EFF
EATON VANCE FLOATING-RATE INCOME PLUS FUND
stock NYSE

I was affected by the Coldcard hack. Thankfully, my Coldcard Q was only 1 key in a 2 of 3 multisig. My coins are safe. But with 1 key compromised, I decided to migrate.
My new 2 of 3 multisig:
\-Coldcard Q updated with the new firmware. Seed generated with 150 physical dice rolls using casino grade dice. This is one key. Yeah, I'm pissed at Coldcard too. Idk if the entropy issues are resolved through the firmware update. Thats what the community seems to say. I dont trust it. But I think seeds generated through physical dice rolls are fine especially with a strong passphrase and I like the hardware. Will never buy another Coldcard though. Not supporting that company with my money any further.
\-Other two keys have the same seed as before generated using device rng (not Coldcard). All keys (including Coldcard) are now passphrased with the same 6 word passphrase formed using physical dice rolls and EFF list.
Yes, I could have done a different passphrase for all 3 keys. Too bothersome and I thought it would be excessive. I accept this weakness.
\-Two hardware devices holding 2 keys and corresponding seedplates will be custodied by 2 separate individuals I trust.
\-Another two separate individuals I trust will each custody a copy of the passphrase hand-written on paper and sealed in an envelope. These are backups in case I forget or lose the passphrase (fire, theft)
\-I will keep one key, seedplates for that key, and a copy of the uniform passphrase hand-written on paper in my safe.
\-This setup has 4 custodians and will require 3 out of the 4 to collude to attempt to steal my coins (both key custodians and one passphrase custodian). The custodians are very remote in each other's social circles and only know each other, if at all, through me (may have introduced each other at a social event I've thrown). I'm pretty sure they don't even have each other's phone numbers.
\- For one of the key custodians, I custody a key for his multisig and he has more coins than me. He better take care of mine to make sure I take care of his.
\-The key custodians will not be told the keys are passphrased.
\-The passphrase custodians agreed to hold "a sealed envelope" with sensitive information for me. They don't even know what it is.
\-Even if 3 custodians did collude, they will not have the output descriptor which I will keep to myself.
Not perfect but I figure itll be good enough. Posting as an example on how to multisig as I'm a proponent of it but by no means claiming this as the model example.

I was affected by the Coldcard hack. Thankfully, my Coldcard Q was only 1 key in a 2 of 3 multisig. My coins are safe. But with 1 key compromised, I decided to migrate.
My new 2 of 3 multisig:
\-Coldcard Q updated with the new firmware. Seed generated with 150 physical dice rolls using casino grade dice. This is one key. Yeah, I'm pissed at Coldcard too. Idk if the entropy issues are resolved through the firmware update. Thats what the community seems to say. I dont trust it. But I think seeds generated through physical dice rolls are fine especially with a strong passphrase and I like the hardware. Will never buy another Coldcard though. Not supporting that company with my money any further.
\-Other two keys have the same seed as before generated using device rng (not Coldcard). All keys (including Coldcard) are now passphrased with the same 6 word passphrase formed using physical dice rolls and EFF list.
Yes, I could have done a different passphrase for all 3 keys. Too bothersome and I thought it would be excessive. I accept this weakness.
\-Two hardware devices holding 2 keys and corresponding seedplates will be custodied by 2 separate individuals I trust.
\-Another two separate individuals I trust will each custody a copy of the passphrase hand-written on paper and sealed in an envelope. These are backups in case I forget or lose the passphrase (fire, theft)
\-I will keep one key, seedplates for that key, and a copy of the uniform passphrase hand-written on paper in my safe.
\-This setup has 4 custodians and will require 3 out of the 4 to collude to attempt to steal my coins (both key custodians and one passphrase custodian). The custodians are very remote in each other's social circles and only know each other, if at all, through me (may have introduced each other at a social event I've thrown). I'm pretty sure they don't even have each other's phone numbers.
\- For one of the key custodians, I custody a key for his multisig and he has more coins than me. He better take care of mine to make sure I take care of his.
\-The key custodians will not be told the keys are passphrased.
\-The passphrase custodians agreed to hold "a sealed envelope" with sensitive information for me. They don't even know what it is.
\-Even if 3 custodians did collude, they will not have the output descriptor which I will keep to myself.
Not perfect but I figure itll be good enough. Posting as an example on how to multisig as I'm a proponent of it but by no means claiming this as the model example.