay acquisition to be unlocked. The optionality the upside the future state value sits with GameStop.
The market is pricing this backward. eBay trades at a 46 billion dollar market cap valuing its mature operations at full reasonable multiples. GameStop trades at 11.8 billion dollar market cap of which 9.4 billion dollars is cash. The market is essentially saying eBay mature operations are worth 41 billion dollars and GameStop entire strategic platform is worth 2.4 billion dollars. This relative pricing reflects what each company has been historically not what the combined entity is positioned to become.
SECTION 10 SYNTHESIS SCORECARD
Eight metrics that matter for forward looking investment value. The pattern across all of them is consistent.
On every metric that matters for the forward looking value of the combined entity GameStop carries the strategic advantage. This is true even though eBay reported per share metrics look superficially better because the per share comparison is dominated by share count engineering rather than business performance.
SECTION 11 CONCLUSION THE REPRICING THESIS
Your hypothesis was that the market has not evaluated and repriced both companies for future growth or planned developments. The data supports that hypothesis on both sides.
eBay is priced for what it has been. A 24 times multiple on 1.89 billion dollars in normalized net income supported by ongoing buybacks modest growth and AI enabled efficiency. There is no premium for transformation no premium for the collectibles category becoming structurally more important no premium for tokenization optionality and no premium for being absorbed into a larger strategic platform. The current 104 dollar price reflects more of the same financially engineered.
GameStop is priced for what it was. A declining retailer with cash. The market is valuing the operating business at 2.4 billion dollars against a 9.4 billion dollar cash position. There is no premium for the eBay acquisition closing no premium for the architecture thesis PSA Goldin tZERO vault integration no premium for the X integration possibility no premium for the capital stack mechanics warrant cascade convertible bond hedge unwinds and no premium for Cohen 35 billion dollar comp alignment. The market is treating GameStop as if the strategic transformation is not happening.
Your GME is the future business model and eBay is just infrastructure framing is correct on the data and on the structure.
In the proposed merger GameStop is the acquirer. The combined entity is structured around GameStop strategic vision with Cohen as CEO. eBay becomes the marketplace infrastructure layer that the GameStop platform sits on top of. The post merger company is GameStop with eBay plumbing not eBay with GameStop stores.
When the market eventually reprices these companies for what they actually are rather than what they look like through the lens of buybacks and dilution the relative valuation gap should compress substantially. Whether that happens through GameStop re rating up eBay re rating down or both depends on how the deal closes and how the strategic vision unfolds. But the direction of the repricing is not symmetric. GameStop has dramatically more upside surface area than eBay does.
SECTION 12 SPECULATIVE LAYER THE X INTEGRATION COUNTER TO MB
MB strongest fundamental critique of the eBay acquisition is that the combined entity cannot compete with Amazon at the logistics level. eBay has no warehouses no last mile fleet no Prime ecosystem. Acquiring eBay does not give GameStop Amazon competitor capability through eBay alone. This is correct as far as it goes.
But logistics is not the only axis of competition. If the strategic intent is building an authenticated regulated social distribution commerce platform that competes with Amazon on a different axis entirely the architecture lines up.
GameStop 1 600 physical stores for authentication intake fulfillment and live commerce.
eBay 134 million plus active buyers 80 billion dollars GMV mature payment infrastructure.
PSA Vault Goldin authentication and custody at scale across collectibles.
tZERO regulated tokenization rails with SPB D license 23 patent families 103 patents.
X potential 600 million MAU integrated payment rails being built xAI agentic commerce.
DT administration regulatory environment pro crypto pro tokenization pro American commerce.
The combined architecture would not be Amazon competitor on logistics. It would be trust layer commerce ecosystem with social distribution and regulated digital settlement. Different category different moat different valuation framework.
Amazon moat is logistics. The proposed combined entity moat would be authenticated commerce plus regulated digital rails plus integrated social distribution. That is a defensible competitive position even without matching Amazon warehouse footprint.
Why the market has not priced this. The architecture has not been publicly articulated by Cohen as a unified strategy. Only the eBay bid has been confirmed. X integration is not announced. There is no commercial partnership disclosed. The tZERO partnership is structurally inferred but not commercially confirmed. The regulatory environment has shifted faster than analyst frameworks have updated. Most importantly institutional analysts price each company on standalone fundamentals because that is the documented information. Strategic optionality is not in the model.
What would change the pricing. 13D filing this week confirms position size and intent. Definitive merger agreement provides terms financing structure and timeline. Any tZERO press release naming GameStop eBay PSA or Collectors. Any X announcement of payment rails commerce integration or partnership. A second acquisition announcement that hints at the broader platform thesis. Cohen articulating the strategic vision beyond the eBay deal in any public forum.
The speculative layer should be understood as forward looking optionality that is real but not documented. The structural fundamentals comparison in this document stands on its own without requiring any of the speculative layer to be true. If any of it does become true the GameStop side of this comparison becomes substantially stronger. The eBay side does not change meaningfully.
SECTION 13 DT ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL TAILWINDS
Overview
One under discussed element in the public record is the documented proximity of Sultan Al Maadeed to both the GameStop ecosystem and the DT orbit. While this does not constitute direct evidence of administration involvement in the eBay bid it creates a plausible political and regulatory tailwind that should be noted as part of the broader environment in which this transaction would be reviewed.
This section summarizes the verifiable public connections and their potential implications while clearly distinguishing between documented facts and inference.
Documented Connections
Sultan Al Maadeed public record with DT. On June 29 2025 Sultan posted a photograph from Mar a Lago with a caption referencing his role as one of the very large shareholders of tiktok us. Multiple additional verified photographs show Sultan with DT at Mar a Lago on separate occasions as well as with Elon Musk Maye Musk Kimbal Musk and the Emir of Qatar.
These are not single instances. They represent repeated documented access to the highest levels of the incoming DT administration and its associated network.
Timeline Alignment
March 19 to 21 2025 public X activity and reported meetings between Ryan Cohen and Sultan Al Maadeed.
June 29 2025 Sultan at Mar a Lago with DT.
January 2026 Cohen performance award disclosed requiring transformative M and A.
January 30 2026 Cohen states on record he is targeting a very very very big publicly traded consumer company.
May 3 2026 GameStop submits non binding proposal for eBay.
The Mar a Lago meeting occurred well before the eBay bid was public during the period when capital relationships for a transaction of this scale would have been developing.
Potential Implications
Regulatory Environment. The DT administration has publicly signaled support for domestic tokenization frameworks skepticism toward aggressive antitrust enforcement in certain sectors and a preference for strengthening American technology and capital formation. A vertically integrated GameStop plus eBay plus PSA plus tZERO platform could be framed as aligning with those priorities an American owned on shore solution for collectibles authentication custody and tokenized settlement.
TikTok US JV Precedent. The TikTok US joint venture closed January 22 2026 established a recent template for Gulf linked capital participating in a major U.S. technology restructuring with political support. Sultan public claim of being a very large shareholder in that entity combined with his documented relationship with Cohen makes him a plausible relationship node for similar structures even if no public filing currently places him inside the GameStop financing stack.
Important Limitations
There is currently no public document that places Sultan Al Maadeed ONX Qatari capital or any Gulf vehicle inside the actual GameStop financing or eBay bid structure.
His role remains that of a documented relationship and potential capital bridge not a confirmed transaction participant.
Any political or regulatory benefit would be indirect and would manifest if at all during the HSR review process rather than at announcement.
Bottom Line Section 13
The DT administration angle is a real and verifiable contextual factor not speculation. Sultan Al Maadeed documented access and timing create a plausible positive tailwind for regulatory review. However the current public record does not show direct administration involvement or confirmed Gulf capital inside the financing.
This section should be read as an expansion of the Sultan Al Maadeed analysis in Section 6 not as evidence of a done deal or guaranteed favorable treatment. It is offered for completeness in mapping the full public evidence surface.
METHODOLOGY NOTE
Financial figures are sourced from publicly available 10 K and 10 Q filings the May 3 2026 GameStop offer letter and accompanying materials and analyst consensus estimates where filings are unavailable for the most recent period. Several FY2025 figures for GameStop are estimated based on the offer letter disclosed 9.4 billion dollar cash position 4.2 billion dollar convertible debt at 0 percent coupon 418 million dollar net income and 2 billion dollar annualized cost reduction target.
Where exact figures vary between primary sources this document uses the most recent reported value or the midpoint of analyst estimates. For any specific data point that would be load bearing in a published DD post the source filing should be verified directly.
Tangible book value calculations exclude goodwill intangibles and capitalized software. Capital allocation adjusted enterprise value calculations use period end share counts and closing prices on the relevant dates. Insider purchase aggregations are estimated from Form 4 filings and proxy statements. Exact totals vary based on whether one counts gifts transfers and family member transactions.
DISCLOSURES
Not financial advice. The author has a position in GME. This analysis reflects publicly available information primary source SEC filings and reasonable structural inferences as of May 2026. Several specific projections combined entity EPS future market multiples strategic optionality outcomes are explicitly speculative and depend on the eBay acquisition closing on terms similar to those proposed.
The eBay bid has been formally submitted but not formally accepted contested or counter proposed. eBay board has not yet publicly responded. Multiple counterarguments are real including MB leverage concerns the change of control put on eBay existing senior notes the antitrust risk profile and the execution risk on 2 billion dollars in promised cost reductions. These are addressed in the GameStop Trilogy companion document.
Do your own research. Verify primary sources directly. Treat this as an analytical framework rather than a prediction.

My story unfortunately. Watch tech moon, barely made much. But I'm on vacation, was barely paying attention. Caught the NET bounce and called it a day

I have almost every ticker in this category. panw has the best recovery. zs recovered fine, but not compar to crwd, panw. One more i have is checkpoint software and i think it’s a good underdog. pe is like 11.. too cheap to get ignored.
I bought panw at $141, $crwd $350, $net $196, $rubrik $43, zs $115. adobe $224. and asked every one to buy on this sub on april 10th.
no one listened to me. i’m here to again, to call to buy crm..
Most of the bigger cybersecurity names, but because they are obvious, they are still expensive and have recovered quickly. **CRWD, PANW, FTNT, RBRK, NET, ZS, VRNS**. Datacenter expansion: **DDOG**. Interestingly Dynatrace **DT** is the second in the market to DDOG but has not recovered\*\*.\*\* Semiconductor expansion, **SNPS, CDNS**

Market might be overreacting to cuts/guide. 20% workforce reduction can actually improve margins long term, and infra demand for NET still structurally strong.

NET will deep more

Sold some of the NET 197.5s
If I get assigned, I get assigned.

NET down 23%. Only needs to fall another 50% so I can buy.

something that has been helpfull for me is to watch what others are doing and specially those which have a good track record. i watch my feed on Sirius: trade with friends (IOS APP) and see whaat people i follow are doing, what they are holding and how they are performing. NET is poping up a lot on my for you page... every day many buyers with good track record

Here's a short review of SaaS and AI dumpsters, if you're a masochist "value investor" like me or brave enough: choose your poison if you want to fight AI.
Easy of coding and making software reduces the cost to make software. Incumbents now have to compete by investing in more tech to keep clients reducing margins or race for a better product. Terminal values of % of TAM now has the potential to hit zero. Weakest are point solutions, single use, and horizontal software. Weakest customers are private SMBs. This is because switching cost for a customer has now fallen.
Some interesting names:
"Obvious AI beneficiaries," could be due to higher AI use volume, data center expansion, etc. Most of the bigger cybersecurity names, but because they are obvious, they are still expensive and have recovered quickly. **CRWD, PANW, FTNT, RBRK, NET, ZS, VRNS**. Datacenter expansion: **DDOG**. Interestingly Dynatrace **DT** is the second in the market to DDOG but has not recovered**.** Semiconductor expansion, **SNPS, CDNS**
"Vertical software" that specifically targets industries or types of customers and provide the entire software suite, they are way more resilient than horizontal software because switching cost is not primarily coding, but regulations, customer service, network effects: **CNSWF, TOITF, ROP**. Publicly traded names: **TYL, BSY, VEEV, GWRE, ADSK, DASTY, SSNC, MANH, IOT, DSGX, WK, WAY, TOST, TTAN, PCOR, NICE**. These are slightly riskier than the Constellation type because of single industry exposure.
"Systems of records," companies that have customer's data, so customer switching cost is primarily safety and management of their own data. Horizontal software like **NOW, CRM**, all the HCMs, **ADP, WDAY, PAYC**, etc. ServiceNow can also be thought of as a potential AI beneficiary because it manages how AI and humans work together.
Other interesting names:
**TEAM**. It is very uncertain if AI coding benefits or hurts Atlassian, but based on the most recent quarter, it's a beneficiary so far because the volume of code and bugs leads to higher JIRA seat growth.
Most horizontal software are high risk, but can potentially disrupt incumbents, IF they are nimble enough. Still, high risk. **HUBS** down -20% today. **INTU**'s QuickBooks is horizontal. **ADBE** is thought of as a horizontal software for creatives, but it could be a vertical software for marketers if you consider the ecosystem and "system of records. **GPN, FISV**, payments but also software for financial institutions.
Other AI disrupted names, because like it or not AI is changing industries:
"AI access public data and available to all so data becomes zero value overnight." **FDS, MORN, SPGI, TRI, WTKWY, VRSK, CSGP, IT**. Disruption is specific to industry and company. Legal is more disruptible, health and finance might be. VRSK has very low risk of AI because of proprietary data, same with SPGI, and maybe CSGP.
"Human relationships and disintermediation": Why pay for a human middle man if AI has the answer? Insurance brokers **MRSH, WTW, AJG, BRO**. A business might now ask AI, which is the right insurance plan for me? Insurify came out with a tool and brokers all crashed. AI also reduces friction costs because human labor is worth less and much more productive, this results in companies using the "cost arbitrage" business model being disrupted. Biotech CROs that do the clinical trial labor including statistics and coding: **IQV, ICLR, CRL**, if AI in biotech is used more. IT consulting, including those using foreign labor: **ACN, IT, Indian ITs, EPAM, GLOB**

The issue with SaaS is that they traded at expensive/very expensive valuations for years because everyone loved the SaaS business model. Now that the future is less certain for these companies (not saying 0's like people have bizarrely taken to acting like what's happening, but future growth, etc), there has been a significant re-rating. Are these names actually genuinely cheap, or were they very expensive and now just reasonable (but with concerns about the future, are they likely to get very expensive again for a long time? In other words, has the ceiling been lowered?)
I wouldn't look at where these have traded in the past ("what if it got back to that?"-style thinking), I'd really focus on what companies in this sector can you make a very, very strong case for going forward because while these names will find a floor at some point, there will be other headlines in the months and years ahead.
So, I think people have to have a very specific thesis and for all the questions about software in recent months on here, nobody's talking about the fact that these companies have been volatile and had similar declines in the past, including the recent past. Nobody cared much when CRM or NOW were down 50% off the top in 2021-2022, but so much interest now that there's a narrative.
I have zero interest in CRM (Benioff created a massive company, but he's increasingly turned into a real life Gavin Belson), NOW has never really interested me and ADBE is a no. The stuff that kind of interests me are smaller names (something like IOT, where there are devices and it's not just 100% software) or something like NET (certainly not a good reaction to earnings, but the name had gotten ahead of itself in recent weeks.)

https://preview.redd.it/64rvo3ff8yzg1.png?width=1170&format=png&auto=webp&s=a62f8123bf855d8c1eb9d265f7c54ec79b67525b
CRWD and NET