DAOUSDT
DAO Maker / Tether USD
crypto Composite

close DAO votes get less turnout than landslide ones. I pulled 18 months of data across 10 DAOs and the pattern is consistent. contested votes draw fewer voters

i keep seeing this framed as a pure bridge failure, but half of it is a governance failure. rsETH being on aave's accepted asset list was a governance decision, and so was every panic-pause that followed. the bridge exploit is the headline, the response speed is the governance question. most protocols still push emergency actions through the same proposal pipeline as a routine parameter tweak, so by the time a pause vote clears the funds are already spread across 20 chains. the ones that handle this well keep a separate fast lane, a security council that can pause or delist in minutes with the full DAO able to override after, instead of one slow path for everything. that's the boring infrastructure gap these hacks keep exposing.

I'm always on the look out for cheap Cryptos with high probability of going up in the future and also was up in the past. Right now **SWELL** is at it's lowest buying price yet (extremely cheap), so my advice is to invest before the price jumps up, I did myself but at a little higher price then it's current. Also on a side note, Swell was at 0.014 before people got scared from all the tariff nonsense that had nothing to do with crypto. So my advice would be to stay invested and look at the past charts even beyond that, it has high potential.
If you're new to the how to buy/sell crypto coin game, I would suggest using the coinbase app. They do have fees for buying and selling but worth it in my opinion in the grand scheme of things. They do have graphs and other useful information as well. Here is some info about SWELL if your interested:
[https://www.swellnetwork.io/](https://www.swellnetwork.io/)
Swell's mission is to deliver the world's best liquid staking and restaking experience, simplify access to DeFi, and secure the future of the Ethereum network
. Swell Network is a non-custodial protocol that allows users to stake ETH and receive liquid tokens (swETH) that can be used across the DeFi ecosystem. 
Core components of Swell's mission
* **Democratize access to staking:** Swell aims to make staking ETH accessible to everyone, regardless of the amount of ETH they hold or their technical expertise. Traditional staking on Ethereum typically requires users to lock up 32 ETH and have specific technical knowledge to run a validator.
* **Provide a high-quality user experience:** The protocol strives to overcome the complexity and poor user experience often found in DeFi. It focuses on creating a simple and easy liquid staking process for all users.
* **Embrace decentralization and innovation:** Swell is built on core values of decentralization and innovation. It uses new technologies, such as Distributed Validator Technology (DVT) and restaking protocols like EigenLayer, to enhance the security and integrity of the Ethereum network.
* **Strengthen community governance:** The Swell Network is governed by the Swell Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), which is run by holders of the SWELL token. This allows the community to participate in major decisions, ensuring the protocol aligns with the collective interests of its members.
* **Uphold a security-first approach:** Recognizing the inherent risks in DeFi, Swell prioritizes security. The protocol undergoes regular smart contract audits, offers bug bounty programs, and uses reputable node operators to protect user assets and the network.

i think you're stacking two separate problems and calling them one. token-weighted governance, which is what optimism, uniswap and ens actually run, doesn't care how many wallets you spin up, because 10,000 dust wallets carry dust weight. funding a python botnet hollows out an airdrop, it does not move a vote. the sybil problem is real but it lives in distribution, not in voting.
the failure mode that actually eats DAO governance is the opposite of sybil: turnout. most token holders never vote at all, so a handful of large delegates end up deciding everything, and an orb credential does nothing about that. one-human-one-vote only matters if you've already decided votes shouldn't be weighted by stake, and almost no protocol with real money on the line has decided that. worth being precise about which problem you're solving before reaching for biometrics.

I went down a rabbit hole on how voting actually works on vote.uniswapfoundation.org and the part nobody really talks about is the relayer.
In a plain OpenZeppelin Governor setup, casting an onchain vote is a transaction, so you pay gas. fine for a whale delegate. but if you're sitting on a few hundred UNI of delegated weight, paying real money to vote on a proposal you might be on the losing side of anyway is a genuine disincentive. participation quietly skews toward people who don't notice the gas.
The gasless flow sidesteps that with a relayer. you sign your ballot as an EIP-712 typed message offchain, a relayer submits it onchain and eats the gas. the vote still settles onchain, you just don't pay for the settlement. catch is somebody has to, and right now that somebody is the Uniswap Foundation covering the relayer cost out of its budget. ENS DAO does the exact same thing for its own governance.
which makes gasless voting a subsidy, not a protocol feature. it holds as long as the foundation keeps funding it. if that line item ever gets trimmed, gasless voting doesn't throw an error, it just silently reverts to gas-gated participation and small-delegate turnout craters. feels like relayer funding should be endowed or treated as a protocol-level cost rather than a discretionary foundation expense, and I haven't seen a proposal that actually does that. given how much of current turnout leans on it, that's a strange gap to leave open.

**Gm frENS, Happy Friday.**
**ETH Daily - May 14, 2026**
* CLARITY Act [advances](https://x.com/BankingGOP/status/2054975087795716133).
* KelpDAO [resumes](https://x.com/KelpDAO/status/2054977337264144768) rsETH withdrawals.
* Coinbase treasury [deployer](https://www.coinbase.com/blog/coinbase-and-hyperliquid-aligning-markets-on-hyperliquid-to-usdc) on Hyperliquid.
* Lido [plans](https://x.com/d_gusakov/status/2054956970575118462) validator consolidation.
* ACDC #178 [minutes](https://christinedkim.substack.com/p/acdc-178).
* Fidelity FILQ [market fund](https://x.com/VivekVentures/status/2054946669083390374).
* Lido DAO [approves](https://x.com/LidoFinance/status/2054978950372208924) Earn protection.
* EIP-8025: [optional execution proofs](https://x.com/ladislaus0x/status/2054880667293339966).
* PSE: [problems](https://pse.dev/blog/private-transfers-engineering-user-research) in private transfers.
* Vitalik [on MTSlive](https://x.com/MTSlive/status/2054991439654965284).
* Ethereum Security QF [final day](https://x.com/ethereumfndn/status/2054969464387436576).
* Ethereum Hub [in Libson](https://x.com/EFetheverywhere/status/2054934350702026995).
* Etherscan [adds](https://x.com/etherscan/status/2054890415317512399) snakey charts.
* Aave [bug bounty](https://x.com/StaniKulechov/status/2054940212455789009).
* Kraken [migrates](https://x.com/krakenfx/status/2054941472512717301) to CCIP.
* Zerion [CLI](https://x.com/zerion/status/2054947495512510546) for agents.
Read more: [https://ethdaily.io/947](https://ethdaily.io/947)

the part that gets lost here is that Tally was an interface, not the governance itself. the governance for Uniswap, ENS, Arbitrum lives in OpenZeppelin Governor contracts that are still onchain and still getting votes regardless of which frontend renders them. a frontend company winding down is a counterparty moment, not an endgame - the contracts keep running and someone else serves the UI. so 'Tally is dead' and 'DAO governance is dead' are two very different claims, and only the first one is actually true. on the participation point the top comment makes, it's real, but a chunk of it is mechanical: voting onchain costs gas, so turnout gets gated by whether anyone will sponsor a gasless relay. the DAOs that fixed that (ENS and Uniswap both sponsor relayers indefinitely) see meaningfully higher participation. that doesn't make governance a mass-participation activity, but 'nobody votes' is partly a UX bill nobody wanted to pay.

Kelp DAO contracts never failed; the vulnerability stemmed entirely from LayerZero underlying infrastructure.
The mass exodus we are seeing today, with institutions like Kraken and giants like Solv abandoning LayerZero technology, confirms that the problem was systemic.