FCF
First Commonwealth Financial Corporation
stock NYSE

The question I'd ask before adding here is about capital allocation, not just price. Netflix is spending $17B/year on content and generating maybe $8-9B in FCF. They have good operating leverage if they slow content growth. The risk is that slowing spend makes the catalog feel stale and churn ticks up.
Comcast and T-Mobile don't have that same knife-edge tradeoff. If you want the growth story, stick with Netflix. If you want sleep-well compounders, the other two are more stable picks.

Well- had sat at 2.08 raising .04/year until 2021 when it decided to cut to the 1.11.
They stated at the time they would raise to keep the payout at 40% FCF and they have not done that - rather have kept the dividend steady.
It’s a decent payment still but as a dividend investor I don’t like when the dividends are stagnant. I will play covered calls during the occasional spikes in price.

Airlines are a bit like Car companies or Cruise liner business. During good times, they will make alot of money but also require alot of capex to be competitive, and during bad times, they will lose money. There is hardly an in-between.
Buffett doesn't like it at all, although he has been tempted to buy some airlines. And he also owns a growing fractiional ownership Netjets business.
Peter Lynch, in his writings tries to decipher the top and bottom of these cyclical stocks. I have only analysed the cruise liners and what Peter Lynch said is true: reverse P/E is true, and during bad times, the losses are so crippling that the "E" drops faster the "P" resulitng in a high P/E. A better valuation would be Price / Cash Flow (not FCF), in my opinion.

Right, but FCF margin is already at 51%. Are we going to 70% FCF margin?

How in the world are we going to get there though?
We would need at least 30b of revenue by 2028 to hit that low end FCF target.
Assuming we do 6b this year and grow 100% next year, we would need to grow more than 100% in 28 to have a chance of hitting 15b FCF assuming the margins stay the same.
I usually don't doubt Karp's guidance since he has been able to overdeliver every quarter since the stock started to skyrocket.
But to say they can grow 100% for 2 years in a row on top of the 80% growth this year is insane.

KD. Share price $12.25/share. IBM spin off where they dumped all their shit business. First year they were independent their pretax margins were -5%. Their business is longterm contracted business with contract lengths of 5+ years. Debt is not an issue and is investment grade. Last year their 4th year independent they increased pretax margins to 3.7% with $340M of FCF. They still have about 1/3 of the old pre-spin IBM business to convert to higher margin contracted business as new contracts are renewed in the 8-9% pretax margin range. This year (FY27) they are projecting $400-500M of FCF which would be $200M higher except they are taking a charge to right size the business as some of the business was not renewed so revenues have fallen over the last 4 years but appear to be reaching an inflection point. Next year, they are projecting $1B+ of FCF against a market cap of $2.7B. They are using all their FCF to buy in shares at this undervalued level. If they achieve $1B+ of FCF next year, you are likely looking at a 4+ multi-bagger as the market figures it out. A high return opportunity IMO.

Don't fall for Meta's P/E. Net income hides the true, immediate cash hit of their massive AI CapEx. Their FCF is also a mirage: they add back billions in employee stock options to boost operating cash, then turn around and spend over 96% of their reported FCF buying back shares just to stop dilution. If you subtract the cash needed to keep the float flat, their real Price-to-FCF ratio sits north of 1000x. Everything now hinges on whether this CapEx layout actually pays off.

Tbh I think it was overvalued at >30x TTM earnings, but then they were hit with a perfect storm: Maturing business, Figma acquisition fail, GPT release, SaaSpocalypse, CEO/CFO departure, etc.
I think the market has really overshot the correction at <10x Non-GAAP earnings. Sub $100B market cap with this kinda FCF is ridiculous. Add in the buyback authorization, and I think the math starts to get compelling.
Really all it needs is a sentiment shift, and it can rerate back to \~20x TTM earnings, which puts it around $200B market cap. Depending on how many shares they buyback, the price would be >$500 (503 with current shares)

Karp said they would be doing $15-$18b in FCF by 2028? Source?

**Fable 5 Max prediction for GEV:**
**Bull case:** Q1 was a monster — $163B backlog growing faster than expected, guidance raised to $44.5–45.5B revenue and $6.5–7.5B FCF, with new gas orders priced 10–20 points higher per kilowatt than the old backlog . Zacks Earnings ESP sits at +10.35% , suggesting another beat is likely.
**Bear case (this is the real tension):** The average analyst target is \~$1,220 — only \~4% above spot , and the stock trades at roughly 40x NTM EV/EBITDA, more than double the sector median, so any execution slip carries real valuation risk . Smart money is hedging: bearish flow hit this week with \~7,900 puts trading at 1.3x expected volume, concentrated in Aug $1,100 puts and 7/10 weekly $1,000 puts . There’s also sector-wide skepticism creeping into everything data-center-related .
**Structures worth pricing out** (check the ATM straddle for the implied move first — I can’t see the live chain):
**• Bull put spread** below the implied move (e.g., short \~$1,000/long \~$950, Jul 24 exp): sells inflated IV, wins on beat, flat, or modest dip. Fits the “beats but stock is priced for it” scenario.
**• Call debit spread** (\~ATM/+5%) if you want upside without paying full IV-crush tax on naked calls.
**• Iron condor** if you think a beat is already priced in and the stock pins — the Q1 pattern (only +2% day-of, with the 14% move spread over a week) actually supports this.
**•** Avoid naked long calls/straddles: with IV pumped pre-earnings, you need the move to *exceed* what’s priced just to bre

CMC Markets traded at 203p on 10 November 2025. As of the valuation date it sits at 700p, an all-time high, after a 56% one-week surge triggered by a guidance upgrade on 1 July. What was a cyclical retail CFD and spread-betting broker is now being priced as a B2B platform company. The operating-leverage step-change that price assumes is guided, not yet delivered, and the audited cash flow is pointing the other way.
**Headline numbers** (FY26, year ended 31 March 2026)
- Trailing P/E: 26.3x, the highest in the company's listed history; roughly 12x forward on FY27 guidance
- Forward EV/EBITDA: 6.7x on £250m FY27 EBITDA guidance; trailing 13.4x
- Operating margin: 27.0%, up from 18.2% in FY24
- Net cash: £163.8m, which includes a €300m commercial paper programme draw
- Operating cash flow / net income: 0.66x, the worst in seven years, on a £192m receivables build
- Dividend yield: 1.9% (13.8p DPS, 50% payout, 1.23x FCF cover)
**The guidance that moved the stock**
The FY26 preliminary results on 4 June guided FY27 net operating income to £460-480m with operating expenses of roughly £280m. Twenty-seven days later, the 1 July trading update raised that to "at least £550 million" with £250m of EBITDA. The arithmetic implies about £270m of operating profit before variable remuneration, which is 2.4x FY26's £111.1m operating income, and the entire upgrade flows through to EBITDA because the cost base is held flat.
The engine is a Westpac partnership extension that will migrate A$39bn of assets and roughly 500,000 share-trading accounts onto CMC's platform over a 12-month window, on top of an Australian stockbroking business that grew NOI 32% to A$140.3m in FY26. The B2B turnaround is genuine: the Investing segment went from a £19.4m operating loss in FY24 to £18.1m of profit before tax in FY26. But that £18.1m is 18% of group PBT. For FY27 EBITDA to double as guided, Investing has to become the dominant profit driver in a single year, or the Trading segment needs another favourable client-outcome year. Neither outcome is audited.
**What the accounts flag**
Gross margin expanded from 59.6% to 87.0% in two years. In a CFD model that swing is dominated by client trading outcomes (when clients lose, CMC's cost of revenue falls), not by the B2B pivot or the 2024 cost reset, and it may not repeat.
Cash conversion collapsed to 0.66x. Net receivables jumped from £269.1m to £455.0m, which is 110.7% of annual revenue, and the composition of that balance is not disclosed in any RNS filing. The prior year showed the opposite extreme, 2.82x conversion on a £94.1m working-capital release, so neither year is a clean read on run-rate cash generation.
The balance sheet has also changed shape. A firm that carried near-zero leverage for a decade set up an up to €300m commercial paper programme in November 2025; short-term debt went from £3.1m to £95.2m and interest expense rose 5.3x to £10.1m against roughly £5.5m of treasury-related trading income, so the treasury operations were net value-destructive at the PBT level in year one. Meanwhile reported capex was just £3.3m, with Westpac integration costs being capitalised instead. The same mechanism produced a £12.3m platform write-off in FY24.
**Valuation against the peer set**
At the 2 July snapshot, CMCX carried the highest trailing P/E in its peer group (26.3x vs 13.4x for IG Group and 17.2x for Plus500) alongside the lowest ROE (16.3% vs 26.1% and 50.5%). If the FY27 guidance is delivered, the forward multiples compress below both peers' trailing levels. If it slips, this is the most expensive stock in the group with the worst cash conversion and the lowest returns. The stock also sits 67% above its 50-day moving average, so the position is mechanically fragile if the next print disappoints.
**Bottom line**
The note's view is that the risk-reward at 700p is balanced but binary. Roughly 12x forward earnings is undemanding for a business guiding to 100% EBITDA growth, while the trailing 26.3x has no cushion if that guidance slips. The H1 FY27 interims in November 2026 are the single data point that resolves it: an NOI print at or above £275m validates the operating-leverage thesis, and anything materially below exposes the premium.
**What to watch**
- H1 FY27 NOI (November 2026): below £260m signals the £550m full-year guidance is back-end loaded and unproven
- Westpac integration milestones before March 2027: any RNS disclosing slippage removes the largest B2B revenue engine from the FY27 bridge
- FY27 receivables-to-revenue: staying above 100% suggests the working-capital absorption is structural to the B2B model, not transitional
**Sources**
- FY26 Preliminary Results, 4 Jun 2026 (RNS)
- Trading Update, 1 Jul 2026 (RNS)
- Westpac Partnership Extension, 29 Sep 2025 (RNS)
- H1 FY26 Interim Results, 20 Nov 2025 (RNS)
- Selfside data: income statement, balance sheet, cash flow and peer snapshot, FY2020-FY2026
*For information purposes only, not investment advice - independent research, originally published in full at Selfside.*

I seen you believe these will all double I'm 5 years, why?
When you say double do you mean share price e, EPS,FCF?

$2.9T valuation
$170B TTM OCF
$12B TTM SBC
$97B TTM CapEx
$61B TTM true FCF
2.1% true FCF yield
It’s a great company, maybe with a lot of growth left, but you’re paying a lot for it.

The bridge between your two observations is one accounting line: depreciation. Earnings can hit records while FCF goes negative because the GPUs are paid for in cash today but expensed over 5-6 years. Both PEs are built on that assumption.
Which means the real question isn't "MSFT or AMZN" — it's whether 5-6 years is the true useful life of an AI datacenter. If chips actually need replacing every 3-4 years to stay competitive, then this isn't growth capex, it's maintenance capex wearing a growth costume — and the "E" in both PEs is overstated right now. That's your "perpetual maintenance" scenario, and it hits both names equally.
FCF-negative during a buildout isn't the red flag by itself — AMZN ran this exact movie with AWS in 2015-2018 and it built the best business in tech. The difference worth checking: back then the spend chased contracted, visible demand. The test isn't the burn, it's whether there's a paying customer on the other end of it.

At the moment, I like this mix: GPIQ (30%); SCHD (30%); Intl Growth (15); ETF du Jour (10-15%) (IHI is very depressed but loaded with medical companies with tons of FCF); Bond etf (10 %) (SCHY or DCFC); remaining in gold. What ever you do, nibble, don't gobble, we may have a VERY interesting August/Sept/Oct! But if you don't have a ROTH, please set up. Same with Health Savings Account (HSA) Also, you may want to go back to school, have a childo help a niece or nephew, so 529 that you are the owner, you can change beneficiary later. You might want to skip the gold for now, but keep an eye on it

Disclaimer: I am invested with BGL. This is not financial advice.

I previously posted about BGL on [31 July 2025](https://www.reddit.com/r/ASX_Bets/comments/1mdrk5i/bgl_a_case_of_institutional_overhang/). They are a gold producer operating out of WA, making an attempt at being low emissions (very high renewable energy consumption on site) but the main area to consider whether BGL is now a good investment (in my opinion) is the state of their hedge book.

On my previous post, a couple of users raised concerns about the state of their forward hedge book - and at the time it didn't look great. For user's unfamiliar, this is effectively gold that they have already committed to selling in the future (when it is mined) at a fixed price. The price gets locked in when the contract is agreed and is unlikely to be a good price for the miner. They do it so whoever they owe debt to (banks etc) knows there is guaranteed income to cover the debt if the spot price tumbles. It's important because the spot price of gold is way higher than the price in those locked in hedges, which is hurting revenue.

As at their last quarterly update (31 Mar 26), BGL had:
* \~91k oz on the hedge book (amount to still clear) (down from 124k in December)
* $2,932 AUD average hedge price
* \~40k oz produced
* $3,459 AUD/oz average realised price
* $2,578 AUD/0z all in sustaining cost (AISC)
* $158M free cash flow (FCF)
* $18M FCF after voluntary hedge pre-deliveries
* $181M cash and gold
* $100M debt
The key point I'd like to make is that BGL cleared a big amount of their existing hedge book in that quarter. It hurts cash generation now but increases exposure to the spot price in future after all hedges are cleared. The rate of clearance is 6-10k oz per month and I would anticipate that the hedge book would be fully cleared at this rate in about 10 months (assuming all other variables remain the same). If gold is still strong in a year, then BGL turns significantly more profitable.

The share price has been all over the place since I last posted, but only upwards from then. It got up to $2 in January and two days ago (when I bought back in), it was trading at $1.20. Price at posting: $1.35.

The bear case is that this is a single asset underground gold miner and tied at the hip to the spot price. It's also subject to grade failures, AISC increases, delays etc. Confidence could slip despite good fundamentals and we could head back below $1.

I am nothing if not a gambler though and the bear case sees us above $2 within the year and then matching GMD for market cap in 2-3 years.

The next announcement by the company should be within the next few weeks, being the June quarterly announcement, which will give some additional context to the above figures and help crystal ball even better.

As always, keen for the thoughts from the brain's trust.

Growth and FCF mainly. I don’t see a scenario where Uber doesn’t continue growing revenue at 10%+ for the next 5 years at least. I think a \~21 forward PE is quite cheap for that reason. It’s the definition of a quality compounder. Elite investors like Nancy Pelosi and Bill Ackman also being bullish on the stock is a nice bonus.

A key takeaway of value of investing is not just about buying bargain stocks.
Hear me out: most companies are mediocre, a lot more shouldn’t be allowed to exchanges their securities with the public.
It is a basic logical principle: Financial securities are contractual promises, legal claims. But most promises are cheap, rarely fulfilled to their fullest.
The existential claims are extended to the financial economy and even more so to securities markets.
It is much cheaper to boldly make a business pronouncement than to consistently produce FCF yield to shareholders.
The only matters that therefore makes an investment remotely “ valuable” is its consistency in producing positive earning yield and return to the shareholders.
I know most investors try to make excuses about capital reinvestments or acquisitions growth against competitive pressure; but without cash return, the validity of owning a stock security cannot be differentiated from a speculative undertaking.
Screw the management claims: Where is my money?
This simple premise is enough to filter out 95% of listed stocks as more or less insiders enrichment operations built on overvalued stock issues.
Stocks are created ex nihilo, out of thin air by companies; the process is supported by the Financial industrial banking complex and the financial media that depends on commissions sales and promotional marketing contracts for their subsistence.
The target is therefore always retail investors, public investments funds, the little guy trying to get piece of the growing economy pie!
But it is all bullshit.
The securities economy is its own propaganda machine serving the financial casino.
Rational thinking is not encouraged, public schooling is an important apport in mollifying critical thinking and self intellectual reliance.
So, the moment one realizes that Wall Street is just a giant Casino and that most investors are sucked in and squeezed out of their little savings, it is the moment you become an investor and you cease to buy into the financial matrix.
This imply therefore that rather approaching the market with OPTIMISM, SKEPTICISM IS A MUST!
Why? Because most truly profitable companies need not to go public to operate.
I just wrote a report on COREWEAVE, Inc., as an evidence of the Great Wall Street machine.
The entire apparatus is built as an exit liquidity scheme for companies insiders.
You actually want to buy stocks when Wall Street is bleeding and when the experts are announcing the end of “ their” world.
Other than that, just read or like me, investigate fraud for 95% of stocks listed globally aren’t worth cockroaches’ shit!
One buy a year, maybe even one buy every 2 years for 100 bullshit stocks analyzed.
Real value investing is all about filtering out deceitful promises; in my opinion, the value investing community is way too gun shy in denouncing financial nonsense.
The financial market is really the eye of Sauron, the epicenter of economic malevolence and systemic criminality.
Wall Street has always been committed to speculation and overzealous hype and hyperbole. Real capitalism is about balance and flushing out capital misallocation and uncovering fraud.
A real value investor shouldn’t just be focused on buying mispriced securities and undervalued investments. Value investing is also about publicly denouncing abuses, false claims, corruption, systemically unjust policies and so forth.

Overall, you nailed it pretty well. It's pretty wild to see that since like 2024, they grow like 30% QoQ. People have different approaches around their investments, but I'm a GARPy investor, so for me, this company is always just a pass.
Like the PEG isn't bad since they grow EPS pretty quick too, but it's kind of hard to stomach forward PE of like 70, PS of 16, P/FCF at 2,455.
I put this company into a bucket where I don't think you're going worry about it going bankrupt, but it's just a question if you have beat the market. It's a great name to add on pullbacks and should have solid long term growth, just something that doesn't fit or align how I like to invest.

$15-18 bill FCF by end of 2028. i thought it was at the end, but its about halfway through the interview, when the red TV screen behind him.