MUSE
TCW Multisector Credit Income ETF
stockNYSEETF

> Und ob bei diesen Preisen dann noch jemand OPENClaw oder MUSE als "Mommies Executive assistant" ( Vox.com - Explain it to me - When AI agents run your life) einsetzen wird; Das ist Fraglich. Kommt aber auch darauf an wie lange das dauert. Moore's Law und so. Der Preis für Rechenleistung sinkt. Und die Effizienz von Rechenanwendungen steigt. Ich gehe davon aus, dass die Entwicklung von spezieller KI-Hardware mit den ganzen Geld-Zuschüssen an NVIDIA, etc. auch noch schneller wird. GPU Entwicklung dauert lange. Die aktuellste NVIDIA-Architektur Blackwell wurde schon 2022 geleakt, vor dem KI-Hype, vor ChatGPT. Die Cutting-Edge wird sicher immer teuer bleiben, aber die Top-Modelle von Heute werden in wenigen Jahren lokal auf dem Handy laufen.

**Airbnb (ABNB): a growing company using AI rather than being threatened by it** Airbnb isn’t cheap, but I think it’s a valuable business that is growing well, and I’m comfortable owning it. The market tends to treat it as a mature short-term-rental story. The company is instead broadening its addressable market in three directions while using AI to lower costs. Core homes supply growth is focused on top markets and calendar utilization rather than raw listing count. Hotels are the largest incremental TAM, and experiences and services are the long-term growth drivers. RBC frames it as a category-leading brand with a hotel monetization story, plus a company modernizing its booking policies and fees in a way that sets up faster multi-year growth in nights booked. The hotel push looks more interesting than it first appears. Management sees a mix of incremental and substitutional demand. NYC’s short-term rental ban pushed demand entirely to hotels, and independent and boutique hotels have an incentive to diversify their booking sources. The four initial launch markets (New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Madrid) saw higher net adds in August than in July, with further progress in September. On the cost side, AI-driven customer support has cut cost per booking by 16%. That is a real efficiency gain showing up today, not a promise. Experiences and services are being treated as long-term pain-point solutions. Grocery delivery is the single most requested service among guests, and the company is pursuing grocery, luggage, airport transportation and resort passes. Booking data shows experience demand broadening toward a mix of landmark activities and more everyday curated options. The newer “reserve now, pay later” option has been broadly positive. Cancellation rates have ticked up modestly but not materially, hosts haven’t voiced frustration over last-minute cancellations, and guests aren’t booking multiple locations for the same dates. Amex adding Airbnb listings to Amex Travel adds distribution. **Valuation versus Booking and Expedia** On consensus estimates, Airbnb is the most expensive of the three on every enterprise-value measure, and by a wide margin. At a $101.2B enterprise value, ABNB trades at 20.0x 2026 and 17.5x 2027 EBITDA. Booking ($132.6B EV) trades at 12.2x and 10.8x, and Expedia ($37.7B EV) at 9.1x and 8.3x. On free cash flow the picture is the same: ABNB at 20.6x and 18.9x, versus 14.1x and 12.4x for Booking and 10.6x and 10.7x for Expedia. On sales it’s 7.1x and 6.4x for Airbnb, 4.5x and 4.2x for Booking, and 2.3x and 2.2x for Expedia. On 2027 EBITDA, that is roughly a 60% premium to Booking and about double Expedia’s multiple. Part of that premium is earned through growth. Airbnb’s 2027 revenue is estimated to grow about 11.6%, versus 9.2% for Booking and 7.0% for Expedia. EBITDA growth is 14.0% versus 13.0% and 9.9%, and net income growth is 15.8% versus 13.3% and 12.8%. Margins are strong too. Airbnb’s 2026 EBITDA margin of about 36% is well above Expedia’s 26% and a touch below Booking’s 37%. But the growth edge over Booking is only a few points, and Booking’s margins are actually slightly higher, so growth alone doesn’t explain a premium this size. Free cash flow is the softer spot. Airbnb’s 2027 FCF growth is about 8.8% against 13.7% for Booking. So I’m paying up, and I know it. What I’m paying for is a faster grower with the cleanest AI story of the group, plus optionality in hotels and services that I don’t think consensus fully captures. If hotels and services push growth above these estimates, the premium compresses through earnings rather than through the multiple. If they don’t, Booking offers similar quality at a much lower price, which is the fair counterargument to owning Airbnb. **What could go wrong, how likely it is, and how Airbnb is responding** The threat I’d watch most closely is AI agents disintermediating the booking funnel. Direct traffic is roughly 90% of the site’s volume, so Airbnb is far less dependent on Google and paid search than its online travel peers. Agents like Meta’s MUSE could still sit between guest and platform over time. I’d call this low-to-moderate likelihood near term and a genuine long-term risk. Airbnb’s defenses are the brand pull behind that direct traffic and the fact that 71% of its listings are exclusive to Airbnb rather than also on Vrbo or Booking.com. An agent can’t route around inventory it can’t find elsewhere. That protection depends on supply staying exclusive, which is worth monitoring. Regulation is the highest-probability risk because it is already happening. NYC is the clearest example, and other dense tourist cities have moved in the same direction. The impact is manageable but real for the core homes business. Airbnb’s counter is structural: the hotel product captures demand that regulation displaces, as it did in New York, and its supply strategy concentrates on markets and utilization rather than blanket growth. Competition from hotel-first platforms is a near-certainty. Booking, Expedia and the hotel chains’ direct channels are all established, and Airbnb is entering their territory with a smaller hotel footprint. I’d rate the likelihood of competitive pressure as high and the likelihood of it breaking the thesis as low-to-moderate. Airbnb’s angle is differentiation. It targets independent and boutique hotels that want alternatives to dependence on the big intermediaries. The early launch-market data is encouraging, but four markets is a small sample. Policy risk on the guest side is smaller. Reserve now, pay later could raise cancellations, and the early evidence says that hasn’t happened to a worrying degree. I’d rate it low likelihood, with the main danger being a gradual drift as the feature scales. Finally, there is ordinary macro and valuation risk. Travel demand is cyclical, and given the premium multiple above, there is little room for a growth stumble. That’s the risk Airbnb can least counter directly. My conclusion is that the growth drivers (hotels, services, experiences) are additive to a strong core. The cost story is already visible, and the main long-term question is whether AI agents ever become the front door to travel. For now, Airbnb’s direct traffic and exclusive supply are doing a lot of work to keep that from happening. I’d like to hear where others see the weak points, especially whether the premium to Booking is justified.