GSM Reddit Mentions | ChartExchange

**FFAI Post-Split Friday July 24 — Complete Analysis**
**The Price Action — A New Market**
**Time**
**Price**
**Venue**
**Notes**
**9:30 open**
**$10.25**
DARK
4,687 shares
9:30-9:33 AM
$9.01-10.25
Dark/DARK
Immediate fade
9:33-9:37 AM
$8.72-9.53
Mixed
Walk down
9:37-9:55 AM
$8.57-9.01
Dark
Continued decline
**10:08-10:14 AM**
**$8.00-8.30**
Mixed
**$8 floor attempt**
10:14-10:24 AM
$7.50-8.10
Mixed
Walk down
**10:19 AM**
**$7.90**
**BATS/DARK**
**7,072 + 7,338 twin blocks**
10:24-10:31 AM
$7.18-7.50
Multi-venue
Stepped descent
10:31-10:45 AM
$7.18-7.30
Dark/Nasdaq
$7.18 floor
10:45 AM-12:57 PM
$6.74-7.19
Dark dominant
**Extended range**
12:57-13:42 PM
$6.74-7.01
Mixed
Recovery attempt
**13:22-13:39 PM**
**$6.83-7.01**
Multi-venue
**Midday bounce**
13:39-14:57 PM
$6.50-7.00
Dark
Fading
14:57-15:54 PM
$6.41-6.55
Dark/MEMX
Afternoon
**Close**
**$6.49**
3,593
**Stock closed at $6.49 post-split** — down from the $10.25 open, a 36.7% intraday decline on the first post-split trading day.
**In pre-split equivalent terms:**
$6.49 ÷ 150 = $0.04327 pre-split equivalent
**The first post-split day closed at the pre-split equivalent of $0.0433** — lower than the pre-split close of $0.07. The suppression operation immediately attacked the post-split price.
**The Borrow Fee — The Most Important Data In The Series**
**Time**
**Fee %**
**Available**
**Event**
Jul 24 12:29 PM
**10.60%**
10,000,000
Mid-session
Jul 24 5:27 PM
**9.89%**
10,000,000
After hours
**Jul 24 11:10 PM**
**9.89%**
**0**
**→ ZERO**
**Jul 27 1:02 AM**
**143.54%**
**600,000**
**→ 143.54%**
**143.54% — THIS IS THE NUMBER**
**The borrow fee jumped to 143.54% overnight between Friday close and Monday morning.**
**Complete fee history context:**
**Date**
**Peak Fee**
April managed floor
10.27%
June 2
16.38%
June 15
20.81% — prior all-time high
**July 27**
**143.54% — 685% above prior all-time high**
**143.54% annual borrow fee on the post-split shares.**
**The daily cost at 143.54%:**
Short position: 379,676 post-split shares × $6.49 = $2,464,897
Annual cost: $2,464,897 × 143.54% = $3,538,115
Daily cost: $9,694/day
**But wait — at $6.49 the daily cost is actually lower than when the fee was 20.81% because the position value has declined.** The key metric is the rate itself signaling genuine scarcity.
**143.54% represents near-complete supply exhaustion.** At this rate:
Lenders are charging 143.54 cents per dollar per year to lend shares
The genuine market is saying these shares are extraordinarily difficult to borrow
Short sellers paying this rate need the stock to decline >143.54% annually just to break even — impossible since the stock can only go to zero
**The 11:10 PM Zero — Then 143.54%**
Jul 24 5:27 PM: 9.89% @ 10,000,000
Jul 24 11:10 PM: 9.89% @ 0 (ZERO)
Jul 27 1:02 AM: 143.54% @ 600,000
**10,000,000 shares at 9.89% → ZERO → 143.54% on 600,000 shares.**
**Three things happened:**
**1. The 10M pre-split share pool was recalled.** Post-split those 10M shares are now worth 1/150th — the lending arrangement restructured. The 10M pre-split share lender recalled their inventory during the weekend.
**2. The zero confirms the entire 10M share borrow was from ONE source** — as identified when analyzing the July 1 10M injection. When that single lender recalled their shares, the pool went to zero immediately. There was no distributed lending backstop — just one entity.
**3. The 143.54% fee on 600,000 shares** — a different lender providing a much smaller pool at the genuine market-clearing rate. This IS what FFAI borrow actually costs without manufactured supply at subsidized rates.
**The 10M share pool at 9.89-10.62% was entirely manufactured and has now been recalled.** The genuine market for FFAI borrow costs 143.54% annually.
**The 24-Week Manufactured Rate vs Genuine Rate — Final Accounting**
**The complete picture is now visible:**
**Period**
**Manufactured Rate**
**Genuine Rate**
**Hidden Subsidy**
April
10.27%
\~13-15% est.
\~300-500 bps
June 2
12.31%
16.38%
407 bps
June 10
12.46%
18.72%
626 bps
June 15
—
20.81%
Max visible
July 1-24
9.89-10.62%
\~143.54% est.
**\~13,292-13,365 bps**
**The 10M share pool injected on July 1 at 9.89-10.62% was masking a genuine rate of 143.54%** — a manufactured subsidy of approximately 13,300 basis points. The short operation borrowed 10 million shares at 10% when the genuine market rate was 143%.
**This is the most significant single revelation in 24 weeks of documentation.**
**Post-Split Exchange Distribution**
**Total volume: 1,111,325 post-split shares** (approximately equivalent to 166.7M pre-split shares — extraordinary volume for a 2M share outstanding count)
**Venue**
**%**
**Shares**
**Right Col (Short %)**
**Off-Exchange**
**50.50%**
**561,169**
**64.38%**
Nasdaq GSM
19.88%
220,909
10.87%
NYSE Arca
14.20%
157,830
11.07%
Cboe BZX
4.12%
45,790
1.34%
Cboe EDGX
3.82%
42,398
2.64%
MEMX
3.59%
39,940
3.89%
**Three Critical Exchange Observations**
**Observation 1 — Off-Exchange Down To 50.50%**
**50.50% off-exchange vs the 65-70% documented throughout the pre-split series.** The first post-split session shows meaningfully less dark pool dominance. In a market with only 2M total outstanding shares and extreme illiquidity, the operation cannot route as much volume through dark pools without moving the market.
**But the right column shows 64.38% short in the dark pool** — the same algorithmic signature. The 66.2% VWAP algorithm is still running at 64.38% on the first post-split day.
**Observation 2 — Nasdaq GSM Elevated at 19.88%**
**19.88% of volume on the primary exchange vs the typical 9-15% pre-split.** The post-split price discovery is more visible on the lit exchange — consistent with a thinner, more volatile market where institutional execution gravitates toward the primary venue.
**Observation 3 — MEMX at 3.59% and 3.89% Short**
**MEMX maintained its 3-4% short rate** — confirming it remains the institutional buying venue post-split. 96.11% of MEMX activity was buying on the first post-split day.
**Short Volume — July 24 Post-Split**
**Metric**
**Value**
Short %
**56.87%**
Total Volume
**714,166 shares**
Off-Ex Non-Exempt
53.00%
Off-Ex Exempt
**5.53%**
Long %
**43.13%**
**56.87% short on the first post-split day** — lower than the pre-split average of 60-70% but still short dominant. The operation immediately resumed shorting at the post-split price.
**EDGX: 86.14% short** — near-total short execution on EDGX on Day 1 post-split. The venue concentration pattern carries over immediately.
**CHX: 100% short** — another venue running 100% short on the first post-split session.
**Total short volume: 56.87% × 714,166 = 406,096 shares sold short on Day 1.**
**This is more shares sold short than the entire current short interest (379,676 post-split).** The operation sold short more shares in one day than the total existing short position — either rolling existing shorts or establishing new ones at post-split prices.
**The Anomaly — Twin 7,000+ Blocks at 10:18-10:19 AM**
10:18:14.578 — 7,338 @ $7.90 DARK — $57,900
10:19:10.441 — 7,072 @ $7.90 BATS (56 seconds later) — $55,800
**14,410 shares at $7.90 in 56 seconds — $113,700** — the two largest single prints in the post-split session. These prints are at $7.90 — exactly the pre-split equivalent of $0.0527.
**These appear at the session low before a brief bounce** — consistent with the accumulation pattern documented throughout the pre-split series. Large dark pool + lit exchange coordinated prints at the session low marking the turning point.
After these prints price briefly recovered from $7.90 to $8.30 before the afternoon walk to $6.49.
**The 9:19 Sequential 1,000-Share Units**
09:39:04 — 1,000 @ $8.77 DARK
09:39:40 — 1,000 @ $8.64 DARK
09:42:32 — 1,000 @ $8.90 EDGX
09:43:16 — 1,034 @ $8.70 EDGX
09:44:25 — 1,000 @ $9.16 DARK
09:45:32 — 1,000 @ $9.00 DARK
09:46:22 — 1,276 @ $9.00 NASDAQ
09:47:30 — 1,000 @ $8.80 NASDAQ
09:49:22 — 1,457 @ $8.70 DARK
09:50:32 — 1,000 @ $8.78 DARK
09:51:54 — 1,000 @ $8.62 DARK
09:52:18 — 1,000 @ $8.72 DARK
**12 consecutive prints of exactly 1,000-1,034 shares** in 13 minutes between 9:39-9:52 AM. The 1,000-share round-lot execution in the post-split market mirrors the 22,910-share base unit documented in the pre-split market. The algorithm adapted its execution size to the new share count structure while maintaining the same pattern.
**What Needs To Happen Now — The Post-Split Thesis**
**The split is done. The compliance is achieved. What’s next:**
**The 143.54% Borrow Fee Changes Everything**
At 143.54% annual rate:
A short seller establishing a new position at $6.49 needs the stock to fall to $0 within 8.5 months just to break even on borrow
Existing short sellers of 379,676 shares are paying $9,694/day
Over 30 days: $290,820 in borrow fees on the short position
The position is now economically irrational to maintain at any reasonable investment horizon
**The August 12 Special Meeting — 18 Days Away**
The Private Placement Proposal must pass for the note conversion to proceed. At $6.49 post-split the note conversion math:
$25M × 108% = $27M
$27M ÷ $6.49 = 4,160,246 new post-split shares
4,160,246 ÷ 2,024,000 current outstanding = 205% dilution
**The note conversion at $6.49 post-split is still extremely dilutive.** The floor price of $0.15528 pre-split = $23.29 post-split. With stock at $6.49 the conversion would happen at the floor price, generating 4.16M new shares vs the current 2.02M outstanding.
**This is why the short operation is still pressing** — if they can keep price below $23.29 post-split (the floor breach equivalent) through August 12 the note conversion remains dilutive.
**The 143.54% fee is the market’s mechanism to force this resolution.** At that rate:
Short sellers face bankruptcy-level carrying costs
New short positions are economically impossible
Existing shorts must cover or face geometric cost escalation
**The Post-Split Float — The Most Illiquid Market In The Series**
**Post-split market structure:**
**Metric**
**Value**
Total outstanding
\~2,024,000 shares
Float (estimated)
\~549,333 shares
Short interest
\~379,676 shares
Short % of float
69.1%
Borrow available
600,000 shares @ 143.54%
Daily short volume Day 1
406,096 shares
Total market cap at $6.49
\~$13.1M
**Friday’s short volume of 406,096 shares represents 73.9% of the estimated post-split float in a single session.** In a 549,333 share float, 406,096 shares of short selling means the operation essentially shorted the entire float once.
**At 143.54% borrow cost on a $13.1M market cap position of $2.46M** the carrying economics have become structurally unsustainable for the short operation.
**The Complete 24-Week Thesis — Final Summary**
**What we documented:**
**22 consecutive automated 8:47-8:48 PM borrow drain events** — confirmed as a scheduled automated process
**66.40-66.41% VWAP short algorithm** — pinned across 5.5 hours on multiple sessions, documented twice
**European pre-market supply injection and drain pattern** — documented 20+ times
**Single-source 10M share post-deletion injection** — lent at 9.89% while genuine rate was 143.54%
**Off-exchange exempt abandonment on SEC referral day** — behavioral evidence of consciousness of guilt
**FTD threshold avoidance** — 23 documented resets before the 5-day Reg SHO trigger
**Fee suppression from 20.81% genuine to 9.89% manufactured** — 1,092 basis point artificial suppression
**Put ladder construction** — $200,000+ in deep ITM puts now worthless
**Multi-venue coordinated simultaneous prints** — documented in 50+ sessions
**Price walked from $0.53 to $0.07 pre-split** over 24 weeks despite documented commercial progress
**What the market answered:**
**Board implemented 1-for-150 split** — maximum authorized ratio
**Put ladder: completely destroyed** — every documented put position worthless at $10.75+ equivalent
**Borrow fee: 143.54%** — genuine market rate revealed after manufactured supply recalled
**Nasdaq compliance: achieved** — September 16 deadline resolved
**Short position: trapped** — 379,676 shares at 143.54% cost in a 549,333 share float
**What remains open:**
Active SEC investigation of Hua Qixin and named defendants
Civil litigation with discovery subpoena power
August 12 Special Meeting (note conversion vote)
Note floor breach at post-split equivalent $23.29 (stock at $6.49)
143.54% borrow rate creating daily covering pressure
**The One Number That Summarizes Everything**
**143.54%**
For 24 weeks the manufactured borrow rate was held at 9.89-20.81% through artificial supply injection. The moment the single-source 10M share lender recalled their inventory the genuine market rate was revealed: **143.54%**.
The 133.65 percentage point gap between the manufactured rate (9.89%) and the genuine rate (143.54%) is the documented magnitude of the borrow rate manipulation across 24 weeks.
At 143.54% the short operation’s position costs $9,694 per day. Over the 24 weeks documented at the manufactured rate the operation saved approximately:
24 weeks × 7 days = 168 days
Average manufactured rate: \~11%
Genuine rate: 143.54%
Savings per day on $4M position: ($4M × 132.54%) ÷ 365 = $14,525/day
Total savings over 24 weeks: $14,525 × 168 = $2,440,200
**The manufactured borrow rate saved the short operation approximately $2.4 million in carrying costs over 24 weeks** — costs that would have made the suppression campaign economically irrational long before the split was forced.
The 143.54% is the answer to the question posed on July 10 when someone asked why it was being manipulated so hard. It was being manipulated because at genuine rates the position was unsustainable. The manufactured supply kept the operation alive long enough to drive price from $0.53 to $0.07.
It wasn’t enough.
**The split happened. The puts are worthless. The genuine rate is 143.54%. The float is 549,333 shares against 379,676 short.**
The 24-week documentation is complete. Now we compile the thesis.

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