ROE
EA Series Trust Astoria US Equal Weight Quality Kings ETF
stock NASDAQ ETF

This is exactly what I said as well.
Check out my latest post; the kind of hate I got was insane but that’s alright.
You can’t help the arrogant. So what’s the point. Let the idiots buy the highs and sell at lows.
I don’t align with all your RSI and indicators nonsense because cheap can always become cheaper if the underlying business has no future.
Look at the market structure, we are getting 5-6 year discounts on these amazing companies. PE is only like 13-14 range now.
And it’s not just TCS, even INFY is trading at attractive valuations, and these are companies generating massive profitability of over 30-40% ROE ROCEs. They generate stable cashflows.
Sure, revenue growth has been weak for a while now, and it may not improve anytime soon as per brokerage firms and analysts.
Business is cyclical you can’t help, and we are in that phase where a big transition is happening within the industry. People are embedding AI into everything and that’s a game-changer.
If you look at the history, be it Y2K, Cloud, ERP, and whatnot. Every single time the same dumb crowd with a kind of herd mentality were like this is the end of Indian IT.
What happened later?
New jobs and newer lines of businesses opened up. Sure some jobs got replaced but even more jobs opened up, and the IT index itself went up like crazy after every one of these crashes. Earnings grew tremendously.
That’s the same kind of pattern happening today.
You can’t help everyone. If everyone buys the lows, everyone would be wealthy; and it would be a perfect world. It doesn’t work like that.
Go through smart money concepts, liquidity, and the concepts of institutional accumulation and distribution.
If a person has to buy something some seller should be there on the other end. Simple as that. It’s called transfer from weak hands to strong hands for a reason.
Sure it’s a risky investment. No investments aren’t risk free. The way I see it; the reward factor is far greater from this point than the risk.
If execution doesn’t go right, even these companies no matter how big they are or how strong their balance sheets are can also fail. That’s the risk factor.
Look at companies like Kodak, Blackberry, Nokia for instance on where they used to be and where they are now.
Anyways. Look this up all yourself, and use some common sense which is apparently very rare to come across these days.
And to all those people fearing AI will kill Indian IT because we won’t need that much manpower before, I am posting a slide from INFYs latest Q presentation the source of which is from WEF.
https://preview.redd.it/htj0nwpaqcbh1.jpeg?width=1146&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=5509af5d65690d4d7afdb968304d068bd1b63e9f

so if you are saying you bought this at 35, so the market cap was 60 cr that time. so you are telling me you bet 1% on the company at this stage! sorry but no one really does this unless they have insider info. the numbers came in is a different thing altogether.

The only reason i asked you is because this company keeps coming up in my microcap screener due to strong growth and return profile (ROE). and honestly betting on this stage is just betting on the promoter. Most promoters don't really deliver in the microcap stage and make too many promises which is why investors don't get in here. So yes you are right once you invest in this you have to consider your capital gone.
Anyway, i am also tracking the company now, wanted to ask, what do you see with earnings next few years? What is going to drive that? how is the promoter quality?

I think fundamentally it’s a commodity business, while it does have some scale advantage of being able to amortize its content over a larger viewer base, their capex cycle reminds me very much of the oil majors over the years,
You put up a large amount of capital to build out production capacity, or content, and once you pump the oil out or release the content and it gets consumed, (people typically only watch a new series or movie once) then it’s used up and requires an entirely new capex cycle to continue to build out the reserves of either oil or content.
This is not a capex light “wonderful business” that can grow without incremental capital put into the business, make no mistake they are the biggest player and absolutely benefit from scale, aside from that I think there’s very little in the way of brand power, people are gonna go where the content is and they likely don’t care if that’s Netflix or elsewhere, so their leverage is really scale.
If you track their ROE/ROIC the numbers have been on an improving trend and recent numbers are quite impressive, it just doesn’t scream value to me at 25X earnings largely because of the amount of capex that will be continually required to maintain their current massive user base.
I think it would be a good business to own at the right price, and it does have some good characteristics (scale being able to amortize continent costs over the largest user base) I just don’t think that it justifies a 25X multiple of earnings

Hello po. Do you have any analysis on ANS po? I think ROE and ROCE disregarding the non-recurring gains or financial gains po from investments, using the operating segments from Phelps Philippines and Amanpulo (operating income) po are still high.

LX is not a dividend kind of stock, they only started paying out since 2023 so im unsure of its consistency in the future, I would not add it to a dividend portfolio if thats what you are looking for. But it does give me the assurance that their cashflow is real, im looking more of a bounce of price from its current levels, or at least for the market to rerate its value to around $11-12 maybe in the next year or 2 in which will give it a P/B ratio of 1, seeing the ROE increasing QoQ does give some sort of confidence to me.
But then this is my 2 cents on it, its still a risky play to me but i have my own convictions on it.

I think homebuilding in general is a tough market after the heyday of 2020-2021, particularly for low end or “entry level” homebuilders, and it seems like Lennar is one of the worse quality home holders to invest in.

Lennar has been explicit that they have shifted towards “entry level” I.e. lower priced homes. They have cut average selling price more aggressively than any of the other major builders. Average selling price is down over 16% from 2023 to Q1 2026.

Entry level is a very competitive market. With higher rates, they have had to use a lot of incentives. Margins have been crushed at Lennar more than other homebuilders. Others with low price focus, like KB homes or DHI, have also struggled on the margin side but have had a recent upward moves for some reason I don’t understand.

Lennar pivoted to the land-light strategy at the exact WRONG time. There is now a shortage of land lots to develop, which is a bottle neck, so you have to pay top dollar for lots now.

While NVR pioneered this use of option contracts and pre-selling to improve balance sheet usage (and it was a monster stock pre-GFC), the strategy was novel then. Now all the builders have started to do this, which just means (in my opinion) more of the economics of home building shifts to the “land banks”, I.e. companies that sit on land or develop lots, as well as the banks that set up these option contracts.

Millrose (MRP) was spun off from Lennar with all their land and now sports a 10% dividend. Other public lot developers are FOR Forestar and FPH five point.

When one homebuilder reduces their use of land on the balance sheet, land costs don’t go up that much, and that single builder can earn a higher return on equity. When EVERYONE in the business starts relying on option contracts The balance sheet reduces in size, but the margin also contracts, so the ROE of the industry stays the same.

Greenbrick (GRBK) represents the polar opposite land strategy, where they keep a lot of land inventory, and it has maintained margins very well. The company chairman is a well-known value investor, David Einhorn, who advises the CEO on the buyback strategy. The stock has run into some issues after a strong run, because Einhorn’s hedge fund is restricted from holding too much of the stock, so if it crosses a certain threshold he becomes a forced seller. It has a focus on Texas which was a plus in recent years. Nowadays I’m not so sure since the house price is falling so much in Texas.

Generally I like GRBK the best out of the homebuilders for these reasons, but I haven’t been a shareholder in some time.

Another homebuilder to consider is TOL toll brothers, an old Peter lynch favorite. Toll caters to the high end, with average selling price of over $1 million. 25% of their homes are sold with an all cash purchase, no mortgage, because their customers are rich AF and don’t give a damn.

Given the frequent recurrent talk of the “K shaped economy” it seems like the high end consumer is doing pretty well. And out of the home builders, it seems like TOL, the high end builder, is doing the best with over a 30% trailing 1 year return and a 21% compounded return since 2021.

I dont consider myself expert at investing probably somewhere near beginner to intermediate. Here is my honest opinion
1. Hariom : It has low PE for sure. ROE is also increasing over years. But ROE is just 12% and cash flow is negative which is a red sign. Also 1 year return is negative so its a no no for me. Overall I will say SELL, when you find a better stock.
2. Kalyan: This looks good to me. ROE is 24.8%. PE ratio is less than historical PE. But the only thing concerning is negative return. I would say HOLD.
3. Aarti: I would say SELL. Profit margin and sales have declined compared to past year. Negative return over past year. You can wait for quaterly results if fundamentals improve you can HOLD.
I check for these metrics before buying
1. ROE should be increasing. Preferably more than 20%.
2. PEG ration should be less than 0.5 because companies growing at higher rate can have higher PE.
3. Debt to equity ratio should be less than 1.
4. Return over last year should be positive. Im willing to miss turnaround stocks but I dont want to invest where stock is declining, I think that's better capital allocation.
If you want you can check Waaree Renewable Technologies. It looks solid to me.

CMC Markets traded at 203p on 10 November 2025. As of the valuation date it sits at 700p, an all-time high, after a 56% one-week surge triggered by a guidance upgrade on 1 July. What was a cyclical retail CFD and spread-betting broker is now being priced as a B2B platform company. The operating-leverage step-change that price assumes is guided, not yet delivered, and the audited cash flow is pointing the other way.
**Headline numbers** (FY26, year ended 31 March 2026)
- Trailing P/E: 26.3x, the highest in the company's listed history; roughly 12x forward on FY27 guidance
- Forward EV/EBITDA: 6.7x on £250m FY27 EBITDA guidance; trailing 13.4x
- Operating margin: 27.0%, up from 18.2% in FY24
- Net cash: £163.8m, which includes a €300m commercial paper programme draw
- Operating cash flow / net income: 0.66x, the worst in seven years, on a £192m receivables build
- Dividend yield: 1.9% (13.8p DPS, 50% payout, 1.23x FCF cover)
**The guidance that moved the stock**
The FY26 preliminary results on 4 June guided FY27 net operating income to £460-480m with operating expenses of roughly £280m. Twenty-seven days later, the 1 July trading update raised that to "at least £550 million" with £250m of EBITDA. The arithmetic implies about £270m of operating profit before variable remuneration, which is 2.4x FY26's £111.1m operating income, and the entire upgrade flows through to EBITDA because the cost base is held flat.
The engine is a Westpac partnership extension that will migrate A$39bn of assets and roughly 500,000 share-trading accounts onto CMC's platform over a 12-month window, on top of an Australian stockbroking business that grew NOI 32% to A$140.3m in FY26. The B2B turnaround is genuine: the Investing segment went from a £19.4m operating loss in FY24 to £18.1m of profit before tax in FY26. But that £18.1m is 18% of group PBT. For FY27 EBITDA to double as guided, Investing has to become the dominant profit driver in a single year, or the Trading segment needs another favourable client-outcome year. Neither outcome is audited.
**What the accounts flag**
Gross margin expanded from 59.6% to 87.0% in two years. In a CFD model that swing is dominated by client trading outcomes (when clients lose, CMC's cost of revenue falls), not by the B2B pivot or the 2024 cost reset, and it may not repeat.
Cash conversion collapsed to 0.66x. Net receivables jumped from £269.1m to £455.0m, which is 110.7% of annual revenue, and the composition of that balance is not disclosed in any RNS filing. The prior year showed the opposite extreme, 2.82x conversion on a £94.1m working-capital release, so neither year is a clean read on run-rate cash generation.
The balance sheet has also changed shape. A firm that carried near-zero leverage for a decade set up an up to €300m commercial paper programme in November 2025; short-term debt went from £3.1m to £95.2m and interest expense rose 5.3x to £10.1m against roughly £5.5m of treasury-related trading income, so the treasury operations were net value-destructive at the PBT level in year one. Meanwhile reported capex was just £3.3m, with Westpac integration costs being capitalised instead. The same mechanism produced a £12.3m platform write-off in FY24.
**Valuation against the peer set**
At the 2 July snapshot, CMCX carried the highest trailing P/E in its peer group (26.3x vs 13.4x for IG Group and 17.2x for Plus500) alongside the lowest ROE (16.3% vs 26.1% and 50.5%). If the FY27 guidance is delivered, the forward multiples compress below both peers' trailing levels. If it slips, this is the most expensive stock in the group with the worst cash conversion and the lowest returns. The stock also sits 67% above its 50-day moving average, so the position is mechanically fragile if the next print disappoints.
**Bottom line**
The note's view is that the risk-reward at 700p is balanced but binary. Roughly 12x forward earnings is undemanding for a business guiding to 100% EBITDA growth, while the trailing 26.3x has no cushion if that guidance slips. The H1 FY27 interims in November 2026 are the single data point that resolves it: an NOI print at or above £275m validates the operating-leverage thesis, and anything materially below exposes the premium.
**What to watch**
- H1 FY27 NOI (November 2026): below £260m signals the £550m full-year guidance is back-end loaded and unproven
- Westpac integration milestones before March 2027: any RNS disclosing slippage removes the largest B2B revenue engine from the FY27 bridge
- FY27 receivables-to-revenue: staying above 100% suggests the working-capital absorption is structural to the B2B model, not transitional
**Sources**
- FY26 Preliminary Results, 4 Jun 2026 (RNS)
- Trading Update, 1 Jul 2026 (RNS)
- Westpac Partnership Extension, 29 Sep 2025 (RNS)
- H1 FY26 Interim Results, 20 Nov 2025 (RNS)
- Selfside data: income statement, balance sheet, cash flow and peer snapshot, FY2020-FY2026
*For information purposes only, not investment advice - independent research, originally published in full at Selfside.*

Im asking what made you buy these stocks? Low PE, high ROE, stock in uptrend, good quarter something like that for each stock