JPM
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
stock NYSE

At first i have to say that the question does not make much sense because of the reasons that WhenIntegralsAttack2 mentioned. I want to emphasize that is more team/desk dependent than bank honestly.
But because i want to kill sometime, i am going to entertain the question as if it had a good answer and i will try to estimate it.
Tier 1: JPM, GS. JPM's quabt research team is infamous for always being one of the best and goldmna is goldman. I would put
Tier2: Here it dependa on asset class. I would guess that the more business the bank has in asset class the more probable ot has better models(i doubt that the correlation is really that strong). Thus MS for equities, Citi for rates/fx and Deutsche for credit. Citi was traditionally onw of the strongest in fx/rates and the same goes for Deutsche, havibg created the whole CDs busines if not mistaken.
Tier 3: Barclays i think for indices and UBS for wealth/asset management. BofA no idea.
Probably not close to reality, but hey, this is best answer i could give.

Iran announces a new leader....but they won't tell us who it is. 😂😂😂
Also: JPM 300c 04/02

One easy way to manipulate the market to pick up cheap silver is to drive it down during off-peak hours to trigger stop losses when buyers are sleeping and there is low liquidity. Then, they'll turn around and sell it back into the market during peak trading hours when buyers are back and there is high liquidity.
Market manipulation is a real thing especially in the silver market. JPM was fined 920 million in 2020 for doing it.

PayPal's price slide definitely has people screaming value but you gotta be careful with those acquisition rumors. While that 60% discount looks juicy, I always check the actual stock filings to see if the revenue growth actually supports that intrinsic value. I've been using trylattice lately to set generative market alerts for PYPL so I don't get faked out by random Stripe or JPM hype. Its interactive charts make it way easier to see if the P/E ratio is a real deal or just a value trap. Honestly PayPal is priced for stagnation. The acquisition rumors provide a speculative floor, but there's no credible M&A catalyst. The intrinsic value gap reflects hope, not fundamentals.

<Research>JPM: BABA-W (09988.HK) Qwen Talent Loss Triggers ST Risk Premium

The goods.... all coins and bars come in tube, capsules, mint wrap or flips except some vintage bars. Thank you for taking a look. **If you need better and more photos just ask!!!**
**Kitco Gold Spot $5177**
**Kitco Silver Spot $84.70**
**Shanghai Physical Silver Spot $95.47**
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**Proof and Album**
 [**https://imgur.com/a/TI9dn6G**](https://imgur.com/a/TI9dn6G)
**\*\*\*\*Gold\*\*\*\***
Dos peso little scruffy **$SOLD**
(2) Vintage 1982 Gold Standard Elizabeth Currier 10 Pence .075 AGW 2.33 grams **$387ea (Melt)**
2013 1/10 war in the Pacific **$SOLD**
Vintage 1980 1/2oz AGW Royal Canadian Mint $100 Proof Gold **$2585 (Melt)**
Vintage 1983 1/2oz AGW Royal Canadian Mint $100 Proof Gold **$2585 (Melt)**
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2-Lots of (3) Mixed Date Peace Dollars **$189ea**
6-1921 AU/BU Morgan's **$65ea**
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1/4oz 1969 Foster Silver Eagle Walla Walla Washington **$SOLD**
6.42 Vintage Academy No Weight Stamp **$585**
5oz Vintage Jackson Precious Metals JPM **$490**
5.48 Vintage 1970s Star Metals Hand Finished **$510**
5.49 Vintage 1970s Star Metals Hand Finished **$510**
10oz Johnson Matthey Plain Back Bar **$880**
2-10oz Engelhard C-Series Pebble Back Bars **$SOLD**
10oz Vintage A-Mark Stacker **$SOLD**
25oz **CMI** Constitution Mint Inc USS Constitution **$2125**
4-1oz A-Mark Chunky’s **$103ea**
3-1oz California Crown Mint CCM Trade Units Eagle/Liberty Bell **$94ea**
4-1oz South East Refining Panama City bars **$SOLD**
1-1oz Sharps Pixley and Co. LTD London **$SOLD**
2-1oz 1984 Engelhard "Big E" Reverse in Lollypop Wrap **$SOLD**
1-1oz 1974 USS Constitution "BU Uncirculated" Right Out of a Mint Wrapped Roll **$90**
2-1oz AG Liberty’s Rounds **$90ea**
2-1oz 1977 Vintage Siltex Inc Liberty Rounds **$90ea**
8-1oz Provident Mint “The Gambler” with Saloon Reverse **$89ea**
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5oz 2019 Queens Beast Proof Black Bull of Clarence "Rare"  **less than 400 Mintage $SOLD**
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5oz 2017 Somalia Wildlife Elephant **$475**
2-5oz 2024 Perth Mint Lunar Dragon **$SOLD**
2-2oz 2024 Perth Mint Lunar Dragon **$187ea (1 SOLD)**
7-1oz 2018 Cayman Island Marlins **$89 ea (PENDING)**
1-1oz 2012 Kookaburra with Dragon Privy **SOLD**
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1-Onza Casa de Moneda **$95**
12-1951 Hidalgo Cinco Peso .720 **$53ea Under Melt (2SOLD)**
7-1953 Hidalgo Cinco Peso .720 **$53ea Under Melt (3SOLD)**
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1oz 1984 Viva Mexico Palenque w/toning **$95**
5oz Mexican Pillar 8 Reales Desing 1732 **$525**
7-1oz 1984 Libertad **$105ea**
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2-1oz 2016 BU Libertad **$105ea**
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$BULL, $MELI, $NVO, $IGV, $FOUR, ,$PYPL
All ridiculously low currently and undervalued compared to many other stocks I've seen so far
Also $JPM which isn't undervalued, but a great buy in general

I dont know why AFR keeps glazing DRO. Here's another beauty following their last one about [JPM becoming a "major shareholder"](https://www.reddit.com/r/ASX_Bets/comments/1qd24xl/comment/nzmmnjl/). Interestingly, they didn't publish another mention after JPM ceased [only a few days later](https://cdn-api.markitdigital.com/apiman-gateway/ASX/asx-research/1.0/file/2924-03052682-2A1651352&v=undefined)..
https://preview.redd.it/od0va3y6q4ng1.png?width=1803&format=png&auto=webp&s=384d7d5371c7c51a643028d9b1ef0d69391ee3ac

# The Shadow Ledger, Part 2: The Derivative Paper Trail
# Part 2 of 7
**TL;DR:** Part 1 presented evidence that the phantom locates were not backed by real shares. This post asks: where did the risk go when the shorts could no longer rely on FTX? The trail leads through an offshore ISDA swap network, 8 Initial Margin Agreements filed by Citadel Securities (Europe) with UK Companies House in 7 consecutive days, mapping the prime brokers holding the other side. Citadel's Cayman fund vehicles more than doubled their Gross Asset Value from \~$90B to \~$180B between 2020 and 2025, the period when domestic positions were supposedly closing. And the firm that purchased FTX's bankruptcy claims, the claims containing the counterparty records showing who used the phantom locates, is Diameter Capital Partners, a distressed debt fund with deep Tier-1 bank relationships. The risk didn't disappear. The data suggests it was distributed offshore.
>**📄 Full academic papers:** [The Long Gamma Default (PDF)](https://github.com/TheGameStopsNow/research/blob/main/papers/The%20Long%20Gamma%20Default-%20How%20Options%20Market%20Structure%20Creates%20Artificial%20Stability%20in%20Equity%20Prices.pdf?raw=1), [The Shadow Algorithm (PDF)](https://github.com/TheGameStopsNow/research/blob/main/papers/The%20Shadow%20Algorithm-%20Adversarial%20Microstructure%20Forensics%20in%20Options-Driven%20Equity%20Markets.pdf?raw=1), [Exploitable Infrastructure (PDF)](https://github.com/TheGameStopsNow/research/blob/main/papers/Exploitable%20Infrastructure-%20Regulatory%20Implications%20of%20the%20Long%20Gamma%20Default%20and%20Adversarial%20Microstructure%20Forensics.pdf?raw=1), [Cross-Domain Corroboration (PDF)](https://github.com/TheGameStopsNow/research/blob/main/papers/Cross-Domain%20Corroboration-%20Physical%20Infrastructure%2C%20Settlement%20Mechanics%2C%20and%20Macro%20Funding%20of%20Options-Driven%20Equity%20Displacement.pdf?raw=1)
[*Options & Consequences*](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1raqqef/options_consequences_following_the_money_1/) *mapped tape fractures, balance sheets, microwave physics, and yen funding. Part 1 presented evidence of phantom locates. This post traces where the risk appears to have been transferred.*
# 1. Following the Derivative Trail: What the Call Reports Actually Show
In *Options & Consequences*, the data showed that Citadel's puts didn't vanish in Q1 2021, they increased 47% before migrating into Total Return Swaps (*O&C, Part 2*). The question was: *who was on the other side of those swaps?*
The FDIC requires every U.S. bank to file quarterly **Call Reports** (FFIEC 031/041), which include Schedule RC-L: Derivatives and Off-Balance-Sheet Items. The initial analysis pointed to JPMorgan's +$6T derivative spike in Q1 2021 as a potential hiding place.
**But the data tells a different story when you isolate equity derivatives.**
JPMorgan's 10-Q (Note 6, Derivative Instruments) breaks out notional by asset class:
|Category|Q4 2020|Q1 2021|Change|% Change|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|**Interest Rate**|\~$49,900B|\~$55,627B|**+$5,727B**|**+11.5%**|
|**Equity**|**$1,885B**|**$1,475B**|**-$410B**|**-21.7%**|
|**Total**|$47,175B|$53,187B|\+$6,012B|\+12.7%|
*Source: JPMorgan Chase 2020 10-K and Q1 2021 10-Q, Note 6, Derivative Instruments.*
**The $6 trillion spike was almost entirely interest rate swaps.** JPMorgan's equity derivative book actually *declined* by $410 billion, a 21.7% contraction, during the GME squeeze quarter. Even if 100% of that decline were GME-related (GME's maximum notional at peak: \~$45B, or 3% of the equity total), the correlation between the headline $6T number and GME Total Return Swaps is spurious.
>**What this means:** The total derivative notional (Schedule RC-L) does not decompose by underlying reference entity. The original thesis assumed the $6T spike contained GME TRS. The equity isolation test disproves this, the hiding place, if one exists at domestic U.S. banks, is not visible in JPMorgan's aggregate Call Report data. The SBSR FOIA (deadline: April 3, 2026; [17 CFR § 242.900-909](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/section-242.901)) is the pending data source that could resolve entity-level swap attribution.
This honest correction strengthens, rather than weakens, the overall thesis, because the real derivative evidence was never at JPMorgan's aggregate level. It was in the offshore structure.
# 2. The Offshore Swap Ledger: The UK ISDA Map
In *Options & Consequences, Part 2*, 8 Initial Margin Security Agreements filed by Citadel Securities (Europe) Limited with UK Companies House were identified, all filed in the 7 days before the September 2022 UMR Phase 6 deadline. Those 8 ISDA agreements suggest a minimum uncleared derivative book of **€8 billion**.
>**An important preemption:** September 1, 2022, was the global regulatory deadline for the Basel Committee's Uncleared Margin Rules (UMR) Phase 6. Every financial institution globally with >€8 billion AANA was required to file ISDA Initial Margin CSAs by that date. The filings themselves are therefore mandatory compliance events, not evidence of unusual behavior. What makes them forensically valuable is not that they were filed, it's that they provide a legally mandated, publicly accessible map of the prime broker network that otherwise operates in the dark. UMR Phase 6 forced the shadow ledger into the light.
The ISDA map does more than prove the scale. It maps the **proxy network**, the exact firms that hold the other side of the offshore swaps. Think of it as a wiring diagram: each row is a firm that Citadel Securities is contractually connected to through a derivative agreement, filed with the UK government as a matter of public record:
|ISDA Counterparty|Filed Date|JGB Primary Dealer?|Role in Network|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|**JPMorgan**|Aug 22, 2022|✅|Prime broker, ISDA counterparty|
|**Morgan Stanley**|Aug 23, 2022|✅|Prime broker|
|**Citibank**|Aug 24, 2022|✅|Clearing services|
|**Barclays**|Aug 25, 2022|✅|Prime broker|
|**Goldman Sachs**|Aug 26, 2022|✅|$9-10B crypto-adjacent ([13F-HR](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000886982&type=13-F&dateb=&owner=include&count=40))|
|**HSBC**|Aug 27, 2022|❌|Prime broker|
|**BofA**|Aug 28, 2022|✅|96% clearing for Citadel|
|**Merrill Lynch**|Aug 29, 2022|✅|ETF Authorized Participant|
*Source:* [*UK Companies House, Citadel Securities (Europe) Ltd., charges register*](https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05462867/charges)*, Company No. 05462867.*
[The Offshore ISDA Network: 8 Prime Brokers Figure: All 8 ISDA filings in 7 days. The exact banks that fund the carry trade.](https://preview.redd.it/t4j87qrud4ng1.png?width=640&format=png&auto=webp&s=296d5db0df0745b96e9515c899574381e3e5b4d8)
These aren't random counterparties. They are the exact 8 banks that serve as prime brokers for the largest derivative positions on the planet. Seven of eight are JGB Primary Dealers (JGB Market Special Participants per the Japanese Ministry of Finance), the firms that provide yen funding for the carry trade. And when the yen carry trade blew up in August 2024, every single one of these banks was exposed.
A charge was also filed with **The Bank of New York Mellon** (BNY Mellon) on **April 13, 2021**, exactly 13 days after the Q1 2021 squeeze quarter closed. BNY Mellon is the custodian. When a derivative book explodes in size, you need custodial infrastructure. The timing is a receipt.
# 3. Diameter Capital: The Claims Buyer
When FTX filed for bankruptcy, its entire counterparty ledger became an asset of the estate. Those records contain the names, amounts, and dates of every entity that used FTX's Tokenized Stocks. If those records were disclosed in open bankruptcy proceedings, every prime broker that used phantom locates would be exposed.
Enter **Diameter Capital Partners LP**.
Diameter Capital is a distressed debt and special situations fund that purchased FTX bankruptcy claims. By acquiring claims, Diameter gained standing in the bankruptcy proceedings and influence over what gets disclosed and what gets settled quietly.
Here's the Venn diagram:
* **Diameter Capital's principals** include former Anchorage Capital, Citi, and Centerbridge professionals who specialize in distressed debt and restructuring
* **Diameter Capital maintains ISDA agreements** with the same Tier-1 prime brokers on the UK Companies House map
* **Diameter Capital purchased significant FTX claims**, giving them standing to negotiate settlements like the CM-Equity $51M resolution (Docket 14301), the exact settlement that resolved the $65M phantom locate claim *without litigation*
*Source:* [*SEC EDGAR*](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany)*,* [*Diameter Capital Partners LP Form ADV*](https://advfm.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/search_firm.aspx)*, annual updates. Kroll FTX restructuring filings.*
The CM-Equity claim was settled for $51 million, $14 million less than the original claim, *without* discovery. Without litigation, the court never needed to examine what the "Tokenized Stocks" actually were, who used them as locates, or which prime brokers relied on them. The structural outcome was that the evidence was resolved without discovery.
https://preview.redd.it/ul3s2b2vd4ng1.jpg?width=640&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=e803937b1b8081ce32d1695de1124f0a3c03ac76
Diameter Capital: The Clean-Up Crew *Figure: Former Citadel PMs → distressed debt fund → FTX claim purchase → settlement without discovery.*
To be clear: this is a standard distressed debt strategy. Buying bankruptcy claims at a discount and settling out-of-court to avoid protracted litigation is Diameter's entire business model, it's how distressed debt funds generate returns. It's legal. It's rational. The question is not whether the strategy is unusual (it isn't), but whether the structural effect, sealing the counterparty records that would show who relied on the phantom locates, served the interests of the broader network.
# 4. The Receipt: Citadel's GAV Explosion
If the risk migrated offshore during Q1 2021, we should see it in the offshore fund data. Every registered investment adviser must disclose the Gross Asset Value (GAV) of each private fund on [SEC Form ADV](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&company=citadel+advisors&CIK=&type=ADV&dateb=&owner=include&count=40&search_text=&action=getcompany).
Pulling Citadel Advisors LLC's Form ADV annual updates for the Cayman Islands funds:
|Fund|Jurisdiction|GAV (2020)|GAV (2025)|Growth|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|Citadel Multi-Strategy Equities Master Fund Ltd.|Cayman Islands|\~$45B|\~$97B|\+115%|
|Citadel Kensington Global Strategies Fund Ltd.|Cayman Islands|\~$33B|\~$55B|\+67%|
|Citadel Global Equities Master Fund Ltd.|Cayman Islands|\~$12B|\~$28B|\+133%|
*Source: SEC EDGAR,* [*Citadel Advisors LLC Form ADV Part 1A*](https://advfm.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/search_firm.aspx)*, Item 7.B (Private Fund Reporting), annual updates 2020–2025. CIK search "Citadel Advisors."*
[Citadel Offshore Funds: Gross Asset Value Growth Figure: Cayman fund GAV grew from \~$31B to \~$60B while \\"domestic positions closed.\\"](https://preview.redd.it/tqrsw4dvd4ng1.png?width=640&format=png&auto=webp&s=a627fe9c726156dcd814c4889c83ae3e32093a73)
The Cayman fund vehicles that hold the equity strategies, the same funds incorporated as "exempted companies" under the Cayman Islands Companies Act (*O&C, Part 2*), more than doubled their GAV during the period when the domestic derivative position was supposedly closing.
>**The organic growth defense:** Citadel's flagship Wellington fund returned 26% (2021), 38% (2022), and 15% (2023). Compounding those returns on a $90B base, plus LP inflows, can account for a significant portion of the GAV growth. The doubling alone does not prove that offshore short risk was warehoused. What it demonstrates is *balance sheet capacity*, the Cayman vehicles had more than enough scale to absorb the risk transfer documented by the ISDA network, regardless of whether the GAV growth was organic or position-driven.
# The Hiding Place, Summarized
|Layer|Evidence|Source|
|:-|:-|:-|
|**The JPM Test**|JPM's $6T spike was interest rate swaps; equity derivatives *declined* $410B. GME-specific swap attribution requires SBSR data.|FDIC Call Reports + JPM 10-Q Note 6|
|**The ISDA Network**|8 prime brokers, €8B+ uncleared swaps, all filed in 7 days|UK Companies House|
|**The Claims Purchase**|Diameter Capital buys FTX claims; CM-Equity settled without discovery|Kroll Docket 14301|
|**The Offshore Surge**|Citadel Cayman funds: GAV +115% (2020–2025)|SEC Form ADV|
The original $6 trillion headline doesn't survive scrutiny, the spike was interest rate swaps, not equity derivatives. But the ISDA filing cluster and the Cayman GAV doubling are independent evidence that doesn't depend on JPMorgan's aggregate numbers. The offshore derivative infrastructure exists. What we cannot yet prove, without SBSR data, is the exact GME notional moving through it.
*In Part 3, we follow the money to its source: the $16.7 billion collateral machine that funds the entire shadow ledger, through Tether, the repo market, and the broker-dealer that connects the crypto world to Wall Street.*
*Not financial advice. Forensic research using public data. I'm not a financial advisor, attorney, or affiliated with any entity named in this post.*
>*"The few who understand the system will either be so interested in its profits or so dependent on its favors that there will be no opposition from that class.", attributed to Mayer Amschel Rothschild (disputed)*
# The Shadow Ledger
|Part|Title|
|:-|:-|
|[1](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl2vtu/the_shadow_ledger_part_1_the_fake_locates/)|The Fake Locates|
|**2**|**The Derivative Paper Trail** ← you are here|
|[3](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl3nv4/the_shadow_ledger_part_3_the_ouroboros/)|The Ouroboros|
|[4](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl2x5e/the_shadow_ledger_part_4_the_reflexive_trap/)|The Reflexive Trap|
|[5](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl2x8i/the_shadow_ledger_part_5_the_bridge/)|The Bridge|
|[6](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl2xbu/the_shadow_ledger_part_6_the_cash_engine/)|The Cash Engine|
|[7](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl4m0e/the_shadow_ledger_part_7_the_fingerprint/)|The Fingerprint|
|[📋](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl3q1y/the_shadow_ledger_summary_post/)|Summary Post|
⬅️ **Previous:** [Part 1: The Fake Locates](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl2vtu/the_shadow_ledger_part_1_the_fake_locates/) ➡️ **Next:** [Part 3: The Ouroboros](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1rl3nv4/the_shadow_ledger_part_3_the_ouroboros/)

I have found that my best investment ideas often have the simplest theses. I can easily articulate why **Sky Harbour ($SKYH)** can get to **$50 per share**:
Each stabilized campus creates \~$1/share of equity value. 
23 campuses today ≈ $23 fair value. 
Management target = 50 campuses → $50 stock 
Financing is locked.
Today, the stock is trading around **$8–$9**, but the intrinsic value compounding under the surface tells a different story.
Here is the breakdown of the unit economics and the clear path to $50.
**1. The Unit Economics (The Engine)**
Let's look at the **Miami Opa-Locka Executive Airport (OPF)** campus as a baseline. I’m using OPF because it is a "Tier 2" property and representative of Sky Harbour's average campus.
**Note on Rents:** Their future “Tier 1” campuses with ground leases already secured (New York Metro: Stewart International Airport, Bradley International Airport, Hudson Valley Regional Airport, and Trenton-Mercer Airport) will all likely garner higher rents than OPF. In fact, their complete and stabilized San Jose Mineta International Airport campus is already achieving rents **double** that of OPF.
According to the Q2 2025 earnings call, the latest tenant rents at OPF are **$46 per rentable square foot**.
**The Margin Profile at OPF:**
* **Revenue:** $46/sq ft
* **Property Level Opex:** \~$8/sq ft (Ground rent, labor)
* **Lease Structure:** Triple Net (Tenants pay utilities, taxes, insurance)
* **Net Operating Income (NOI):** **$38+ per sq ft**
**2. The Yield on Cost**
Sky Harbour has historically constructed campuses for roughly **$300 per rentable sq ft**. However, the unit economics are improving rapidly.
* **The BTIG Update:** A recent sell-side report from BTIG highlighted that efficiency improvements have driven all-in build costs down to **\~$250 per sq ft** on active sites.
* **Why This Matters:** Lower costs mean higher yields on the same rent.
* $38 NOI / $300 Cost = **\~12.6% Unlevered Yield**
* $38 NOI / $250 Cost = **\~15.2% Unlevered Yield**
Conservatively, even if we assume a blend, we are looking at a **13%+ yield on cost** for these assets.
**3. Value Creation Per Campus**
Here is where the math gets exciting.
* A typical campus is **150,000 rentable square feet**.
* **Construction Cost:** @ $250/sq ft = **$37.5 million**.
* **Annual NOI:** @ $38/sq ft = **$5.7 million**.
If we value these stabilized cash-flowing assets at a **5% cap rate** (reasonable for high-quality aviation infrastructure):
* **Asset Value:** $5.7M / 0.05 = **$114 million**.
* **Value Creation:** $114M (Value) - $37.5M (Cost) = **$76.5 million in created equity**.
With roughly \~76 million shares outstanding (fully diluted), this simplifies perfectly:
**Each new campus creates \~$1 per share of accretive value**.
**4. The Path to $50**
Sky Harbour currently has **23 campuses** complete or under development.
* **23 Campuses** (Current/In-Dev) = Baseline Value
* **Management's stated goal is to reach 50 campuses** within the next few years, adding 7-10 per year.
**The Math:**
* **50 Campuses** (Target) × \~$1 Value Creation/Share = **\~$50 Stock Price**
**Additional Value:** This target captures only the value created by future development. It ignores the \~$178M of equity capital raised since going public (via SPAC trust and PIPEs), which is worth **another \~$2 per share** on top of the development upside.
**5. Why This is Realistic Now**
The biggest risk to this thesis was funding—*could they actually afford to build 50 campuses?*
With the recent **$150M Series 2026 Bond issuance** and the **$200M - 300M tax-exempt facility with J.P. Morgan**, that risk is largely off the table. The capital is there to execute the build-out. Execution risk still exists, but with $150M+ bonds closed and the JPM facility in place, the biggest bear-case hurdle is gone.
If the market were pricing the 23 existing campuses correctly today, the stock would be $23+. It is currently \~$8. We are getting the existing growth for free, plus the path to 50.
**Summary:**
We’re buying a company at \~$9 that has built a repeatable machine to manufacture $1 of per share equity value per campus finished. **50 campuses = $50 stock**. The math is simple. The capital is secured. The runway is clear.
What are your thoughts on $SKYH? Post them below and I’ll reply to every comment.
Not financial advice. DYOR.

I am 20M college student with internships and campus jobs in CA for income source totaling around $33k. Currently, my portfolios are split between Robinhood and JPM (smurf account). I have around $3K cash on hand to buy throughout this choppy year in the market. I am a long term investor, and I will not buy ETFs on purpose to practice stock picking (even though they are great).
This year, we have seen strength in Industrials, Energy, Precious Materials. This have led me to make these additions early in 2026: Northrop Grumman, Caterpillar, GE Aerospace, Costco, Amgen. Costco and Amgen follow the theme of consumer defensive and biotech that have been lagging in previous year relative to tech, we are seeing noticeable comeback. No matter what my principles prioritize wide moat and business structure over valuations, even though it extremely important.
A few moves on my mind that raise the quality of my portfolios. I am thinking of following up on the success of buying Costco, consumer staples, in the $800s to add consumer discretionary which is TJX (continuous record of strengths in earnings combination with affordability crisis creating unique short-medium term opportunity).
Adding more GS is also sensible, we will see IPO market later this year.
Adding Chevron could be strategic exposure to quality energy play, but we are exposed to short term volatile oil market.
Adding Microsoft is very tempting, I won't go into details you guys probably read 1000 posts about that alr. From my perspective, we clearly see reduced risk of OpenAI as they trim down their expected spending my nearly half making it more sustainable, their new products are gaining grounds on Anthropic pure dominance in corporate software, and lastly they have secured large seed rounds make the future look more stable. It more like a no brainer swing play, but I already have so much exposure in MAG7 and AI in general.
I will be casually adding to Amgen until $2000.
Thank you for your take of what make sense here.
Breakdown:
AMZN, $4,763, 14.6%
AVGO, $3,536, 10.8%
TSM, $2,896, 8.9%
NOC, $2,251, 6.9%
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JPM, $896, 2.7% (smurf account)
GS, $869, 2.7% (smurf account)
NFLX, $495, 1.5% (smurf account)

I have found that my best investment ideas often have the simplest theses. I can easily articulate why **Sky Harbour ($SKYH)** can get to **$50 per share**:
Each stabilized campus creates \~$1/share of equity value. 
23 campuses today ≈ $23 fair value. 
Management target = 50 campuses → $50 stock 
Financing is locked.
Today, the stock is trading around **$8–$9**, but the intrinsic value compounding under the surface tells a different story.
Here is the breakdown of the unit economics and the clear path to $50.
**1. The Unit Economics (The Engine)**
Let's look at the **Miami Opa-Locka Executive Airport (OPF)** campus as a baseline. I’m using OPF because it is a "Tier 2" property and representative of Sky Harbour's average campus.
**Note on Rents:** Their future “Tier 1” campuses with ground leases already secured (New York Metro: Stewart International Airport, Bradley International Airport, Hudson Valley Regional Airport, and Trenton-Mercer Airport) will all likely garner higher rents than OPF. In fact, their complete and stabilized San Jose Mineta International Airport campus is already achieving rents **double** that of OPF.
According to the Q2 2025 earnings call, the latest tenant rents at OPF are **$46 per rentable square foot**.
**The Margin Profile at OPF:**
* **Revenue:** $46/sq ft
* **Property Level Opex:** \~$8/sq ft (Ground rent, labor)
* **Lease Structure:** Triple Net (Tenants pay utilities, taxes, insurance)
* **Net Operating Income (NOI):** **$38+ per sq ft**
**2. The Yield on Cost**
Sky Harbour has historically constructed campuses for roughly **$300 per rentable sq ft**. However, the unit economics are improving rapidly.
* **The BTIG Update:** A recent sell-side report from BTIG highlighted that efficiency improvements have driven all-in build costs down to **\~$250 per sq ft** on active sites.
* **Why This Matters:** Lower costs mean higher yields on the same rent.
* $38 NOI / $300 Cost = **\~12.6% Unlevered Yield**
* $38 NOI / $250 Cost = **\~15.2% Unlevered Yield**
Conservatively, even if we assume a blend, we are looking at a **13%+ yield on cost** for these assets.
**3. Value Creation Per Campus**
Here is where the math gets exciting.
* A typical campus is **150,000 rentable square feet**.
* **Construction Cost:** @ $250/sq ft = **$37.5 million**.
* **Annual NOI:** @ $38/sq ft = **$5.7 million**.
If we value these stabilized cash-flowing assets at a **5% cap rate** (reasonable for high-quality aviation infrastructure):
* **Asset Value:** $5.7M / 0.05 = **$114 million**.
* **Value Creation:** $114M (Value) - $37.5M (Cost) = **$76.5 million in created equity**.
With roughly \~76 million shares outstanding (fully diluted), this simplifies perfectly:
**Each new campus creates \~$1 per share of accretive value**.
**4. The Path to $50**
Sky Harbour currently has **23 campuses** complete or under development.
* **23 Campuses** (Current/In-Dev) = Baseline Value
* **Management's stated goal is to reach 50 campuses** within the next few years, adding 7-10 per year.
**The Math:**
* **50 Campuses** (Target) × \~$1 Value Creation/Share = **\~$50 Stock Price**
**Additional Value:** This target captures only the value created by future development. It ignores the \~$178M of equity capital raised since going public (via SPAC trust and PIPEs), which is worth **another \~$2 per share** on top of the development upside.
**5. Why This is Realistic Now**
The biggest risk to this thesis was funding—*could they actually afford to build 50 campuses?*
With the recent **$150M Series 2026 Bond issuance** and the **$200M - 300M tax-exempt facility with J.P. Morgan**, that risk is largely off the table. The capital is there to execute the build-out. Execution risk still exists, but with $150M+ bonds closed and the JPM facility in place, the biggest bear-case hurdle is gone.
If the market were pricing the 23 existing campuses correctly today, the stock would be $23+. It is currently \~$8. We are getting the existing growth for free, plus the path to 50.
**Summary:**
We’re buying a company at \~$9 that has built a repeatable machine to manufacture $1 of per share equity value per campus finished. **50 campuses = $50 stock**. The math is simple. The capital is secured. The runway is clear.
What are your thoughts on $SKYH? Post them below and I’ll reply to every comment.
Not financial advice. DYOR.

I was under the impression that trump doesn’t like banks (esp JPM) because they froze or investigated his accounts

Stay away from these! NAV decay. Look at Neos, Goldman, or JPM CC funds.

F JPM. This article is all you need to know.
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8260-20

I bought in October at $343, down almost 9% overall but was up and doing great until here recently. Bought it along with C, GS, JPM at the same time. GS is up 16.5% for me overall, should have bought more, that and C are doing great.

Well some of us poors on here say that BoA and JPM have made various moves and since I highly doubt anybody would go on the internet and tell lies or jump to incorrect conclusions I'm curious how they got that data

JPM 295c 04/02

You're wondering why the antiquated system barely even leaving the 1980s is feeling threatened by literally any system that could provide even a mild quality of life upgrade for pretty much every human?
The banks are going to fight tooth and nail to defang any new innovation they can't get a piece of the pie on, and they're going to harangue any new act where they aren't getting their cut. Banks are fine with yields as long as they are getting them, see JPM Coin, look at all the infrastructure banks are building with their own little worthless private blockchains.
The only reason banks survive is because they're ingrained into society. Crypto never will be, but there's no reason that there can't be *some* regulation so there are *some* rules on Crypto that actually stick and make sense in it.

You do understand that the underlying appreciation alone (JPM for example) during the same time period is up like 4x those returns? Why target underperformance? Granted the past 3 months have been the picture perfect set up for CC strats but for a buy and hold is ludicrous…
Also did I read you’re doing this all in a taxable account???