MPC
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORPORATION
stock NYSE

Dude, what… are you investing in individual companies without knowing how to read statements?
Net income 2011 — 1.1 billion.
Net income 2024 — 300 million.
So net income went down by a factor of almost 4x.
Revenue 2011 — 18 billion.
Revenue 2024 — 17.5 billion.
So revenue is flat over an extended period time and income went down massively. Hence— net margins compressing from 6% to 0.75% they are lowering the price of their products to keep revenue churning. The fact you didn’t know that means you shouldn’t be investing in stocks. Let alone trying to provide an analysis. Also, for your MPC comparison. They were growing top and bottom line at 25% when they got their deal. The very opposite of what’s happening with Kohl’s. This is dead in the water without anyway of getting out and that is actual facts. You don’t have to believe me though. The statements tell the story.

Go off dude 👏🏼 do you! I’m just highlighting your bull case is the equivalent of the second coming of Jesus. Everything would have to go perfect. Which is unlikely without private equity stepping in or a super investor.
Edit: Also, MPC didn’t have failing financials in 2012, so why even compare lol. That was there third straight year of 25% growth, top and bottom line.

Different asset classes have different tolerances for debt, different multiples- ie MPC get beat up holding a lot of debt.. bring in MPLX to take on all the debt and tada MPC fairly valued MPLX fairly valued. Now KSS retail and KSS CRE - kSS retail valued at 6-12 PE multiple, KSs CRE co at 14x FCF rolled into it via “rent” payments that just flow right back into KSS coffers

Now deep dive how they rose the debt: started an SPV separated from KSS that took on the debt. They’d have gotten a lower rate as KSS, yet they spun into a separate entity… why? No idea cuz they went into 0 detail on the call. My speculation, how do you mark to market assets without major tax events(like selling)?
Copy MPC/MPLX MLP spin off. 2012 the pipeline assets were ~$180M in BV on MPCs books. They dropped them into MPLX, ipo’d at $2B+ and had assets marked to market efficiently and only sold a minor interest, 25% stake.

Incorrect, KSS has $565M FCF, $1.256B EBITDA, $1.5B EBITDAR. They could easily shift the CRe into a reit vehicle and only sell 25% of it to get a tax efficient mark-to-market vehicle and get their underlying assets appreciated. We aren’t advocating actually selling it. Just copy MPC/MPLX pipeline asset type rolloffs. When MPC did this back in 2012, BV of assets they spinoff was $180M, IPO of same assets was $2B+. They sold off a 25% stake and still own 75% of it to this day.

Dude, what… are you investing in individual companies without knowing how to read statements?
Net income 2011 — 1.1 billion.
Net income 2024 — 300 million.
So net income went down by a factor of almost 4x.
Revenue 2011 — 18 billion.
Revenue 2024 — 17.5 billion.
So revenue is flat over an extended period time and income went down massively. Hence— net margins compressing from 6% to 0.75% they are lowering the price of their products to keep revenue churning. The fact you didn’t know that means you shouldn’t be investing in stocks. Let alone trying to provide an analysis. Also, for your MPC comparison. They were growing top and bottom line at 25% when they got their deal. The very opposite of what’s happening with Kohl’s. This is dead in the water without anyway of getting out and that is actual facts. You don’t have to believe me though. The statements tell the story.

Go off dude 👏🏼 do you! I’m just highlighting your bull case is the equivalent of the second coming of Jesus. Everything would have to go perfect. Which is unlikely without private equity stepping in or a super investor.
Edit: Also, MPC didn’t have failing financials in 2012, so why even compare lol. That was there third straight year of 25% growth, top and bottom line.

Different asset classes have different tolerances for debt, different multiples- ie MPC get beat up holding a lot of debt.. bring in MPLX to take on all the debt and tada MPC fairly valued MPLX fairly valued. Now KSS retail and KSS CRE - kSS retail valued at 6-12 PE multiple, KSs CRE co at 14x FCF rolled into it via “rent” payments that just flow right back into KSS coffers

Now deep dive how they rose the debt: started an SPV separated from KSS that took on the debt. They’d have gotten a lower rate as KSS, yet they spun into a separate entity… why? No idea cuz they went into 0 detail on the call. My speculation, how do you mark to market assets without major tax events(like selling)?
Copy MPC/MPLX MLP spin off. 2012 the pipeline assets were ~$180M in BV on MPCs books. They dropped them into MPLX, ipo’d at $2B+ and had assets marked to market efficiently and only sold a minor interest, 25% stake.

Incorrect, KSS has $565M FCF, $1.256B EBITDA, $1.5B EBITDAR. They could easily shift the CRe into a reit vehicle and only sell 25% of it to get a tax efficient mark-to-market vehicle and get their underlying assets appreciated. We aren’t advocating actually selling it. Just copy MPC/MPLX pipeline asset type rolloffs. When MPC did this back in 2012, BV of assets they spinoff was $180M, IPO of same assets was $2B+. They sold off a 25% stake and still own 75% of it to this day.

Hot and cold...
If you like to "Gamble, send crypto, receive an NFT ETC ETC"
THIS is your "hot wallet" this way if let's say you get duped by a smart contract in sol or etherium or I guess polkadot? Not ALL of your friends will be compromised
"Cold wallet" is typically one that is set up without having been connected to the Internet and preferred the laptop as well ... But isn't 100% need to be a treazor.. could be a paper wallet that is now on stainless steel etc etc
Essentially, the hot wallet is minimal funds, NFTS, ETC,
A cold wallet is ment for DEEP long term storage..
On February 21, 2025, a group of hackers from North Korea pulled off the largest cryptocurrency heist in history after stealing $1.5 billion in Ethereum tokens from the Dubai-based cryptocurrency exchange ByBit
How Bybit Could Have Prevented This Hack (But Didn’t)
Bybit got hit with one of the most preventable hacks in recent crypto history. This wasn’t some cutting-edge exploit—it was just bad internal security practices. Here’s what went wrong and how they could have stopped it.
**What Bybit Did Wrong**
1. *Signers blindly approved a malicious transaction*:
The attackers didn’t steal private keys; they tricked Bybit’s multisig signers into approving a contract change.
This is a textbook Ice Phishing attack, where the UI makes a transaction appear legitimate, but the actual execution does something else.
2. *No second-layer verification for transactions*:
They only used one UI (Safe/Gnosis) to verify transactions, which the attackers manipulated.
A proper security setup would require signers to independently verify raw transactions on Etherscan or another trusted explorer before signing.
3. *No transaction simulation before signing*:
If Bybit had used pre-signing simulations (Tenderly, OpenZeppelin Defender, or ChainSecurity), they could have seen exactly what the contract was going to do before approving the transaction.
This alone could have prevented the attack.
4. *No withdrawal delays for large transactions*:
Bybit allowed a $1.4 billion transfer to happen instantly with no internal review.
A 24-hour time lock on large transactions would have given them a chance to freeze the funds and stop the attack.
5. *No smart contract "Guardian" system*:
Most high-security institutions use Guardian Contracts to prevent unauthorized contract changes.
Bybit let their cold wallet contract get modified without requiring secondary approval, which is a serious security oversight.
6. *No anomaly detection or security alerts*:
Billions of dollars moved in one go, and Bybit’s system didn’t even flag it as suspicious.
Any proper security system should have on-chain monitoring for unusual transaction patterns, especially for cold wallets.
**Why Bybit Likely Didn’t Bother**
Bybit wasn’t ignorant—they cut corners for convenience and probably assumed that no one would exploit their weak security policies.
1. *Security is expensive, and they wanted faster transactions*:
Implementing time locks, extra signers, and pre-signing checks slows down fund transfers.
They likely thought "this will never happen to us" and prioritized speed over security.
2. *They underestimated UI-based phishing attacks*:
The hackers didn’t break into Bybit’s systems—they manipulated how transactions were displayed to signers.
Bybit trusted their UI too much instead of enforcing raw transaction validation at the hardware wallet level.
3. *Other exchanges would not have fallen for this*:
Platforms like Fireblocks, Anchorage, and Coinbase Custody implement much stronger safeguards.
They use MPC wallets (instead of standard multisig), automated transaction simulations, and withdrawal velocity controls.
If Bybit had followed the best practices of these firms, this hack wouldn’t have been possible.
**Conclusion: Bybit’s Security Model Was Flawed**
1. They could have stopped this with better multisig policies, transaction validation, and contract security.
2. They didn’t because extra security slows down withdrawals, and they assumed UI-based deception wasn’t a real threat.
This wasn’t an advanced exploit—Bybit essentially handed the hacker the ability to steal their funds through weak security processes.