DAOUSDT
DAO Maker / Tether USD
cryptoComposite

Hi r/ethstaker. We built Coffer, a contract that a validator sets as its own withdrawal credentials so it can issue fixed-rate ETH bonds against its stake. Since Pectra (EIP-7002), that contract can trigger the validator's exit itself. So if a validator fails to fund a matured bond, anyone can force the exit, and the stake repays the holders. No oracle, no DAO, and no cooperation needed from the operator. We call it a shared withdrawal credential, because the validator isn't the only one who can act on it. Here's how it works. * A validator deploys its own Coffer contract and points its withdrawal credentials at it (0x02 if you want partial withdrawals). * It sets its own terms, including the rate, the minimum and maximum duration, and a buffer held back against penalties. * Holders buy bonds at a fixed rate. Each bond is an NFT, and the principal, minus the fee, goes to the validator. * The validator keeps validating and has one job, which is to have the ETH in the contract when each bond matures. * If the contract can't pay a matured bond, anyone can declare a default. All bonds become due, anyone can trigger a full exit through 7002, and the whole stake lands in the contract to pay holders. We call a Coffer a shared withdrawal credential, because holders and, in a default, anyone can act on it, not just the validator. There's no oracle and no governance, and the contracts are immutable. The only admin power is choosing which address receives the fees. The protocol's only fee is a share of bond interest. It starts at 1% and rises to 9.9% over ten years, on a schedule fixed in the code. Some honest limitations, since you'll ask anyway. * The contracts don't read the beacon chain. Holders have to check withdrawal credentials and backing themselves. It's all public and our app shows it, but you shouldn't have to trust our app. * Partial withdrawals share the exit churn, so a validator funding maturities from its stake has to plan for long queues, not the usual day or so. * In practice a default ends the validator. Anyone can request its exit, and that request can't be cancelled, even if every bond is paid afterwards. So this only suits operators who take their funding schedule seriously. * In a default, holders claim first come, first served. If the stake doesn't cover everything owed, the last to claim lose out. * No buffer covers network-wide events like a long inactivity leak or mass slashing. It's live on Hoodi, so nothing real is at stake yet. We'd really value feedback from people who actually run validators. * Would you point a validator's withdrawal credentials at a contract like this? What would you need to see first? * What buffer would you consider sane for a single validator? * As a holder, what would you check before buying a bond from a specific validator? * Beyond bonds, what other jobs could a validator take on where failure is provable from Ethereum's own data? [Why we built it](https://docs.coffer.bond/blog/one-validator-one-bank/) · [Whitepaper](https://docs.coffer.bond/whitepaper/) · [Contracts on GitHub](https://github.com/blockroad-doo) · [Testnet app](https://hoodi.app.coffer.bond)

A new strategic direction for Polkadot has been proposed for the DOT DAO on OpenGov

I mean, the ability for some entity or group of people after the fact to change who owns what without the owners permission seems like it runs antithetical to the crypto ethos. And, it’s already possible to do that, if the fraud is big enough. Just like the DAO hack and the split into ethereum and classic. You can just undo everything after a certain block if everyone agrees.