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ROIC
Retail Opportunity Investments Corp.
stock NASDAQ

Inactive
Feb 12, 2025
17.49USD0.000%(0.00)5,572,105
Pre-market
0.00USD-100.000%(-17.49)0
After-hours
0.00USD0.000%(0.00)0
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ROIC Reddit Mentions
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We have sentiment values and mention counts going back to 2017. The complete data set is available via the API.
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ROIC Specific Mentions
As of Jul 4, 2026 12:38:40 AM EDT (<1 min. ago)
Includes all comments and posts. Mentions per user per ticker capped at one per hour.
9 hr ago • u/Alert_Win359 • r/stocks • ge_vernova_sellhold • C
GE vernova earnings and ROIC are superior to Siemens
sentiment 0.54
9 hr ago • u/_quantitative • r/ValueInvesting • repost_for_the_this_industry_will_change_the • C
Yes I am, and thanks; I appreciate it.
ASML and TSM have competitive advantages which keep their ROIC high and not get competed down, and those moats keep competition deterred from entering. So it's arguably not-so-easily replicable.
However, for airlines, transporting you from one place to another is a commodity, much like a product. you can choose either united or american to take you from LA to NYC at the same time, and you'd opt for whichever is cheaper.
Again, it does not mean moats are permanent; there are mechanism why a high moat company like Intel/IBM from 20 years ago are not market leader in their segment today
I have explained why this happens in much more detail in the article.
sentiment 0.95
14 hr ago • u/GoldenPresidio • r/wallstreetbets • meta_explores_partnership_with_samsung_for_77 • C
I personally see it as a great business. Yes margin / ROIC is lower than their ads business but it’s an incredibly sticky business with low risk to have over supply when they have a built in demand driver (with more as they acquire/build up new businesses). I also think about it as creating a moat incase social media sentiment sours or goes to the next big thing as it’s an infrastructure business.
All this does in my opinion is maximize net profits for shareholders but I understand why some people wouldn’t be happy. They allocated capital to the business based on a low capex view point but man those days are gone across all the hyperscalers.
sentiment 0.80
15 hr ago • u/SuperbPercentage8050 • r/IndianStockMarket • tcs_is_at_2000_the_monthly_rsi_is_flashing_a • C
No, that's not the right lens to value TCS and compare it to companies that have structural moats, network effects, pricing power, and a very long reinvestment runway for growth. TCS, or almost any Indian IT company, lacks almost all the reinvestment and expansion engines.
The companies you have mentioned have some of the strongest pricing power on this planet. They have multiple expansion opportunities within their ecosystems.
Meta, for example, is a floating model. If one region gets saturated, they expand further. When one revenue stream gets saturated, they create a new stream of growth. They have the best ad-targeting pricing power and still have more than a decade of reinvestment runway because they operate in a very large TAM. They have both the innovation engine and the reinvestment engine, so even on the same base they can keep adding new layers and expanding. The Asian region itself is hardly monetized, and the WhatsApp ecosystem is just getting started, which is where the principal reinvestment can happen.
Apple has insane pricing power, and then they layered it with services to grow deeper and improve margins. Their reinvestment engine first came through products, then within products, and then through services.
Microsoft is the rarest of the rare because it has the DNA of successful cloning to create new reinvestment markets. Again, they have insane pricing power. It was available at 12-15 multiples only a decade ago, but then they got a massive reinvestment runway in a very large TAM through cloud, Azure, and now AI. There were structural reasons for those things to happen.
Now map that to TCS. Do they innovate? No. Do they have the DNA to do that? Absolutely not. Can they charge a premium and have pricing power? No. And whatever was left is getting more commoditized as well.
You can make such arguments only when there are signals from the business state that a new reinvestment cycle can happen. They had those cash flows from 2014-2015. Were they creating a new reinvestment runway? Absolutely not. They were just focusing on inflating EPS through buybacks at idiotic valuations and destroying shareholder value, while the rest was paid out as dividends.
The companies you are comparing TCS to, look at how many of them pay dividends, and in what proportion. I can give you endless reasons.
The too big argument applies only when certain variables are present. It depends on the TAM, the market share a company has within that TAM, the ROIC, the reinvestment runway, and the structural moat around the business model.
They create new TAMs. Alphabet invests in innovation, and now a trillion-dollar autonomous vehicle TAM has been created. The TPU TAM has been created. The cloud TAM was created. The digital advertising TAM already exists. Then you map how much of that TAM has already been captured by the company you are willing to buy.
And even the current IPO of NSE, for which the whole world is excited, is not going to create value because it's already operating at almost 90% of the TAM it serves. There is hardly any reinvestment runway left. BSE, on the other hand, still has the runway to take market share from NSE.
NSE is a great business model and has insane pricing power, but it lacks the reinvestment engine. Compounding at its core is about ROIC, the reinvestment engine, and the TAM. That's why the pools become so critical.
Even Amazon, because I'm giving you examples, so why not take all the MAG 7? Amazon still has an insane TAM. Only around 40% of its ecosystem is e commerce, so the first reinvestment engine is there itself. Then comes its advertising vertical, which is still in its early stages. Again, that's an insane high margin TAM. That's why it compounds, because it can keep reinvesting as it operates in massive TAMs.
Then you compare where the reinvestment is happening. Is it happening at higher margins and higher ROIC, or lower? If it's lower, it's against capital creation and moves towards capital destruction, which is what ITC has done to its shareholders.
Now take Bajaj Finance. It has a TAM to reinvest into for the next two decades because the TAM itself is currently around 900 billion, and by 2035 it is expected to reach around 2.3 trillion. Yet it still has only around 5-6% of that TAM, so the reinvestment engine can keep operating for a very long time.
Now layer that with the moat. How strongly can it invest, defend the moat, and keep expanding? Because capitalism is brutal. It always attracts competition.
On the other hand, I don't remember the exact figure, but Asian Paints TAM is only around 80-100 billion, and Asian Paints already occupies almost 50-60% of that TAM. So there isn't a meaningful reinvestment runway left after that, and the stock was trading at 100x multiples.
Look at Asian Paints. For almost a decade, it has been trying to expand by going into lighting, tiles, wallpaper, and sanitaryware because if they don't expand the TAM and create new reinvestment runways, the compounding stops.
Now, the majority of the things they are trying are not working, and their core business model is operating in a saturated TAM. So what are they doing now? They are trying to layer high-end premium versions and services because if they don't, the share price will stagnate.
And this is exactly what will happen to all the investors who paid ridiculous multiples of 100-120x for this company in 2022. It will almost be a lost decade for those investors if Asian Paints is unsuccessful in creating new reinvestment runways.
And reinvestment runways exist in every direction. Whether you have a reinvestment runway through pricing power, through profits, through services, through new products, or through expanding into entirely new TAMs.
sentiment 0.97
9 hr ago • u/Alert_Win359 • r/stocks • ge_vernova_sellhold • C
GE vernova earnings and ROIC are superior to Siemens
sentiment 0.54
9 hr ago • u/_quantitative • r/ValueInvesting • repost_for_the_this_industry_will_change_the • C
Yes I am, and thanks; I appreciate it.
ASML and TSM have competitive advantages which keep their ROIC high and not get competed down, and those moats keep competition deterred from entering. So it's arguably not-so-easily replicable.
However, for airlines, transporting you from one place to another is a commodity, much like a product. you can choose either united or american to take you from LA to NYC at the same time, and you'd opt for whichever is cheaper.
Again, it does not mean moats are permanent; there are mechanism why a high moat company like Intel/IBM from 20 years ago are not market leader in their segment today
I have explained why this happens in much more detail in the article.
sentiment 0.95
14 hr ago • u/GoldenPresidio • r/wallstreetbets • meta_explores_partnership_with_samsung_for_77 • C
I personally see it as a great business. Yes margin / ROIC is lower than their ads business but it’s an incredibly sticky business with low risk to have over supply when they have a built in demand driver (with more as they acquire/build up new businesses). I also think about it as creating a moat incase social media sentiment sours or goes to the next big thing as it’s an infrastructure business.
All this does in my opinion is maximize net profits for shareholders but I understand why some people wouldn’t be happy. They allocated capital to the business based on a low capex view point but man those days are gone across all the hyperscalers.
sentiment 0.80
15 hr ago • u/SuperbPercentage8050 • r/IndianStockMarket • tcs_is_at_2000_the_monthly_rsi_is_flashing_a • C
No, that's not the right lens to value TCS and compare it to companies that have structural moats, network effects, pricing power, and a very long reinvestment runway for growth. TCS, or almost any Indian IT company, lacks almost all the reinvestment and expansion engines.
The companies you have mentioned have some of the strongest pricing power on this planet. They have multiple expansion opportunities within their ecosystems.
Meta, for example, is a floating model. If one region gets saturated, they expand further. When one revenue stream gets saturated, they create a new stream of growth. They have the best ad-targeting pricing power and still have more than a decade of reinvestment runway because they operate in a very large TAM. They have both the innovation engine and the reinvestment engine, so even on the same base they can keep adding new layers and expanding. The Asian region itself is hardly monetized, and the WhatsApp ecosystem is just getting started, which is where the principal reinvestment can happen.
Apple has insane pricing power, and then they layered it with services to grow deeper and improve margins. Their reinvestment engine first came through products, then within products, and then through services.
Microsoft is the rarest of the rare because it has the DNA of successful cloning to create new reinvestment markets. Again, they have insane pricing power. It was available at 12-15 multiples only a decade ago, but then they got a massive reinvestment runway in a very large TAM through cloud, Azure, and now AI. There were structural reasons for those things to happen.
Now map that to TCS. Do they innovate? No. Do they have the DNA to do that? Absolutely not. Can they charge a premium and have pricing power? No. And whatever was left is getting more commoditized as well.
You can make such arguments only when there are signals from the business state that a new reinvestment cycle can happen. They had those cash flows from 2014-2015. Were they creating a new reinvestment runway? Absolutely not. They were just focusing on inflating EPS through buybacks at idiotic valuations and destroying shareholder value, while the rest was paid out as dividends.
The companies you are comparing TCS to, look at how many of them pay dividends, and in what proportion. I can give you endless reasons.
The too big argument applies only when certain variables are present. It depends on the TAM, the market share a company has within that TAM, the ROIC, the reinvestment runway, and the structural moat around the business model.
They create new TAMs. Alphabet invests in innovation, and now a trillion-dollar autonomous vehicle TAM has been created. The TPU TAM has been created. The cloud TAM was created. The digital advertising TAM already exists. Then you map how much of that TAM has already been captured by the company you are willing to buy.
And even the current IPO of NSE, for which the whole world is excited, is not going to create value because it's already operating at almost 90% of the TAM it serves. There is hardly any reinvestment runway left. BSE, on the other hand, still has the runway to take market share from NSE.
NSE is a great business model and has insane pricing power, but it lacks the reinvestment engine. Compounding at its core is about ROIC, the reinvestment engine, and the TAM. That's why the pools become so critical.
Even Amazon, because I'm giving you examples, so why not take all the MAG 7? Amazon still has an insane TAM. Only around 40% of its ecosystem is e commerce, so the first reinvestment engine is there itself. Then comes its advertising vertical, which is still in its early stages. Again, that's an insane high margin TAM. That's why it compounds, because it can keep reinvesting as it operates in massive TAMs.
Then you compare where the reinvestment is happening. Is it happening at higher margins and higher ROIC, or lower? If it's lower, it's against capital creation and moves towards capital destruction, which is what ITC has done to its shareholders.
Now take Bajaj Finance. It has a TAM to reinvest into for the next two decades because the TAM itself is currently around 900 billion, and by 2035 it is expected to reach around 2.3 trillion. Yet it still has only around 5-6% of that TAM, so the reinvestment engine can keep operating for a very long time.
Now layer that with the moat. How strongly can it invest, defend the moat, and keep expanding? Because capitalism is brutal. It always attracts competition.
On the other hand, I don't remember the exact figure, but Asian Paints TAM is only around 80-100 billion, and Asian Paints already occupies almost 50-60% of that TAM. So there isn't a meaningful reinvestment runway left after that, and the stock was trading at 100x multiples.
Look at Asian Paints. For almost a decade, it has been trying to expand by going into lighting, tiles, wallpaper, and sanitaryware because if they don't expand the TAM and create new reinvestment runways, the compounding stops.
Now, the majority of the things they are trying are not working, and their core business model is operating in a saturated TAM. So what are they doing now? They are trying to layer high-end premium versions and services because if they don't, the share price will stagnate.
And this is exactly what will happen to all the investors who paid ridiculous multiples of 100-120x for this company in 2022. It will almost be a lost decade for those investors if Asian Paints is unsuccessful in creating new reinvestment runways.
And reinvestment runways exist in every direction. Whether you have a reinvestment runway through pricing power, through profits, through services, through new products, or through expanding into entirely new TAMs.
sentiment 0.97
1 day ago • u/ValueSeeker1 • r/ValueInvesting • zoetis_zts_70_gross_margins_20_roic_and_now_11x • C
The Elanco comparison really drives it home. The spread in ROIC and margins is honestly wild for companies in the same sector. Even if ZTS margins compress 200-300bps from competitive pressure, they'd still be head and shoulders above everyone else in animal health.
sentiment 0.36
1 day ago • u/Weekly_Ganache5192 • r/ValueInvesting • monotaro_stock_japanese_b2b_company • Discussion • B
I dont know if anybody ever mentioned this stock on this sub. I invested a small position of my portfolio a few months ago, maybe 1 percent of the portfolio into the company and its down since but i am still very comfortable with the numbers.
They are a provider of simple industrial material in the japanese market, giant online platform. I checked the market share in japan with gemini so no safety on that one but it told me that they expanded market share around 25 percent but overall just hold 4 percent in the japan market. They also expand into other markets such as indonesia and india. They deliver products very quickly and got a pretty good supply chain but the market in japan is still very much fragmented and many small businesses still shop at small vendors. The thing i am a bit worried about the company is, that they don't have a really realiable moat expect of infrastructure of the supply chain, the range of inventory they deliver, and the network effects. Of course a headwind might be the aging japanese population and therefore reduction of the mercants in Japan really needing the products. However because of expansion into other markets i am not too worried about it.
Otherwise fundamentals seem strong to me. They tripled revenue, earnings per share and profit since 2019. Free cashflow would cover debt in one year and they got a ton of cash around. Cashflow was shrinking but turned in recent years and is now growing even tho 2025 was a dip again. They also got a ROIC of 27 and a gross margin of 27.
however, the P/E of around 26 could be high and it is in an downward trend which could of course still be a falling knife.
however i am quite positive on the company and wondering if i am overlooking anything with this japanese company or if it could be a solid boring business with good growth. Has anyone else ever checked it out or any thoughts on it?
sentiment 0.99
2 days ago • u/MoatVestor • r/ValueInvesting • uber_the_business_thesis_played_out_the_stock • Detailed Investment Analysis • B
Uber is the cleanest example I've found of the question value investors actually wrestle with: what do you do when a genuinely great business is trading at a merely *fair* price?
Quick context for the setup. Bill Ackman's Pershing Square began building an Uber position in **Q1 2025** — the quarter it first appears in their 13F — accumulating while the stock traded in roughly the **low-$60s to mid-$70s**, then going public on Feb 7, 2025 with a **\~$2.3B stake (30.3M shares)** that instantly became his largest position. He called Uber *"one of the best managed and highest quality businesses in the world,"* trading at *"a massive discount to its intrinsic value."* (13Fs don't disclose cost basis, so any exact average is an estimate — but that entry window sits right in the value band this framework flags.) And he's stayed: as of the Q1 2026 13F, Uber is still a **top-3 position at \~30M shares**. Since then the business has delivered, the stock ran to \~$100 last October, and it has round-tripped back to \~$75.
So I ran **today's** Uber through a strict, Buffett/Graham-style framework — four lenses: **Meaning, Moat, Management, Margin of Safety** — then leaned on the AI behind it for the parts a scorecard can't settle. Full teardown below.
**The moat: genuinely wide, and strengthening**
Uber's moat is a network effect compounded by efficient scale — more riders pull in more drivers, which cuts wait times, which pulls in more riders. The two-sided Mobility + Delivery structure means Uber Eats' courier density partly subsidizes customer acquisition for the whole platform.
The financials confirm the network is now *converting to cash*, which is the real test of whether a platform moat is durable or illusory. Annualized growth rates across the windows:
**Revenue:** \~25–31%/yr across the 5/7/10-year windows — remarkably steady
**Operating cash & FCF:** accelerating hard — Op. Cash +146% and FCF +193% in the latest 3-year window, the crossover from scale-*investment* to scale-*harvesting*
**10-year compounded growth: \~50%/yr vs. \~13% for the S&P**
Every growth axis scores at or near the top — Revenue, Equity, Operating Cash, and FCF all max out at 100. The one that stands out the other way is **earnings, scoring 75**, dragged by 1-year earnings growth of just \~4% — worth flagging honestly, because it's the single metric that lags all the others and bears watching (cost pressure, or one-time items?). Still, four of five moat axes pinned at 100 and the fifth at 75 is broad-based strength, not one fragile pillar.
**Honest soft edges:** Lyft (US), DoorDash/Instacart (delivery), and Grab/DiDi (international) all compete directly, and driver loyalty is thin because most drivers multi-app. The moat is real but not impenetrable. The single thing I'd watch is **take rate** over the next few quarters — if it holds or expands while gross bookings grow, pricing power is intact; if it compresses, the moat is being tested where the historical data can't yet show it.
**Management: the honest part (and where a framework earns its keep)**
This is the screen that separates a disciplined process from cheerleading.
The turnaround under Dara Khosrowshahi is **real and visible in the numbers**:
Return on equity: **−24% (10-yr avg) → +37% (last year)**
Net-debt leverage fell from **2.30x → 0.71x**, and net debt / FCF is **0.47x**(leverage risk basically off the table)
Buybacks have *started* — notable for a company that spent most of its life diluting shareholders
But here's what the framework refuses to wave away:
**ROIC is only \~11%** — improving, but it hasn't crossed the \~15% line that signals consistent wealth compounding. On a 10-year average, returns on capital are still dragged down by a decade of capital destruction.
The management quality score lands at **"good, not great"** — competent and clearly improving, but **stock-based comp dilution is still meaningful**, and insider ownership is modest.
When I pushed the AI on whether the turnaround makes this a "buy the management" story, it didn't cheerlead — it flagged that Uber is earning above its cost of capital *only recently*, so the jury is still out on whether that discipline is structural or cyclical. That's the read I trust: *the balance sheet is fixed; this is not yet a proven compounder.* Whether the new buybacks are sustained and accretive — versus a one-off — is the real test of whether management has shifted its shareholder orientation. The framework scores the decade, not the highlight reel.
**Margin of safety: this is the close call**
Three price anchors, increasingly conservative:
**Intrinsic value:** \~$120/share
**Earnings-payback price:** \~$74.67
**Strict 50%-discount buy price:** \~$60
At \~$75, the stock sits **right on top of** the earnings-payback anchor — barely **$0.30 above it** — and roughly 25% above the strict $60 buy price. So it has cleared the most constructive of the three zones, but not the two stricter ones. The verdict lands at **"Fair" margin of safety**: real, but thinner than the textbook 50% discount.
One thing I appreciate: the framework doesn't extrapolate peak growth. Uber compounded \~50%/yr over the past decade, but the model **caps the forward growth assumption at 15%**— so the \~$120 intrinsic estimate is built on a conservative rate, not a heroic one. That built-in conservatism is *why* the value anchors sit where they do.
This is exactly where reasonable value investors split, and I don't think there's one right answer:
**Some are fine buying here** — it's essentially *at* a legitimate value anchor (under 1% above), the business quality is high, and holding out for a perfect entry can mean never owning a compounder at all.
**Some want all three anchors to line up**before committing, and would rather pass than bet on a stock that may never trade back to the $60s.
**Many split the difference and scale in via tranches** — a starter position near this level, adding on weakness toward the stricter prices — so you're neither chasing nor sitting out.
What the framework won't do is pretend a fair price is a screaming bargain. It's saying: good business, roughly fair value, thin margin — size and pace your entry accordingly.
**The wildcard nobody's framework can price: autonomous vehicles**
A scorecard is useless here — so this is where I stopped reading numbers and started arguing with the AI behind the tool, which reasons over the actual figures. Instead of a verdict, I had it steelman both sides.
**The bull read:** the Waymo/WeRide partnerships position Uber as the *demand-aggregation layer*rather than the vehicle operator — potentially eliminating its single biggest cost (drivers) while the network effect stays entirely intact.
**The bear read:** the mirror image — Waymo or Tesla bypass Uber entirely and build direct-to-consumer robotaxi networks, attacking the demand side of the moat in exactly the high-density markets that drive the economics.
Then the genuinely useful part. I asked it what single number would tell me which way this is actually breaking — and instead of hedging, it pointed at the **take rate** over the next four quarters. If it holds or expands while gross bookings grow, pricing power is intact; if it compresses under driver-incentive pressure or discounting, the moat is being tested in the one place the historical data can't yet show.
That's the judgment call no model prices. Having something grounded in the real numbers argue both sides and then hand me the one metric that settles it is a lot more useful than a rating — but this part's on you to underwrite, not the spreadsheet.
**The takeaway**
A framework that only flags what's *good* is useless. The useful signal here is the distinction it forces: Uber is clearly a good *business* (wide moat, real turnaround, cash finally compounding), and at \~$75 it's a *fair-to-okay price* — right at one value anchor, short of the stricter two.
Whether that's a buy is a conviction-and-sizing question, not a yes/no: full position, starter tranche, or wait for a deeper discount. And the biggest swing factor — autonomous vehicles — is something you have to underwrite yourself, because no model prices it.
*(Standard caveat: I'm sharing a way of reasoning about it, not a track record or a recommendation. Do your own work.)*
**Disclosure:** the tool I used is one I built myself — an app called Moatly. It runs any stock through this exact 4M framework in about 30 seconds, but the part I actually lean on is the AI mentor on top of the numbers: you can interrogate it, throw rebuttals at it, and test scenarios, all grounded in the calculated data. A study partner that argues back, not a stock-tip bot. I'm not here to pitch it — the analysis stands on its own and I mostly want the debate. I've kept the link out of the post; I'll drop it in the comments for anyone who wants it.
**So where do you land at \~$75?** Buy near the value zone now, start a tranche and add on weakness, or hold out for the stricter $60s? And how are you underwriting the AV question — free call option, or the thing that eventually commoditizes the platform? (Name a ticker and a thesis, and I'll post what the tool's AI fires back at it.)
sentiment 1.00
2 days ago • u/complimentsblossoxo • r/ValueInvesting • at_these_valuations_how_can_anyone_not_buy_copart • C
Love this kind of writeup on CPRT. The combo of network effects, insane ROIC, and that land bank angle makes it feel way closer to a compounding machine than a “car auction” business. I like that you actually dug into volumes and pricing instead of just slapping on a multiple. My only hangup is jurisdiction / regulatory risk long term, but man, at these valuations it’s hard not to start a position.
sentiment 0.09
2 days ago • u/PuzzleheadedEscape5 • r/ValueInvesting • zoetis_zts_70_gross_margins_20_roic_and_now_11x • Stock Analysis • T
Zoetis (ZTS): 70% gross margins, ~20% ROIC, and now ~11x forward earnings. What am I missing?
sentiment -0.80
2 days ago • u/solacelabx • r/stocks • makes_a_fortune_in_cash_costs_almost_nothing_to • Company Analysis • B
TL;DR: Collegium ($COLL) sells patent-protected extended-release drugs for pain and ADHD. Asset-light, 61% gross margins, \~$290M owner earnings, revenue compounding \~20% for five years. Including \~$488M of net debt, the whole enterprise trades around 5.6x owner earnings. I think the market is pricing a cash-gushing business as if it's dying next year. Trading at \~$35 vs. intrinsic value around $122 (a \~70% margin of safety).
The Business
Collegium doesn't discover drugs. They buy and commercialize patent-protected, extended-release medicines for two chronic conditions: severe pain (Belbuca, Xtampza, the Nucynta franchise) and ADHD (Jornay PM, plus the newly acquired AZSTARYS). Pain is \~80% of revenue and grows slowly; ADHD is \~20% and grows fast.
It's asset-light. They own the intellectual property and outsource manufacturing, so capex runs about 0.27% of revenue. It behaves more like a toll road on a set of patents than a lab. The moat is federal patent law: no generic Jornay until 2032, no generic AZSTARYS until 2037.
The Numbers
| | |
|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $331.0M |
| Stock-Based Compensation | -$41.3M |
| WC neutralization (add-back) | +$4.4M |
| WC reinvestment | -$0.9M |
| Smoothed CapEx (5yr avg) | -$3.5M |
| \*\*Owner Earnings\*\* | \*\*$289.7M\*\* |
At \~$35, including the net debt, the enterprise sits around 5.6x owner earnings, roughly an 18% yield to enterprise value. On the equity alone it's cheaper, but the debt is real so I anchor on the enterprise multiple.
Quality metrics:
- Gross Margin: 60.68%
- Operating Margin: 24.16%
- 5yr Revenue CAGR: 20.28%
- CapEx: 0.27% of revenue
- Net Debt: $488M
- Buybacks: $150M authorization remaining
Why It's Cheap
The stock trades around 5.6x owner earnings. Three things spooked the market:
1. Generic erosion fear in the legacy pain portfolio, which is still \~80% of revenue, plus the general opioid stigma that keeps a lot of funds away.
2. Patent cliffs. Jornay PM goes generic in 2032, AZSTARYS in 2037. Finite runway.
3. A levered, ugly balance sheet: $930M total debt, $488M net debt, deeply negative tangible book, and reported ROIC of only \~6.4%. Anyone screening on clean balance sheets or high reported returns throws this out on sight.
Why I Think The Market Is Wrong
The reported returns are depressed by acquisition amortization, not by a bad business. Look at the cash: $331M of operating cash flow against basically no maintenance capex. Against a \~$1.6B enterprise value ($1.1B market cap plus $488M net debt), that's roughly an 18% owner-earnings yield.
The part everyone fears is holding. In Q1 2026 pain revenue actually grew 4%, and they turned the Nucynta generic threat into a profit-share deal with Hikma. Meanwhile Jornay PM net revenue grew \~36%. Revenue has compounded \~20% for five years and gross margins expanded to 61%.
On the debt: they funded the $650M AZSTARYS deal with cash and a term loan, leverage sits near 2x EBITDA, and they already paid down \~$50M last year. A business throwing off $330M with near-zero capex de-levers fast. Management is buying back stock and paying down debt with the cash, which is what you want when your own stock trades at a fraction of intrinsic value.
Put a conservative 15x on $9.14 of owner earnings, subtract \~$15/share of net debt, and you get roughly $122 against a \~$35 price. I use 15x rather than a 25x "toll bridge" multiple precisely because the patents expire. Even haircutting for the cliffs, you're paying a fraction of what the cash is worth.
Disclosure: I hold a position in COLL. Hard data from filings, AI-assisted writing, personal review and position. This is not financial advice.
sentiment -1.00
2 days ago • u/Excellent_Border_302 • r/ValueInvesting • the_formula_for_value_investing • C
>ROE is not the return you are going to get unless you buy at P/B=1.
Yes that is what I said.
There are very few businesses in this world that I would consider stable enough to safely own with negative equity and Starbucks and McDonald's are definitely not on that list. If I were to own one, I would use ROIC instead of ROE. I generally prefer ROE unless they have negative equity or are hoarding cash.
If we got a -5% price drop with a %10 money supply increase then that would mean that the government is building infrastructure in an successful way that makes labor more efficient. Or, far more likely, it would mean there's a deflationary credit crunch in the economy and the government is doing QE or something. In that environment, if a company stays profitable, then it probably has a moaty high RoE in normal times. Many commodity type businesses would go through a phase of unprofitabililty.
In the credit crunch scenario where prices go down 5% and money supply increases by %10, it would be possible that prices would have gone down %15 if the government hadn't of printed. Those are impactful numbers I don't think it's being pedantic to consider these things.
sentiment 0.95


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