Create Account
Log In
Dark
chart
exchange
Premium
Terminal
Screener
Stocks
Crypto
Forex
Trends
Depth
Close
Check out our Level2View

EBIT
Harbor AlphaEdge Small Cap Earners ETF
stock NYSE ETF

At Close
Feb 12, 2026
36.30USD0.000%(0.00)34,184
0.00Bid   0.00Ask   0.00Spread
Pre-market
0.00USD-100.000%(-36.30)0
After-hours
0.00USD0.000%(0.00)0
OverviewHistoricalExchange VolumeDark Pool LevelsDark Pool PrintsExchangesShort VolumeShort Interest - DailyShort InterestBorrow Fee (CTB)Failure to Deliver (FTD)ShortsTrends
EBIT Reddit Mentions
Subreddits
Limit Labels     

We have sentiment values and mention counts going back to 2017. The complete data set is available via the API.
Take me to the API
EBIT Specific Mentions
As of Feb 13, 2026 6:44:00 PM EST (1 min. ago)
Includes all comments and posts. Mentions per user per ticker capped at one per hour.
1 hr ago • u/Margin-of-Safety • r/ValueInvesting • rddt_and_the_huge_winners_in_the_ai_era • C
Not to be a party pooper but EBIT margin after deducting sg&a would be a more appropriate metric here…
sentiment 0.21
4 hr ago • u/FeistyTraffic2669 • r/StocksAndTrading • where_do_you_actually_find_undervalued_stocks • B
Every stock I look at is either fairly valued or clearly expensive. Market has been on a tear and the easy picks got snapped up a while ago. But there's always something mispriced somewhere if you know where to look.
My current process: screen for low EV/EBIT and high ROIC, check insider buying on openinsider, browse 52 week low lists, and look at what super investors bought in their latest 13F filings.
Screener approach gives me candidates but half the time stocks are cheap for a reason. Insider buying is interesting but insiders are wrong plenty of times too. 13F filings are 45 days stale so the price has usually moved.
One thing that's helped recently is using valuesense to look at which stocks are trading furthest below their estimated intrinsic value across multiple valuation methods. If a stock shows up as undervalued on DCF, earnings power value, AND relative metrics simultaneously, that's a stronger signal than any single method.
What other approaches do people use? Especially anything systematic that helps you find names you wouldn't have discovered on your own.
sentiment 0.96
10 hr ago • u/arnaldo3zz • r/PLTR • burrys_short_is_burrysh1t • B
https://preview.redd.it/hwci9nsse9jg1.png?width=1588&format=png&auto=webp&s=2b7d46083a0b7db66853560b4c6a287b4a8e48be
I just read Michael Burry's short report on Palantir

That is BURRYSH1T.

\+10,000 words. Here are the 10 worst takes:

1. "**Palantir’s margins are not even SaaS-level**, but when Palantir’s functionality succumbs to the commoditization of AI coding tools, **they will fall further."**

2. "The result is a Net Dollar Retention surge from 107% to 139%. 139 is extraordinary. **It is also suspect.** Such heights are rarely sustained and almost always associated with base effects.

3. "Not enough bandwidth? **That sounds exactly like a consultancy.** Not enough integration engineers, not enough Palantir people to customize the
installations."

4. "So, after the company lost $4bn in almost 20 years as a private company, it has continued to give tons of stock to employees while losing money on
bubble SPACs and growing to a remarkably petite $4.5bn revenue for 2025 – **petite for being the U.S. government’s pet data enforcer AND an AI FOMO/Lucky Strike poster child."**

5. "**\[Selling Gotham\] was not too hard**. Government software was terrible, and hence, low-hanging fruit. It took 3y, but after that, low hanging fruit."

6. "Foundry was produced in 8 weeks, AIP in a few weeks. Foundry is an integration layer for thin apps that require extensive customization. **AIP is simply a wrapper.** Putting the cost of its fleet of FDEs in R&D pumps up R&D artificially."

7. "Palantir moved to 'bootcamps' – short demos in lieu of full FDE deployments – as a way to onboard Foundry AIP customers faster and improve margins.
**As these boot camps are rehearsed scenarios built on curated data, for ease of use, they can fail** in real life scenarios that vary from the curated ones."

8. "Palantir creates architectural overhead in a system, and now that LLMs are integrated into this overhead, **the coming commoditization of LLMs should render Palantir a user interface provider of little value.**

9. "Let’s spend some time on those money-losing years onas it was a very long time for a **company full of supposed geniuses to not make any money.**"

10. "Calling his engineering consultants 'forward deployed' fit right into his **desired noble, militaristic vibe. A righteous and right company**."

\------------------------------

I lost 10 QI points while reading the entire report, so you don't have to.

Here are a few personal thoughts:

1. The report seems entirely written by GPT.

2. \~20% of the report is focused on how the company was at DPO in 2020. We are in 2026

3. Doubts on the validity of the software are dismantled by customers themselves:

• Airbus, client since 2015, just got a **\~$1bn 10y expansion**
• Hyundai HD, client since 2021, just got a **"hundreds of millions" expansion**
• **$200mn** Lumen expansion
• **$440mn** deal with the US Navy to provide Ship OS;

Are these clients nuts?

4. Burry wildly misunderstand the Palantir's AI thesis.

Burry just sees AI = LLM , but there is much more than that.

**Palantir doesn't build an AI model.**

Palantir bets that as LLMs converge toward commoditization, value will increasingly shift to the model-orchestration layer to deliver outcomes: call it AIP.

The 20 years of building software in the most critical use cases put Palantir in a prime position to capitalize on this.

5. Burry wildly misunderstands Palantir's financials, as he believes growth and margins will decrease.

Operating leverage + network effects
**= sustained growth with expanding margins**

6. Trying to prove US Commercial is a scam by showing International Commerce does't grow is dumb.

Palantir voluntarily pivoted the entire company on the success of US Commercial, the most important market, while it saw the Int market was not ready to capture the AI wave.

US Commercial:
**+137% YoY Revenue Growth**
**+145% YoY Remaining Deal Value**
**+49 % clients**

7. Seeing the low number of clients as a minus is dumb.

The fact that Palantir has been able to generate \~$4bn with \~1,000 clients shows an abnormal earnings potential vs its similar size "competitors":
**• Databricks (17,000 clients),**
**• Snowflake (12,000 clients),**

8. Many concerns have dismantled infinite times:
**• "consultancy"**
**• "SPACs"**
**• "SBC"**

They are not concerns now.

9. Dilution is simply not an issue any longer.

**The truth is in the Earnings Per Share:**
**• 8x YoY**
**• 43% GAAP Margin.**

PLTR is diluting by 2% while growing revenue by \~70% at 57% EBIT adj margin. As an investor, I am only happy if we get only 2% dilution to get these results.

10. **His $46 valuation** uses dumb inputs:

• **16% WACC is crazy**. PLTR is no longer a money-burning startup.
• **4% dilution** vs 2% actual dilution
• **50% growth for 5 years and 25% after**: this is not that negative, but inferior to what the strength of the company can achieve.

11. **Burrito is proving himself to be a bad influencer more than an investor**.

If he had properly analysed the situation he could have focused on discussing valid points.

Essentially, he wanted to short and asked GPT to help him draft the thesis, leveraging his "influencer status."

If he wanted to provide a reasonable short report, he would have provided evidence like:

• big customers churning;
• product failing to deliver;
• serious evidence of corporate misconduct.

Why hasn't he done this? There is simply no ground.

There was once an investor.

Now there is only a substack grifter.

Yours,
[u/arny\_trezzi](https://x.com/arny_trezzi)
sentiment -0.85
11 hr ago • u/Minute_Lake4945 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
I understand, very good point, I hadn't thought of it that way. It makes perfect sense and I had overlooked it...
Thank you very much!
Just to mention: I always do NTM projections for growth businesses, which is perhaps why the multiple seemed so low. Even so, in LTM it's trading at around 21.95x (using your formula), which is an extremely attractive price. Personally, I think Adyen is worth around 21x EV/EBIT
sentiment 0.93
12 hr ago • u/Bayard8 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
I would think about it like this:
(MarketCap + (Debt-(Cash-Payables))) /(EBIT-(((cash-payanles)/cash) * interest income))
So that the interest income is being reduced in proportion to the cash you are subtracting from EV
The whole thing is kind of academic but your EV/EBIT ratio looked a little low to me.
sentiment 0.40
14 hr ago • u/Minute_Lake4945 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
I'm not messing with you... maybe Reddit's translation isn't the most accurate, or it's just a cultural thing in my country; we treat those who help us very well. I wasn't picking on you at all.
Based on what you said, if I do: EV = MC + total debt - (cash - payables) Then: EBIT = EBIT - Income Interest
I already understand that, and the justification I gave in the previous message was that I can't be subtracting cash that isn't theirs, but at the same time including in EBIT the money they earn precisely with that money that isn't theirs...
Please tell me if I'm correct; that's my interpretation.
sentiment 0.26
16 hr ago • u/ToeSufficient2241 • r/ValueInvesting • financial_analysis_simteract_sa_q4_2025 • Stock Analysis • B
# Financial Analysis: Simteract S.A. (Q4 2025)
# Executive Summary
The central tension for Simteract S.A. lies in its dual-track strategy: balancing stable but capped "work-for-hire" revenue (Prodigy Track) against the higher-risk, higher-reward potential of proprietary IP (North Star Track). While Q4 2025 results show a company that is profitable and growing, the growth is incremental rather than explosive, raising questions about the scalability of their current model.
The company delivered a solid quarter with **3.17M PLN** in revenue (up 5.2% YoY), driving full-year revenue to **10.01M PLN**. Profitability has improved significantly at the net level, but operating margins in Q4 tightened slightly compared to the previous year. The "North Star" release, *Taxi Life*, has not transformed the P&L into a hockey-stick growth curve, leaving the studio reliant on the continued milestone payments from the upcoming *Bus Simulator 27*.
**Verdict: NEUTRAL**. The heavy lifting is being done by contract work. Until the "North Star" track proves it can generate self-sustaining hits, Simteract remains a stable service provider rather than a high-growth product company.
# Key Financial Metrics
|Metric (PLN)|Q4 2025|Q4 2024|YoY Change|FY 2025|FY 2024|YoY Change|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|**Revenue**|3,174,535|3,018,180|\+5.2%|10,013,876|9,192,098|\+8.9%|
|**Operating Profit (EBIT)**|816,346|734,202|\+11.2%|686,078|973,436|\-29.5%|
|**Net Profit**|819,396|445,295|\+84.0%|593,505|316,966|\+87.2%|
|**Amortization**|94,814|121,888|\-22.2%|459,769|441,471|\+4.1%|
# Portfolio & Sales Performance
# Taxi Life: A City Driving Simulator
*Released: March 7, 2024*
This title represents the "North Star" track—ostensibly the path to higher margins. However, the report is critically opaque regarding unit sales. There are no mentions of "copies sold," "active users," or specific revenue attribution.
* **Forensic Note**: The Balance Sheet shows "Costs of completed development works" (Intangibles) at **596k PLN**, down from **907k PLN** a year ago. This implies the asset is being amortized, but the low carrying value is a red flag. Either the game was incredibly cheap to make (unlikely for a 3D city simulator), or—more likely—most production costs were covered by the publisher (Nacon) or expensed, leaving Simteract with little capitalized risk but also likely a thinner royalty tail.
* **Performance**: The lack of a revenue spike in FY 2025 (only +8.9% total company revenue YoY) despite a major release suggests *Taxi Life* was a moderate performer, not a breakout hit. The revenue stream appears steady ("monetization" is mentioned), but not transformative.
# Bus Simulator 27
*Status: In Development (Work-for-Hire / Prodigy Track)*
This project is the financial backbone. The stability in revenue (approx. 2.5M - 3M PLN per quarter) strongly suggests a milestone-based payment structure typical of work-for-hire arrangements with Astragon Entertainment.
* **Risk**: While this provides a floor for revenue, it caps the upside. The decrease in "Inventory/Work in Progress" (-255k PLN YoY) suggests that costs are being invoiced out rather than accumulating on the balance sheet, confirming the service-based nature of this revenue.
# Future Outlook & Pipeline
The report clarifies the pipeline, identifying two additional initiatives beyond the main "Prodigy" title.
* **Bus Simulator 27**: Confirmed. Public sources indicate an appearance at IGN Fan Fest (Feb 25), suggesting marketing is ramping up. This ensures revenue visibility for 2026 via milestone payments.
* **Unannounced "North Star" Project**: The report confirms an unannounced title is in early development without a publisher. This is the intended next step in their high-margin strategy, but "early stage" implies it is likely years away from significant revenue contribution or commercial release.
* **Project DUST**: An R&D initiative co-financed by EU funds (ERDF) to build tools and processes for "off-road driving games" in Unreal Engine 5. While not a game release itself, it signals the technical direction for future portfolio entries.
**Strategic Assessment**: The pipeline is technically multi-project, but commercially single-threaded. *Bus Simulator 27* pays the bills today. The "North Star" project and "Project DUST" represent the future upside, but they are currently cost centers (or grant-subsidized R&D) rather than near-term revenue generators. The studio must bridge the gap between *Bus Simulator's* launch and the maturity of these internal projects.
# Risk Assessment
1. **Client Concentration**: The dependence on Astragon Entertainment (*Bus Simulator*) and Nacon (*Taxi Life*) is absolute. Loss of either relationship would be catastrophic.
2. **Vagueness as a Risk Signal**: The refusal to quantify *Taxi Life* sales performance is a negative signal. Successful games usually generate press releases with numbers.
3. **Low Asset Value**: The extremely low value of intangible assets (<600k PLN) means the company owns very little IP value on its books. They are selling labor, not building a long-term asset library.
4. **Work-for-Hire Trap**: To grow valuation, Simteract needs a hit they genuinely *own* or have a high royalty stake in. The newly confirmed "North Star" and "Project DUST" initiatives are the strategic answer to this, but they remain early-stage. Until these own-IP projects launch, the company's financials will continue to reflect a service-based software house model rather than a scalable product company.
sentiment 0.99
22 hr ago • u/Bayard8 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
Are you trying to be sarcastic...
I'm just saying you should subtract (from EBIT) the portion of the interest income that is derived from the cash you are subtracting from the debt to come up with net debt that you are then using to calculate EV.
If you are reducing the EV by the net cash (cash - payables) but not reducing the interest income proportionally you are essentially double counting the net cash.
sentiment -0.62
22 hr ago • u/Masterandcomman • r/ValueInvesting • irrational_sell_off • C
Amazon is trading at lower valuations despite their huge ecommerce segment growing faster than Walmart's consolidated sales. Omni-channel ecommerce travels better than Amazon's model, so maybe people see a longer runway there. If Amazon's non-AWS segments traded at 33X, similarly to Walmart, then AWS is something like 22X trailing EBIT.
That's quite a healthy skepticism about margins and runway, even though incremental ROIC remains strong for the big cloud services providers.
sentiment 0.82
23 hr ago • u/Inso81 • r/ASX_Bets • market_open_thread_for_general_trading_and_plans • C
Previous FY26 forward guidance was EBIT $135m. The amended guidance is $110m, so -18.5% from where the market is priced. Today’s drop at -25% could be seen as oversold, and this type of correction is a one-off. But this is the ASX so who the fuck knows, might crap itself like health and tech.
sentiment -0.78
23 hr ago • u/DonJuansCrow • r/ASX_Bets • market_open_thread_for_general_trading_and_plans • C
Without knowing their growth story, they are trading around 20x 2026 guidance so I'd say they are not cheap
For reference Beach had higher H1 NPAT than ASB FY EBIT guidance before they revised it down and Beach is only 25% more expensive
sentiment -0.35
23 hr ago • u/skii65 • r/ASX_Bets • market_open_thread_for_general_trading_and_plans • C
Well instead of an 12% increase to EBIT now its a 3% decrease in guidance vs LY Pretty big error. If you ask me.
sentiment 0.85
23 hr ago • u/Minute_Lake4945 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
Claro, no había caído en esto... Si asumo que el EV es mayor porque el float no pertenece a Adyen, tiene todo el sentido del mundo restarle los intereses generados al EBIT. Al fin y al cabo, ese beneficio viene de rentabilizar en cuentas overnight un capital que no es suyo, ¿no?
Muchas gracias tío! Una aportación brillante, te lo agradezco de corazón
sentiment -0.71
1 day ago • u/Bayard8 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
I am saying that you should subtract the interest income that Adyen earns on the cash you are subtracting from Adyen's market cap to calculate EV from the EBIT you are using to calculate the EV/EBIT ratio.
sentiment 0.46
1 day ago • u/Compound_Hound • r/ASX_Bets • market_open_thread_for_general_trading_and_plans • C
RIP ASB owners
Austal Limited (ASB) has updated its EBIT guidance for FY2026.• Identified a US$17.1m overstatement in incentives related to its T-ATS program• Updated EBIT guidance for FY2026 to approximately A$110m
sentiment -0.18
1 day ago • u/Bayard8 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
Do you subtract out interest income when calculating EV/EBIT?
sentiment 0.46
1 day ago • u/ToeSufficient2241 • r/ValueInvesting • investment_analysis_purple_ray_studio_sa_q4_2025 • Stock Analysis • B
# Investment Analysis: Purple Ray Studio S.A. (Q4 2025)
# Executive Summary
**Verdict: NEUTRAL / WATCHLIST**
The central tension for Purple Ray Studio is the stark contrast between its reported net profit and its operational cash burn. While the company reports a full-year net profit of **199k PLN**, this figure is optically engineered through the capitalization of development costs. The reality is a **negative operating cash flow of -1.95M PLN** YTD, driven by heavy investment in its upcoming title, "Nightmare".
The company's recent NewConnect debut provides liquidity, but the balance sheet is loaded with **7.5M PLN** in Work-In-Progress (WIP) inventory. This represents a massive "all-in" bet on "Nightmare". The existing title, "Boti: Byteland Overclocked", acts as a minor revenue stream but lacks the traction to sustain the studio. The investment thesis rests entirely on the execution and commercial reception of "Nightmare" in 2026. Until the new IP proves its market value, the equity value is speculative.
# Key Financial Metrics
|Metric|Q4 2025|Q4 2024|YoY Change|YTD 2025|YTD 2024|YoY Change|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|**Revenue**|122.8k PLN|119.3k PLN|\+2.9%|844.4k PLN|711.6k PLN|\+18.7%|
|**Op. Profit (EBIT)**|\-40.9k PLN|\-8.5k PLN|\-381%|237.7k PLN|263.5k PLN|\-9.8%|
|**Net Profit**|\-53.8k PLN|\-46.1k PLN|\-16.7%|199.4k PLN|215.5k PLN|\-7.5%|
|**Op. Cash Flow**|\-726.9k PLN|\-895.6k PLN|N/A|\-1.95M PLN|\-2.06M PLN|N/A|
>**Analyst Note:** The divergence between Net Profit (+199k) and Operating Cash Flow (-1.95M) highlights the aggressive capitalization of development costs. Do not mistake the "accounting profit" for operational sustainability.
# Portfolio & Sales Performance
# 1. Boti: Byteland Overclocked (Legacy)
* **Performance:** Weak. The title generated a portion of the \~123k PLN Q4 revenue (shared with work-for-hire contracts).
* **Forensic View:** There is no significant "finished goods" inventory or intangible asset balance associated with Boti, suggesting its development costs are likely fully amortized or expensed. It is a catalogue title providing minimal "keep the lights on" revenue but offers no growth upside.
* **Outlook:** Irrelevant for future valuation.
# 2. Project "Nightmare" (In Development)
* **Status:** Alpha phase complete. Public reveal Q1/Q2 2026.
* **The 7.5M PLN Bet:** The balance sheet shows **7.5M PLN in Inventory (WIP)**, up from 5.1M in 2024. This figure represents the capitalized cost of "Nightmare".
* **Risk:** This asset value is theoretical. It represents *cost*, not *market value*. If "Nightmare" underperforms upon release, this 7.5M PLN asset faces immediate impairment, which would wipe out the majority of the company's equity (8.7M PLN Total Equity). The company is effectively "all-in" on this single asset.
# Future Outlook & Pipeline
# Pipeline Strategy
The studio is pivoting from a service-hybrid model to a proprietary IP model. The 2026 timeline is critical:
* **Q1/Q2 2026:** "Nightmare" Official Announcement. Watch for steam wishlist velocity immediately post-reveal.
* **Release Window:** Likely late 2026 or 2027 based on current "Alpha" status.
# Work-for-Hire (Farada Group)
The contract with Farada Group (dual-use technology) provides a supplementary cash/revenue stream, diversifying risk. However, for a gaming investment thesis, this is a distraction unless it covers the burn rate of the game dev team—which currently, it does not seem to fully cover given the negative OCF.
# Risk Assessment
* **Asset Impairment Risk (High):** The 7.5M PLN WIP asset is the elephant in the room. A lackluster launch for "Nightmare" will force a massive write-down.
* **Cash Burn & Runaway:** With \~1.2M PLN cash on hand and a burn rate that consumed \~726k PLN in Q4 (OCF), the company has a short runway (approx. 2 quarters) without new financing or significant revenue inflows. The recent capital raise (IPO/Series) provided a buffer, but it is being consumed rapidly.
* **Execution Risk:** The transition from alpha to release is where delays often occur, increasing capitalized costs further without valid market validation.
sentiment 0.97
1 day ago • u/Minute_Lake4945 • r/ValueInvesting • why_is_nobody_talking_about_adyen • C
I find the drop in the stock price outrageous after reading the H2 report. Honestly, I don't know if people are profoundly stupid, or if the stock is simply highly institutionalized and automated (you know what I mean). At the monent its trading at 23.7x EV/EBIT LTM and 19.3x NTM
sentiment -0.67
1 day ago • u/ToeSufficient2241 • r/ValueInvesting • draw_distance_sa_q4_2025_a_skeleton_crew_on_life • Stock Analysis • B
The central tension for Draw Distance S.A. is no longer about growth or "next hits," but immediate existential survival. Operating under formal restructuring proceedings since July 2025, the studio has effectively ceased to function as a traditional game developer.
# Executive Summary
The central tension for Draw Distance S.A. is no longer about growth or "next hits," but immediate existential survival. Operating under formal restructuring proceedings since July 2025, the studio has effectively ceased to function as a traditional game developer and has pivoted to a skeleton-crew maintenance and work-for-hire model.
While Q4 2025 delivered a rare Operating Profit (+89k PLN) driven by strict cost controls and the recoupment of *Reckoning of New York*, the balance sheet remains alarming. With cash reserves at a microscopic 45k PLN - barely enough to cover two weeks of operational costs—and a hollowed-out team (1 FTE, 4 contractors), the company is running on fumes. The "turnaround" in Net Profit is largely cosmetic, driven by stopping the bleeding rather than new value creation. Operations are now entirely dependent on back-catalog leftovers and a low-margin service contract with Retrovibe.
**Verdict: Bearish**
# Key Financial Metrics (PLN)
|**Metric**|**Q4 2025**|**Q4 2024**|**YoY Change**|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|**Revenue**|743,103|685,108|\+8.5%|
|**Operating Profit (EBIT)**|89,648|(116,164)|N/A (Turnaround)|
|**Net Profit**|(48,905)|(543,644)|\+91.0%|
|**Amortization**|468,294|485,514|\-3.5%|
|**Cash (End of Period)**|45,234|6,207|\+628%\*|
*\*Percentage increase is misleading due to the negligible base.*
# Portfolio & Sales Performance
The portfolio performance depicts a studio living off past efforts, with its most ambitious recent title confirmed as a commercial failure.
**1. Vampire: The Masquerade – Reckoning of New York** (Recouped)
* **Status**: The report confirms this title finally recouped its production and marketing costs in Q4 2025.
* **Performance**: The company has started receiving profit-share royalties. This recoupment was aided by subscription deal inclusion (Amazon Luna).
* **Insight**: While technically a "success" (it paid for itself), the fact that it took this long to recoup suggests it is a modest earners, not a company-maker. It is now a low-maintenance annuity.
**2. Serial Cleaners** (Flop)
* **Status**: **Dead Asset.**
* **Performance**: Management has capitulated. The report explicitly states the game "has not crossed the sales threshold" and "will not achieve this goal for at least several years."
* **Insight**: The company has ceased detailed reporting on this title. This was intended to be a flagship sequel but has become a drag on the portfolio, monetizable only through deep discounting.
**3. Serial Cleaner (Original)** (Cash Cow)
* **Status**: **Stabilizer.**
* **Performance**: Continues to generate steady revenue, particularly through mobile ports and subscription services (Play Pass).
* **Insight**: Ironically, the 2017 original continues to outperform its sequel in terms of reliability.
# Future Outlook & Pipeline
**Pipeline Status: Non-Existent.**
The report lists **zero** new internal IPs in development. The company’s "production" capability appears to have been dismantled:
* **Headcount collapse**: The report lists employment as **1 FTE** and **4 contractors**. A 5-person team cannot develop "mid-core AA games" as the company claims is its mission.
* **Pivot to Services**: The October 2025 agreement with **Retrovibe** confirms a strategic shift to work-for-hire (porting, code optimization) to secure immediate monthly cash flow.
* **R&D**: While the company completed GameINN grant projects ("Narrative System", "Real World Data"), it lacks the manpower to commercialize them into a new internal game.
**Upcoming Games**:
* *None.* Search of public sources confirms no announced titles for 2026. The "Project Cardinal" (Reckoning of N.Y.) is finished. The studio is effectively dormant regarding new releases.
# Risk Assessment
**1. Liquidity Crisis (Critical)** With **45k PLN** in cash, the company is technically insolvent on a cash basis. It is surviving largely because restructuring proceedings (opened July 2025) have frozen enforcement of its 9.4m PLN in total liabilities (including 3m PLN in loans). Any delay in receivables or the Retrovibe contract payment would cause immediate default.
**2. Zombie Company Scenario** The reduction to \~5 staff members suggests Draw Distance has become a "Zombie Company"—existing solely to service old debts via catalog revenue, with no capacity to build the future value required to pay off those debts in a restructuring arrangement.
**3. Portfolio Concentration** Revenue is entirely dependent on the *Vampire* license (which they do not own) and the aging *Serial Cleaner*. If the licensor rights expire or the long-tail fades, revenue drops to near zero.
sentiment 0.99
2 days ago • u/Key_Variety_6287 • r/ValueInvesting • pfe_worth_a_look • Stock Analysis • B
So I came across this post from a month ago and did some due diligence over the last week. I won't repeat what has already been mentioned here: [https://www.reddit.com/r/ValueInvesting/comments/1qa6jyk/pfe\_pfizer\_a\_gamble\_on\_a\_pharma\_giant/](https://www.reddit.com/r/ValueInvesting/comments/1qa6jyk/pfe_pfizer_a_gamble_on_a_pharma_giant/)
Off course, PFE is coming off the COVID cliff and in future faces patent cliff risk. In addition, the debt burden is quite high but getting better after their acquisition.
Key takeaways from most recent earnings call, total revenue is flat but the non-COVID portfolio grew 6% operationally (good news). Pfizer is on track to deliver $7.2 billion in net savings by the end of 2026—a full year ahead of the original schedule. To address the high debt, mgmt has deliberately paused buyback (I view this as prudent)
In terms of catalyst, Pfizer announced it will initiate 20 pivotal Phase 3 trials (GLP-1 from Metsera acquisition) this year.
Currently trading at Fwd PE of 9.34, EV/EBIT of just under 10 an dividend yield of 6+%.
I am initiating a position and will continue to build over pullbacks.
sentiment 0.63


Share
About
Pricing
Policies
Markets
API
Info
tz UTC-5
Connect with us
ChartExchange Email
ChartExchange on Discord
ChartExchange on X
ChartExchange on Reddit
ChartExchange on GitHub
ChartExchange on YouTube
© 2020 - 2026 ChartExchange LLC