DAOUSDT
DAO Maker / Tether USD
crypto Composite

You can check the inside yourself. Morpho has a public API (api.morpho.org/graphql) that returns every vault's market allocations and its depositors, so I pulled the biggest Ethereum USDC vaults today, Sep 17.
Steakhouse Prime USDC ($117M) is 84% lent against cbBTC, 12% against WBTC and 4% against wstETH. Gauntlet USDC Prime ($94M) is 65% cbBTC, 29% WBTC and 5% wstETH. All of it sits in 86% LLTV markets. By weight the two overlap 81%, and both are about 95% a loan book against wrapped Bitcoin. Picking one over the other changes your cbBTC/WBTC mix and not much else. A BTC gap down that outruns liquidations hits both the same way.
Re KPK (your question further down): KPK USDC Prime ($20.6M) is 64% BTC collateral (39% cbBTC, 25% WBTC) and 36% ETH staking tokens (rETH, OETH, wstETH, LsETH). Its overlap with Steakhouse is 55% and with Gauntlet 70%, so it's less of a copy than the big two are of each other. The API shows a 0% performance fee and 0% management fee.
What I'd look at there is who else is in the vault. The top two depositors hold 75% of it and the top four hold 92%. The largest is the ENS endowment safe with $7.9M, then the CoW DAO treasury safe with $7.5M. Third is an address I couldn't identify ($2.2M) and fourth is the Balancer treasury safe with $1.4M. KPK manages all three of those DAO treasuries. The vault's withdrawable liquidity was $8.05M when I checked, about the size of either of the two big positions. If one of them pulls out, everyone else waits for borrowers to repay. Rates jump and it clears, but not the same day.
None of that is hidden and I don't mean it as a knock on KPK. They publish monthly reports for these DAOs and everything above is on-chain. But the curator's name and the APY tell you none of it, and like peysab said, nobody runs this check continuously.

Ya la integramos en la DAO

> does EF Protocol consider an unbounded staking ratio a problem
The following is my opinion, not an official EF Protocol take :)
I do see current staking incentives as problematic, unsustainable so. Regardless of total stake, Ethereum prints ETH to guarantee stakers at least 1.5%/year nominal yield. There is no market-driven backpressure, no price discovery driving the staking yield towards the organic cost of money.
In six years of proof-of-stake we have accumulated 43.2M ETH stake, about one third of the supply. It's economic quicksand. Year after year, increasing amounts of ETH held by rational actors is sucked down the staking pit. Net staking inflows have held surprisingly steady, at roughly 20K ETH/day.
As far as I can tell no defi application can plausibly compete in size with the 1.5%+/year subsidy: the opportunity cost of money simply isn't that high. This imbalance should continue pulling staking inflows. I expect we'll blow past 50% of the supply staked by decade end. Such high staking ratios are unhealthy for a number of reasons detailed below.
* **erosion of optionality**: Dilution is a transfer from non-stakers to stakers. So as the staked share grows, abstaining from staking gets more expensive and staking gradually shifts from an option to a rational imperative. This is especially detrimental with smaller stakers that can't afford the 32 ETH minimum deposit to stake natively. Those are naturally funnelled to staking pools like exchanges and LSTs.
* **processed ETH**: The staking industrial complex can be viewed as a machine turning pristine ETH into processed ETH. This processed ETH is of a lower grade, encumbered by counterparty risk, governance risk, smart contract risk. It creates fragmentation (stETH, rETH, cbETH) which erodes network effects for ETH as a unit of account and a unit of collateral. Large pools of processed ETH also bear systemic risks. Lido is a $23B pool backed by a $280M governance token, the kind of concentration that made The DAO systemic.
* **stakefi crowds defi**: Collateral-intensive defi products, like decentralised stablecoins, can't compete with 1.5%/year. Stakefi, i.e. the subset of defi pertaining to the tokenisation and distribution of staking yield, is sucking up the air for broader defi innovation. Things like LST looping, i.e. the leveraged extraction of staking yield, are symptomatic of an Ethereum-native Cantillon effect and distorted incentives.
* **special interests**: Cantillon effects breed lobbies. Similar to the banking world, those lobbies form to defend special interests. The ETH holderbase foots the bill despite stakefi being a cottage industry with a combined marketcap less than 1% of ETH's marketcap.
* **tax drag**: In various jurisdictions staking is taxed as income. For example, in the UK I pay 50% income tax on my staking rewards. While it's impossible to precisely measure income tax across stakers, estimating a double-digit percentage blended tax burden seems reasonable. For the sake of argument, call it 20%. That's hundreds of millions of dollars of yearly sell pressure from unnecessarily high staking yields, potentially billions per year should ETH surge.
* **too-big-to-slash**: Proof-of-stake enjoys social slashing as a powerful deterrent from 51% attacks. A high-stake environment erodes the credibility of this last-resort recovery mechanism because of too-big-to-slash dynamics.
> unbounded staking ratio a problem
Today's unbounded staking is a Moloch trap for stakers. When total stake is low there's an incentive to join early, but as more stake accumulates the diluted yield tends to zero. Eventually the nominal yield loses it's meaning, and externalities like like taxes flip the whole staking game into a lose-lose situation.
> is there a level at which it would become urgent?
Unlike the switch to post-quantum cryptography, changing the issuance curve is not urgent to Ethereum's survival. I do however believe fixing issuance is necessary for Ethereum and ETH to thrive. IMO the current issuance is bad enough that issuance as a topic will get louder and louder. I'm optimistic a fix is a matter of when, not if.

Security initiatives in this space are long overdue, but execution is what matters. The DAO situation burned a lot of people, and the lesson wasn't just about smart contract vulnerabilities. It was about how fast things unravel when there's no clear response framework in place. Curious how this round actually structures accountability compared to last time, because vague commitments don't hold up under pressure. Anyone tracking whether there are concrete audit requirements tied to this, or is it still voluntary?