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ARR
ARMOUR Residential REIT, Inc.
stock NYSE

At Close
Sep 25, 2026 3:59:59 PM EDT
14.10USD-0.106%(-0.01)4,936,677
0.00Bid   0.00Ask   0.00Spread
Pre-market
Sep 25, 2026 9:24:30 AM EDT
14.20USD+0.626%(+0.09)4,199
After-hours
Sep 25, 2026 4:39:30 PM EDT
14.11USD+0.106%(+0.01)2,360
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ARR Reddit Mentions
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We have sentiment values and mention counts going back to 2017. The complete data set is available via the API.
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ARR Specific Mentions
As of Sep 26, 2026 12:06:35 PM EDT (1 min. ago)
Includes all comments and posts. Mentions per user per ticker capped at one per hour.
19 hr ago • u/lemontoga • r/wallstreetbets • openai_prepares_new_500_per_month_pro_max_plan • C
Did you reply to the wrong comment? I was asking for a source on the frontier model demand. Everything I've seen points to the opposite.
I don't know who was asking about their ARR.
sentiment -0.56
20 hr ago • u/finecloud1499 • r/StockMarket • bending_spoons_bsp_and_the_27x_arr_airtable_deal • C
The 2.7x ARR headline looks appealing, but the roughly 3% organic growth and $4.09B net debt make execution more important than the entry multiple. The key indicator may be whether Airtable retains customers after pricing and operational changes, rather than simply returning to prior valuation levels.
sentiment 0.42
1 day ago • u/Baco06 • r/CLOV • counterpart_humana • Due Dilligence • B
Hello Fellow Clover Investors,

If you go to [crt.sh](http://crt.sh) you can search for a company's digital certificate logs. If you follow this link you can see all of the unexpired crt logs for %.humana.com:
[https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25.humana.com&exclude=expired](https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25.humana.com&exclude=expired)
In there, I found what looks to me (with some help in comprehending and organizing all of this from AI, since I do not work in healthcare and I do not have an IT or software or developer/programmer background) like a methodical, year-long enterprise engineering pipeline to plug external software (Counterpart) directly into CenterWell primary care clinics.
I'm now going to lay out my thesis with the goal of having people chime in and explain to me why I am WRONG. Please tell me where I am oversimplifying, speculating, exaggerating, misinterpreting, extrapolating, or simply being stupid.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
What are digital certificates and crt logs?
Whenever an enterprise wants an application or server to communicate securely over the web (`https://`), it has to get a digital security certificate from an authority like DigiCert. To prevent fraud, global internet rules (specifically RFC 6962) mandate that every single issued certificate must be published in a public, searchable ledger called Certificate Transparency (CT) logs. You literally cannot build a secure web endpoint without filing what is effectively a public building permit.
Big healthcare companies build software in four distinct, gated phases:
* **DEV (Development):** The workshop where coders write the raw software.
* **QA (Quality Assurance):** The automated test track to catch bugs and verify data feeds.
* **UAT (User Acceptance Testing):** UAT is built so *actual end-users*—in this case, clinic medical directors, doctors, and nurses—can log in and verify that the software works smoothly in their day-to-day workflow.
* **PROD (Production):** The live, finished product operating on real patients.
When an enterprise workload advances to UAT, it means the building is built, the pipes are connected, and the staff is doing the final walkthrough before opening day.
On September 1, 2026, Digicert stamped a brand new certificate for Humana:
[ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com](http://ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com)
On September 16, 2026, DigiCert stamped a batch of similarly named, brand-new certificates for Humana:
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com)
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.qa.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.qa.gcp3.humana.com)
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.uat.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.uat.gcp3.humana.com) *(with dedicated dual-region backups for* `central` *and* `east`*)*
If you only saw those certificates, you might think an engineer spun up a quick sandbox over the summer. But when you pull Humana's full certificate history over the last year, you realize this is the final chapter of a 12-month (or longer, since I can't go back further in the logs) engineering roadmap:

**Timeline:**
**Fall 2025 (The Prototype):** Humana starts testing a "Serverless Service Partner" framework (`svcpart0.dev.ss.serverless.humana.com`), moves it into a brand-new cloud landing zone (`svcpart0.dev.gcp3.humana.com`), and spins up synthetic simulation environments (`sim.dev.gcp3.humana.com`). Right around this window, Counterpart’s own servers revealed a number of [counterparthealth.com](http://counterparthealth.com) subdomains with the word humana in them (the same ones that sent this sub wild and made everyone here instantly obsessed with subdomains) before Clover moved all their staging subdomains behind private wildcard certs.
**Summer 2026:** Humana retires the 'v0' prototype and builds formal, division-specific partner hubs: cw-svcpart (CenterWell Service Partner Gateway) and hum-svcpart (Humana Payer), officially promoting them to Production in August.
**Late August 2026 (Securing the Perimeter):** Humana sets up `svcpartdmz.dev.gcp3.humana.com`—a DMZ gateway specifically built to let an outside vendor’s network safely talk to internal databases.
**September 1, 2026:** The workload enters the pipeline as [`ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com) (Integration Testing).
**September 16, 2026:** Exactly two weeks later, the workload is promoted to ss-cps-crpart across DEV, QA, and UAT, complete with multi-region redundancy across the Midwest and East Coast to ensure clinics don't experience downtime during business hours.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
**Deconstructing the Clues:**
* `gcp3.humana.com`**:** Across thousands of Humana certificates over the past year, `gcp3` is used for only one category of traffic: external Service Partners (svcpart). And inside this entire environment, "crpart" is the only external vendor workload running.
* `cloudrun`**:** Google Cloud Run is an auto-scaling engine that fires up containerized code in milliseconds. It’s what you choose when a primary care physician opens a patient chart in an exam room and needs real-time clinical decision-support prompts to appear instantly.
* `ss-cps`**:** `ss` is Shared Services (Humana’s central integration hub), and `cps` is **CenterWell Primary Care Services / Clinical Platform Services**. This is hooked directly into CenterWell's clinic operations, not back-office actuarial or claims-audit systems.
* **The Linguistic Shorthand:** "Counterpart" is a compound word (Counter + Part). Taking the hard boundary consonants of the first word (**CR**) and combining them with the second word (**part**) gives you `crpart`—standard, lazy developer shorthand.
* **The Smoking Gun in HR:** Months ago, Humana briefly published (and then quickly scrubbed) a CenterWell job listing that explicitly named Counterpart Health within its clinical workflow descriptions.
When you connect the job listing, Counterpart’s reciprocal humana logs, the CenterWell routing tags, and a 12-month engineering buildout ending in UAT, the puzzle pieces fit together almost too well.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
This is where I need your help. If we take off the bull goggles, where does this break down?
**Counterarguments:**
**1. The Taxonomy Problem: What if "part" just means "Partner"?**
In Humana’s plumbing, `svcpart` clearly stands for "Service Partner." If `crpart` follows that exact same naming rule, then `part` simply means "Partner," which leaves `cr` as a standalone two-letter acronym.
* Could `cr` stand for **Cardio-Renal Partner**? Humana and CenterWell run dedicated disease-management programs for seniors suffering from co-occurring heart failure and kidney disease. Could this be a specialized third-party cardio-renal software tool?
* Could it stand for **Clinical Referral Partner**? CenterWell clinics constantly refer seniors to specialists and post-acute facilities. Could this be a referral-management microservice? *(My counter to this: across the entire log, Humana almost universally spells out the word* `care`*—like* `carehub`*,* `findcare`*,* `humanacares`*—and claims systems are always called* `resolutions` *or* `billing`*. But the two-letter acronym risk remains).*
**2. Could it be another healthcare tech vendor?**
Is there another digital health company whose name naturally contracts to "CR-Part"? For example, **CarePort Health** is a massive, widely used patient transition and EHR integration platform in the Medicare space. Could a DevOps engineer have tagged CarePort as `crpart`?
**3. Why would Humana leave a breadcrumb like "crpart" if they are trying to hide the partnership?**
We know Clover went to great lengths to hide their staging environments after Reddit caught them (switching entirely to wildcard certificates). We know Humana scrambled to delete the job posting that mentioned Counterpart. If legal and corporate communications are trying to keep this under wraps under a strict mutual NDA, why would Humana’s infrastructure team turn around and use a subdomain with `crpart` right in the URL? Is it just classic corporate silo behavior (engineers don't talk to PR), or does it suggest that `crpart` is an innocuous internal project that nobody felt the need to hide?
I want to hear from the community: What are the best alternative explanations for this infrastructure?
# _____

**Implications:**
If the skeptical arguments fail and `ss-cps-crpart` really is Counterpart Assistant undergoing final User Acceptance Testing for a CenterWell rollout (presumably beginning with plan-year 2027), the long-term fundamental implications for CLOV are obviously massive. If Humana is adopting this software for its primary care network, it validates the Counterpart business in a huge way.
**The Scale:** CenterWell Senior Primary Care (along with sister network Conviva) operates 350+ clinics serving over 550,000 total senior patients. While CenterWell is payer-agnostic and sees some traditional Medicare patients, roughly 80% to 85% of their patient base is in Medicare Advantage. That gives them a target panel of roughly **450,000 to 500,000 MA patients**.
**The Conservative Software Math:** Forget the aggressive $20–$25 PMPM numbers people throw around. Let’s assume Humana commands massive enterprise volume pricing and negotiates Counterpart down to a conservative **$5.00 to $8.00 Per Member Per Month (PMPM)** software fee:
* An initial rollout across 100k MA patients = **$500k to $800k per month** ($6M–$10M ARR).
* Scaling across their entire MA footprint (\~450k patients) = **$2.25M to $3.6M per month ($27M to $43M in pure ARR)**.
* And that is *just* the base software fee, before factoring in any shared-savings performance bonuses.
\_\_\_\_\_\_
In conclusion, I think this is all likely evidence of a major Counterpart/Humana deal, years in the making, about to go live and into production. Am I delusional?
Even with the assumption that this is true, I DO NOT BELIEVE some kind of announcement or PR is on the horizon in any way. To be honest I'm not sure this alleged deal will ever actually be announced publicly, but I find the CT log breadcrumbs pretty compelling.
I am not giving anyone any advice of any kind. Don't listen to anything I say, I'm stupid and insane.
sentiment 1.00
1 day ago • u/mm_newsletter • r/StockMarket • bending_spoons_bsp_and_the_27x_arr_airtable_deal • Discussion • T
Bending Spoons (BSP) and the 2.7x ARR Airtable deal
sentiment 0.00
19 hr ago • u/lemontoga • r/wallstreetbets • openai_prepares_new_500_per_month_pro_max_plan • C
Did you reply to the wrong comment? I was asking for a source on the frontier model demand. Everything I've seen points to the opposite.
I don't know who was asking about their ARR.
sentiment -0.56
20 hr ago • u/finecloud1499 • r/StockMarket • bending_spoons_bsp_and_the_27x_arr_airtable_deal • C
The 2.7x ARR headline looks appealing, but the roughly 3% organic growth and $4.09B net debt make execution more important than the entry multiple. The key indicator may be whether Airtable retains customers after pricing and operational changes, rather than simply returning to prior valuation levels.
sentiment 0.42
1 day ago • u/Baco06 • r/CLOV • counterpart_humana • Due Dilligence • B
Hello Fellow Clover Investors,

If you go to [crt.sh](http://crt.sh) you can search for a company's digital certificate logs. If you follow this link you can see all of the unexpired crt logs for %.humana.com:
[https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25.humana.com&exclude=expired](https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25.humana.com&exclude=expired)
In there, I found what looks to me (with some help in comprehending and organizing all of this from AI, since I do not work in healthcare and I do not have an IT or software or developer/programmer background) like a methodical, year-long enterprise engineering pipeline to plug external software (Counterpart) directly into CenterWell primary care clinics.
I'm now going to lay out my thesis with the goal of having people chime in and explain to me why I am WRONG. Please tell me where I am oversimplifying, speculating, exaggerating, misinterpreting, extrapolating, or simply being stupid.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
What are digital certificates and crt logs?
Whenever an enterprise wants an application or server to communicate securely over the web (`https://`), it has to get a digital security certificate from an authority like DigiCert. To prevent fraud, global internet rules (specifically RFC 6962) mandate that every single issued certificate must be published in a public, searchable ledger called Certificate Transparency (CT) logs. You literally cannot build a secure web endpoint without filing what is effectively a public building permit.
Big healthcare companies build software in four distinct, gated phases:
* **DEV (Development):** The workshop where coders write the raw software.
* **QA (Quality Assurance):** The automated test track to catch bugs and verify data feeds.
* **UAT (User Acceptance Testing):** UAT is built so *actual end-users*—in this case, clinic medical directors, doctors, and nurses—can log in and verify that the software works smoothly in their day-to-day workflow.
* **PROD (Production):** The live, finished product operating on real patients.
When an enterprise workload advances to UAT, it means the building is built, the pipes are connected, and the staff is doing the final walkthrough before opening day.
On September 1, 2026, Digicert stamped a brand new certificate for Humana:
[ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com](http://ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com)
On September 16, 2026, DigiCert stamped a batch of similarly named, brand-new certificates for Humana:
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com)
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.qa.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.qa.gcp3.humana.com)
* [`ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.uat.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-cps-crpart.cloudrun.uat.gcp3.humana.com) *(with dedicated dual-region backups for* `central` *and* `east`*)*
If you only saw those certificates, you might think an engineer spun up a quick sandbox over the summer. But when you pull Humana's full certificate history over the last year, you realize this is the final chapter of a 12-month (or longer, since I can't go back further in the logs) engineering roadmap:

**Timeline:**
**Fall 2025 (The Prototype):** Humana starts testing a "Serverless Service Partner" framework (`svcpart0.dev.ss.serverless.humana.com`), moves it into a brand-new cloud landing zone (`svcpart0.dev.gcp3.humana.com`), and spins up synthetic simulation environments (`sim.dev.gcp3.humana.com`). Right around this window, Counterpart’s own servers revealed a number of [counterparthealth.com](http://counterparthealth.com) subdomains with the word humana in them (the same ones that sent this sub wild and made everyone here instantly obsessed with subdomains) before Clover moved all their staging subdomains behind private wildcard certs.
**Summer 2026:** Humana retires the 'v0' prototype and builds formal, division-specific partner hubs: cw-svcpart (CenterWell Service Partner Gateway) and hum-svcpart (Humana Payer), officially promoting them to Production in August.
**Late August 2026 (Securing the Perimeter):** Humana sets up `svcpartdmz.dev.gcp3.humana.com`—a DMZ gateway specifically built to let an outside vendor’s network safely talk to internal databases.
**September 1, 2026:** The workload enters the pipeline as [`ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com`](http://ss-it-crpart.cloudrun.dev.gcp3.humana.com) (Integration Testing).
**September 16, 2026:** Exactly two weeks later, the workload is promoted to ss-cps-crpart across DEV, QA, and UAT, complete with multi-region redundancy across the Midwest and East Coast to ensure clinics don't experience downtime during business hours.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
**Deconstructing the Clues:**
* `gcp3.humana.com`**:** Across thousands of Humana certificates over the past year, `gcp3` is used for only one category of traffic: external Service Partners (svcpart). And inside this entire environment, "crpart" is the only external vendor workload running.
* `cloudrun`**:** Google Cloud Run is an auto-scaling engine that fires up containerized code in milliseconds. It’s what you choose when a primary care physician opens a patient chart in an exam room and needs real-time clinical decision-support prompts to appear instantly.
* `ss-cps`**:** `ss` is Shared Services (Humana’s central integration hub), and `cps` is **CenterWell Primary Care Services / Clinical Platform Services**. This is hooked directly into CenterWell's clinic operations, not back-office actuarial or claims-audit systems.
* **The Linguistic Shorthand:** "Counterpart" is a compound word (Counter + Part). Taking the hard boundary consonants of the first word (**CR**) and combining them with the second word (**part**) gives you `crpart`—standard, lazy developer shorthand.
* **The Smoking Gun in HR:** Months ago, Humana briefly published (and then quickly scrubbed) a CenterWell job listing that explicitly named Counterpart Health within its clinical workflow descriptions.
When you connect the job listing, Counterpart’s reciprocal humana logs, the CenterWell routing tags, and a 12-month engineering buildout ending in UAT, the puzzle pieces fit together almost too well.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
This is where I need your help. If we take off the bull goggles, where does this break down?
**Counterarguments:**
**1. The Taxonomy Problem: What if "part" just means "Partner"?**
In Humana’s plumbing, `svcpart` clearly stands for "Service Partner." If `crpart` follows that exact same naming rule, then `part` simply means "Partner," which leaves `cr` as a standalone two-letter acronym.
* Could `cr` stand for **Cardio-Renal Partner**? Humana and CenterWell run dedicated disease-management programs for seniors suffering from co-occurring heart failure and kidney disease. Could this be a specialized third-party cardio-renal software tool?
* Could it stand for **Clinical Referral Partner**? CenterWell clinics constantly refer seniors to specialists and post-acute facilities. Could this be a referral-management microservice? *(My counter to this: across the entire log, Humana almost universally spells out the word* `care`*—like* `carehub`*,* `findcare`*,* `humanacares`*—and claims systems are always called* `resolutions` *or* `billing`*. But the two-letter acronym risk remains).*
**2. Could it be another healthcare tech vendor?**
Is there another digital health company whose name naturally contracts to "CR-Part"? For example, **CarePort Health** is a massive, widely used patient transition and EHR integration platform in the Medicare space. Could a DevOps engineer have tagged CarePort as `crpart`?
**3. Why would Humana leave a breadcrumb like "crpart" if they are trying to hide the partnership?**
We know Clover went to great lengths to hide their staging environments after Reddit caught them (switching entirely to wildcard certificates). We know Humana scrambled to delete the job posting that mentioned Counterpart. If legal and corporate communications are trying to keep this under wraps under a strict mutual NDA, why would Humana’s infrastructure team turn around and use a subdomain with `crpart` right in the URL? Is it just classic corporate silo behavior (engineers don't talk to PR), or does it suggest that `crpart` is an innocuous internal project that nobody felt the need to hide?
I want to hear from the community: What are the best alternative explanations for this infrastructure?
# _____

**Implications:**
If the skeptical arguments fail and `ss-cps-crpart` really is Counterpart Assistant undergoing final User Acceptance Testing for a CenterWell rollout (presumably beginning with plan-year 2027), the long-term fundamental implications for CLOV are obviously massive. If Humana is adopting this software for its primary care network, it validates the Counterpart business in a huge way.
**The Scale:** CenterWell Senior Primary Care (along with sister network Conviva) operates 350+ clinics serving over 550,000 total senior patients. While CenterWell is payer-agnostic and sees some traditional Medicare patients, roughly 80% to 85% of their patient base is in Medicare Advantage. That gives them a target panel of roughly **450,000 to 500,000 MA patients**.
**The Conservative Software Math:** Forget the aggressive $20–$25 PMPM numbers people throw around. Let’s assume Humana commands massive enterprise volume pricing and negotiates Counterpart down to a conservative **$5.00 to $8.00 Per Member Per Month (PMPM)** software fee:
* An initial rollout across 100k MA patients = **$500k to $800k per month** ($6M–$10M ARR).
* Scaling across their entire MA footprint (\~450k patients) = **$2.25M to $3.6M per month ($27M to $43M in pure ARR)**.
* And that is *just* the base software fee, before factoring in any shared-savings performance bonuses.
\_\_\_\_\_\_
In conclusion, I think this is all likely evidence of a major Counterpart/Humana deal, years in the making, about to go live and into production. Am I delusional?
Even with the assumption that this is true, I DO NOT BELIEVE some kind of announcement or PR is on the horizon in any way. To be honest I'm not sure this alleged deal will ever actually be announced publicly, but I find the CT log breadcrumbs pretty compelling.
I am not giving anyone any advice of any kind. Don't listen to anything I say, I'm stupid and insane.
sentiment 1.00
1 day ago • u/mm_newsletter • r/StockMarket • bending_spoons_bsp_and_the_27x_arr_airtable_deal • Discussion • T
Bending Spoons (BSP) and the 2.7x ARR Airtable deal
sentiment 0.00
2 days ago • u/GoForBarney83 • r/wallstreetbets • adbe_is_down_60_while_the_company_keeps_making • DD • B
TL;DR: Wall Street has apparently concluded that because ChatGPT can generate an image of Shrek fighting Jerome Powell in the Costco parking lot, Adobe is now a dying company.
Unfortunately, Adobe has neglected to die.
Revenue: growing. Subscriptions: growing. Cash flow: growing. Users: growing. Shares outstanding: shrinking. Stock price: LMAOOOOOOOO
ADBE is around $239 and roughly 13x trailing GAAP earnings. I think Mr. Market has suffered a traumatic brain injury.
Not financial advice. I learned DCF approximately 15 minutes ago and immediately became dangerous.
# I FOUND THIS SHIT BY ACCIDENT
I was looking for reasonably priced companies because apparently buying businesses based on the amount of money they make is something people used to do before we invented 0DTE options, found Adobe, opened the 5Y chart.
\-60%.
Jesus Christ.
Did Photoshop give everyone AIDS? Did Acrobat assassinate the president? Did Premiere Pro become Premiere Amateur?
I assumed something catastrophic happened.
So, against my better judgment, I did something deeply inappropriate for this subreddit: I opened the fucking 10-K.
And then things got weird. Revenue went up. Cash flow went up. Earnings went up. Subscription revenue went up. Shares outstanding went down. The company improved. But the stock got taken behind the Wendy's and shot.
So either:
A) I am missing something enormous;
B) AI is about to murder this company so violently that the financial statements simply haven't noticed yet; or
C) Mr. Market is being a fucking idiot.
Welcome to my DD.
# PART I: 2021 — EVERYONE WAS ON CRACK
Adobe peaked near $688 in 2021.
This was the era when interest rates were approximately fuck all, every software company was apparently going to conquer the planet, and Jerome Powell was discovering new toner cartridges.
Let's see what you actually got for your $688.
FY2021:
Operating cash flow: $7.230B
Capex: $348M
Therefore conventional FCF: $6.882B
SBC: $1.069B
Now, some people add SBC back and pretend it isn't an expense. I have developed an innovative accounting framework called: PAYING EMPLOYEES COSTS MONEY. So $6.882B - $1.069B = $5.813B
Adobe had roughly 476M shares. Economic cash generation: \~$12.20/share. At \~$688: \~56x.
If Adobe distributed every fucking dollar to you and never grew again, you'd make your money back sometime around the heat death of the universe.
Great business. Fucking psychotic price.
# PART II: THE COMPANY GOT BETTER AND EVERYONE DECIDED THEY HATE IT
Adobe FY2025:
Revenue: $23.769B
Subscription revenue: $22.904B
Operating cash flow: $10.031B
Capex: $179M
About 96% of revenue is subscriptions. This company generates $24 billion a year selling software that already exists to people who mostly already use it. Do you understand how fucking beautiful that business model is?
# PART III: I PUT ON A BERKSHIRE HAT AND STARTED SAYING "OWNER EARNINGS"
Trailing operating cash flow: \~$10.8B
Capex: \~$0.2B
SBC: \~$2.1B
$10.8B - $0.2B - $2.1B = \~$8.5B
Then I rounded it DOWN to $8B because unlike an equity research analyst trying to hit his price target, I am capable of subtracting numbers from my own thesis.
Shares outstanding: \~389M
Owner earnings/share: \~$20.55
Stock: \~$239
Therefore: \~11.6x normalized owner earnings, \~8.6% owner-earnings yield. GAAP P/E: \~13x.
I checked this several times because I assumed I'd accidentally divided by the population of Nebraska.
# PART IV: GENERATIVE AI HAS APPARENTLY KILLED ADOBE
# 🚨 BREAKING NEWS 🚨
ADOBE IS FUCKED. CHATGPT CAN MAKE PICTURES. EVERYONE PANIC. SELL PHOTOSHOP. SELL ILLUSTRATOR. SELL ACROBAT. SELL THE FUCKING OFFICE CHAIRS.
There is only one small problem.
Adobe's latest quarter:
Revenue: +13% YoY
Subscription revenue: \~+14%
Nine-month revenue: \~+13%
Monthly active users: MORE THAN ONE BILLION
AI-first ARR: +150%+ YoY
Apparently Adobe's customers have not yet received the Reddit DD explaining why they should stop giving Adobe money.
**ONE BILLION FUCKING PEOPLE.**
Pause. Adobe says its creativity and productivity products have more than **1,000,000,000 MONTHLY ACTIVE USERS.**
There are a little over 8 billion humans. Roughly one human in eight uses this shit monthly. Imagine lining up humanity. Chinese guy, Indian guy, American guy, Nigerian guy, Brazilian guy, Indonesian guy, German guy**,** some motherfucker trying to rotate a PDF.
Repeat until Finland. This is apparently our dying software company.
**"BUT MIDJOURNEY CAN MAKE A PICTURE"**
Correct.
Observe: "make me an image of Warren Buffett wearing Supreme while riding a velociraptor through Times Square."
Boom. AI. Adobe bankrupt.
Except professional creative work occasionally requires slightly more precision than "make dinosaur cooler." Try "change these two pixels from #ffffff to #fffff0".
AI: "Certainly! I've completely redesigned the background, added a woman with seven fingers, changed your company's logo to Cyrillic and somehow inserted a lamp."
Professional: "for fuck's sake" *opens Photoshop*.
Adobe: that will be $22.99/month.
**PHOTOSHOP IS NOT A FUCKING IMAGE SLOT MACHINE**
This is the part I think people miss. Generative AI is extremely good at "give me something approximately like this." Professional software exists for "give me EXACTLY this."
AI is not necessarily a replacement for that environment, it's another tool inside the environment. So Adobe doesn't need to defeat generative AI, it needs to put a button in Photoshop that says:
**DO THE AI SHIT**
Which is basically what Firefly is.
**PREMIERE PRO: APPARENTLY HOLLYWOOD WILL JUST TYPE THE MOVIE NOW**
AI will automate video editing. But eventually an editor still needs:
FRAME 182,736. CUT. No. ONE FRAME EARLIER. Audio starts here. Use Take 4. Color this shot. Fix that transition. Why is the fucking boom mic visible? Undo. UNDO.
**CTRL+Z CTRL+Z CTRL+Z CTRL+Z**
Congratulations. You have reinvented Premiere Pro. Christopher Nolan is not going to type "make Oppenheimer but 14 minutes shorter and more whimsical" and send the resulting .mp4 to IMAX.
**ILLUSTRATOR**
AI: "here is your beautiful new corporate logo."
Client: "fantastic, can I have the vector file?"
AI: "no"
Client: "pantone colors?"
AI: "no"
Client: "editable paths?"
AI: "no"
Client: "can you make the logo exactly 4.2% wider without changing anything else?"
AI: *creates a completely different logo*
Designer: *opens Illustrator*
Adobe: *+1 subscription*
**ACROBAT: THE SOFTWARE COCKROACH THAT WILL OUTLIVE HUMANITY**
I cannot emphasize this enough.
**PDFS ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE.**
Civilization could collapse tomorrow. Electricity disappears. Nation-states dissolve. The oceans boil. Four humans remain alive. One of them will email another like **"**Contract\_FINAL\_v2\_FINAL\_USETHISONE\_revised(4).pdf".
Lawyers use PDFs. Courts use PDFs. Governments use PDFs. Banks use PDFs. Universities use PDFs. Doctors use PDFs. Accountants use PDFs. Your fucking refrigerator manual is a PDF.
Adobe says 18B+ PDFs were edited with Acrobat in the last year. Now Adobe puts AI inside Acrobat: "Summarize this document. Compare these contracts. Find the indemnity clause. Extract this table. Explain page 69. Find where opposing counsel buried the bullshit." This doesn't sound like AI killing Acrobat. This sounds like Acrobat ate AI and gained its powers.
**"CANVA IS GOING TO KILL ADOBE"**
Canva was founded in 2013. It's 2026. Adobe apparently forgot to die from that too. The person who needs "cute invitation for Brayden's 7th birthday" doesn't need Photoshop.
Great.
They haven't needed Photoshop for a fucking decade. I don't need Adobe to monopolize suburban birthday invitations. I need Adobe to remain embedded in professional workflows.
Different fucking market.
# PART V: THE MONEY PRINTER IS RUNNING BACKWARDS
Adobe share repurchases:
FY2023: \~$4.4B
FY2024: \~$9.5B
FY2025: \~$11.3B
2026: Board authorizes another $25B.
Normal tech company:
**BRRRRRRRRR NEW SHARES**
Adobe:
**SCHLORRRRRRP GIVE THEM BACK**
Shares outstanding have fallen massively from where they were years ago.
This matters because if the company earns $8B: $8B / 500M shares = $16/share. $8B / 400M shares = $20/share.
Same pie, fewer idiots at the table. More pie per idiot. I am one of the idiots.
# NOW LOOK AT THIS FUCKING COMPARISON
**2021**
Economic cash earning power/share:\~$12
Stock: up to \~$688
Multiple: \~50-56x
Market: "Holy fuck Adobe take my retirement account."
**2026**
Normalized owner earnings/share: \~$20.55
Stock: \~$239
Multiple: \~11.6x
Market: "Photoshop? In THIS economy? Disgusting."
# ?????????
EARNING POWER PER SHARE:
📈📈📈
STOCK:
📉📉📉📉📉
MULTIPLE:
**FELL DOWN THE FUCKING STAIRS**
This is the entire DD.
Everything else is me refusing to shut up.
# TO BE CLEAR: I MAY BE EXTREMELY WRONG
Here's the actual bear case.
AI could reduce seats. 10 designers become 7 designers + AI. That's bad. Canva/Figma/AI-native products can destroy the low end. Bad. AI inference is expensive. Margins could compress. Bad. Adobe could completely fuck up monetization. Bad. Subscription revenue has inertia, meaning current revenue growth could conceal weakening new customer economics. Very important.
Maybe the market sees the iceberg and I'm standing on the Titanic explaining that quarterly champagne consumption remains at record levels. Entirely possible.
# BUT HERE'S WHAT I DON'T NEED
I do NOT need:
* 13% growth forever;
* AI monopoly;
* Firefly world domination;
* Photoshop installed in every toaster;
* $700 ADBE;
* A 50x multiple;
* Sam Altman personally surrendering.
I need Adobe to remain a good business. That's basically it. At an \~8-9% normalized owner-earnings yield, modest per-share growth already gets interesting. If Adobe eventually grows like some boring mature software company? Fine. If current double-digit growth lasts longer than the market expects? Very fine. If earnings grow AND someday investors decide Adobe isn't Blockbuster with layers? OH FUCK.
# HOW I'D KNOW I'M REGARDED
If ARR persistently declines. If professional users start abandoning Creative Cloud. If owner earnings structurally decline. If pricing power disappears. If AI compute destroys margins. If buybacks stop actually shrinking the share count because SBC goes apeshit. If Hollywood fires its editors and Avengers 9 is generated entirely by a Discord bot... I will close the position and issue a formal apology to the bears.
Until then, I'm watching the business, not the scary red line on Yahoo Finance.
# CONCLUSION
Five years ago, great company with a fucking stupid price. Today, great company with a suspiciously normal price. Wall Street apparently sees Adobe and thinks legacy software company about to get annihilated by AI.
I see:
* \~13% current revenue growth
* \~14% subscription growth
* 1B+ MAUs
* enormous recurring revenue
* huge cash generation
* minimal physical capex
* shrinking share count
* \~13x GAAP earnings
* \~11-12x my normalized owner earnings
Maybe Wall Street knows something I don't. Maybe I'm about to learn a very expensive lesson about efficient markets. But I went looking for the dying business supposedly hiding underneath this five-year chart.
I CANNOT FIND THE FUCKING BODY. ADBE \~$239.
Bears, please explain where the corpse is before I financially inconvenience myself.
# SOURCES BECAUSE APPARENTLY WE DO THAT HERE NOW
**Adobe FY2021 10-K**
[https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634322000032/adbe-20211203.htm](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634322000032/adbe-20211203.htm)
**Adobe FY2025 10-K**
[https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000003/adbe-20251128.htm](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000003/adbe-20251128.htm)
**Adobe Q3 FY2026 10-Q**
[https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000156/adbe-20260828.htm](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000156/adbe-20260828.htm)
**Adobe Q3 FY2026 earnings release**
[https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000147/adbeex991q326.htm](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000147/adbeex991q326.htm)
sentiment 0.74
2 days ago • u/Zstocks6607 • r/ValueInvesting • panw_ai_may_make_cybersecurity_more_essential_not • AI-Written Content • B
# PANW: AI May Make Cybersecurity More Essential, Not Less
**Palo Alto Networks (PANW) trades around $390.** The company is increasingly moving beyond its firewall roots toward a broad enterprise security platform spanning Network & AI Security, Cortex, Cloud and Identity.
FY2026 revenue reached **$11.48B, up 24.5%**, while Q4 revenue increased 34% to $3.41B. The most important operating metric was Next-Generation Security ARR, which reached **$9.1B, up 63% YoY**. Remaining performance obligations rose 34% to $21.2B, while FY2026 adjusted free-cash-flow margin reached an exceptional **38.4%**.
Management guides FY2027 revenue to **$14.1–14.2B, up 23–24%**, NGS ARR to roughly $11.1B, and adjusted FCF margin to 38%. PANW has also launched an AI-powered continuous security service using advanced models including Claude and GPT, reinforcing the thesis that more AI adoption may create more security demand rather than less.
The weakness in the thesis is valuation. PANW's market cap is already around **$319B**, and forward earnings multiples remain extremely demanding. Consensus price targets are also close to the current share price, suggesting that a substantial amount of growth is already reflected in valuation.
**Bottom line:** PANW is one of the strongest ways to express the AI-security theme, but at today's valuation, execution has to remain exceptional.
sentiment 0.92


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