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[Prabhat Khabar, Dhanbad Edition, Dated 06.07.2026](https://preview.redd.it/hykvy12e9mbh1.jpg?width=410&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=b5492992d48a00a6fdc2988111e3ae75c4764092)
[Prabhat Khabar, Dhanbad Edition, Dated 06.07.2026](https://preview.redd.it/2ishz22e9mbh1.jpg?width=1517&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6e7cb6d700599ba758a55fb17edc49c19ee5fd49)
**Public-source BCCL / BHARATCOAL investor update — not a trade call.**
Prabhat Khabar, Dhanbad City, dated 6 July 2026, has reported a worrying patch-level cost issue in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. As per the report, interim data up to March 2026 shows that some outsourced patches generated **₹2,168.12 lakh revenue** against **₹3,904.68 lakh operating cost**, resulting in a reported loss of **₹1,736.56 lakh / ₹17.36 crore**.
The headline point is not just the ₹17.36 crore loss. The concern is that the report says coal production cost in these patches was about **1.8x the sale value**, or roughly **80% higher than revenue**.
This matters because BCCL is not a lightly outsourced miner. Its own prospectus says third-party contractors handled **84.21% of coal extraction in H1 FY26**, **78.47% in FY25**, **74.93% in FY24**, and **72.04% in FY23**. So contractor economics are central to the business model.
# The reported per-tonne losses are the real red flag
As per the Prabhat Khabar clipping, the worst reported per-tonne loss-making outsourcing patches are:
|Patch/project|Reported loss per tonne|
|:-|:-|
|KenduaDih Phase-4, PB|₹28,805.50/tonne|
|PB Project MDO|₹13,167.34/tonne|
|Moonidih Mine, WJ|₹8,426.94/tonne|
|Gopalichak Fire Patch, PB|₹8,055.47/tonne|
|Damgodia-Borera Patch-A, CV |₹7,273.15/tonne|
|Gopalichak Patch-B, PB|₹6,908.26/tonne|
|Amalgamated Jayrampur Patch-D, Lodna|₹5,655.29/tonne|
|Kankanee Patch-D, Sijua|₹3,012.98/tonne|
|Maheshpur OCP Hired|₹2,482.92/tonne|
|Kudua OCM Hired|₹1,122.19/tonne|
|EJ Area, total|₹961.95/tonne|
|EBC Patch-C, Kusunda|₹739.23/tonne|
|Rajapur OCP|₹452.42/tonne|
|Amalgamated N&S Mega C-2 Patch|₹334.58/tonne|
|GKKC OCM Patch-R|₹66.55/tonne|
BCCL’s FY26 average **sales per tonne** was only **₹3,085.76**, while **cost per tonne** was **₹3,039.64** and **profit per tonne** was just **₹46.12**. In FY25, profit per tonne was **₹446.84**. So company-level profit per tonne has already fallen by nearly **90% YoY**.
# Patch-wise total loss reported up to March 2026
The clipping also gives patch-wise total losses:
|Patch/project|Reported loss up to March 2026|
|:-|:-|
|Amalgamated Jayrampur Patch-D, Lodna|₹457.42 lakh|
|Gopalichak Fire Patch, PB|₹356.77 lakh|
|Moonidih Mine, WJ|₹309.62 lakh|
|ASP Fire Patch-A, EJ|₹144.36 lakh|
|Tetulmari OCP Pahadi Patch, Sijua|₹132.90 lakh|
|Amalgamated N&S Mega C-2 Patch, EJ|₹72.05 lakh|
|Gopalichak Patch-B, PB|₹44.98 lakh|
|Damgodia-Portera Patch-A, CV|₹43.70 lakh|
|Kankanee Patch-D, Sijua|₹32.48 lakh|
|PB Project MDO|₹33.80 lakh|
|KenduaDih Phase-4, PB|₹28.86 lakh|
|Ghanuadih Patch-A, Bastacolla|₹18.99 lakh|
|EBC Patch-C, Kusunda|₹12.53 lakh|
|Rajapur OCP, Bastacolla|₹14.63 lakh|
|Maheshpur OCP Hired, Govindpur|₹9.95 lakh|
|Kuya OCM Hired, Bastacolla|₹7.71 lakh|
|GKKC OCM Patch-R, Kusunda|₹7.23 lakh|
|Amlabad, EJ Area|₹8.63 lakh|
The top three patches account for around **₹11.24 crore**, or roughly **65%** of the reported total loss. The top five account for around **₹14.01 crore**, or about **81%**. So the investor question is whether these are isolated patch issues or signs of structural underperformance in specific outsourced projects.
# Why this is financially material despite being “only” ₹17.36 crore
BCCL’s FY26 PBT was only **₹149.18 crore** and PAT was **₹128.28 crore**. The reported ₹17.36 crore loss equals about **11.6% of FY26 PBT** and **13.5% of FY26 PAT**.
That is why shareholders should not evaluate this only as a percentage of revenue. It is small versus revenue, but significant versus the profit pool left after FY26 margin compression.
# The cost structure was already moving in the wrong direction
BCCL’s FY26 production fell **12.30%**, offtake fell **13.62%**, and revenue from operations fell **14.28%**. But contractual expense still rose from **₹4,311.51 crore to ₹4,482.20 crore**. BCCL attributed the increase to new contracts, wage escalation, higher washing charges and higher leads.
By simple calculation, contractual expense per tonne of production increased from about **₹1,065/tonne** in FY25 to about **₹1,262/tonne** in FY26, a rise of roughly **18.5%**.
# Stripping ratio is the core due-diligence question
In opencast mining, stripping ratio broadly means overburden removed compared with coal extracted. If a patch removes much more overburden than planned but coal output is lower than planned, cost can run ahead of revenue.
BCCL’s prospectus itself says higher strip ratio affects productivity because deeper deposits require more overburden removal for the same coal output. It also says stripping costs are allocated using a standard strip ratio, and excess OB removal can be capitalised as a stripping activity asset.
This means the reported OB-vs-coal mismatch, if accurate, can affect not only mining efficiency but also accounting, margins and investor understanding of real project economics.
# Working-capital context makes this harder to ignore
BCCL’s trade receivables excluding unbilled dues rose from **₹1,847.76 crore to ₹2,863.18 crore**, and trade receivables as days of revenue rose from **34 days to 67 days**. Current ratio declined from **1.19 to 0.93**, ROCE fell from **30.13% to 5.03%**, RONW fell from **20.83% to 2.07%**, and EPS fell from **₹2.66 to ₹0.28**.
Raw coal stock also increased from **6.85 MT to 9.41 MT**, and stock days rose from **65 days to 104 days**.
So the broader issue is not just one media report. The investor concern is this chain:
**Reported high-cost outsourcing patches → higher OB/HEMM/contractor cost → weak or negative patch contribution → lower profit per tonne → weaker cash conversion when receivables and stock are already elevated → need for clearer disclosure.**
I did not find a report-specific NSE/BSE/BCCL disclosure on the exact Prabhat Khabar claim of **₹17.36 crore loss in outsourced patches** in the checked sources. BCCL has, however, separately disclosed interim measures for financial stress in outsourced HEMM and coal-transport contracts arising from bulk diesel price increases, where it said the financial impact was not presently ascertainable.
# Investor questions
1. Are these patch-wise losses final, audited and reconciled with BCCL’s accounts?
2. What was the planned versus actual stripping ratio for each loss-making patch?
3. Was OB removal higher than planned while coal output was lower than planned?
4. Are these losses due to geology, fire-affected areas, low grade, lower offtake, contractor rates, diesel escalation, transport lead, or production shortfall?
5. How much of the excess OB cost is expensed versus capitalised as stripping activity asset?
6. Has BCCL reviewed whether these patches should continue, be repriced, be restructured or be disclosed as project-level risks?
7. If the company has started reviewing outsourcing companies, why has no specific clarification been seen in the checked disclosures?
**Source:** Prabhat Khabar, Dhanbad City clipping dated 6 July 2026; BCCL prospectus; BCCL FY26 performance presentation; BCCL investor-relations disclosures.
**Disclaimer:** Not investment advice. I am not recommending buy, sell, hold, short, exit, average or entry. This is a public-source investor update for discussion. The Prabhat Khabar numbers are treated as reported claims unless confirmed by BCCL or exchange filings. Corrections or additional filings are welcome.

BofA GLOBAL RESEARCH Global Memory Tech
Weekly theme: Meta/CXMT/Korea risks, Japan trip takeaways, Samsung 2Q OP
**Meta's memory chip order cut**
Memory chipmakers believe Meta will keep using more actively HBM, LPDDR5, eSSD, etc. for its Al data centers. Thus, the Street's speculation on "Meta will rent overly invested Al servers or cloud infrastructureạishould be groundless. In fact, some Al supply chain companies (e.g., NAND controller IC providers, substrate material manufacturers, etc.) said Meta's long-term chip/component orders are getting stronger. Chipmakers said Meta can share its own data centers with external customers as a cloud service provider but this does not translate into excess capacity; it can be a business objective diversification using more advanced memory chips.
**CXMT's DRAM for iPhone**
We do not expect Apple to meaningfully adopt CXMT's DRAM. Three reasons: (1) US's restriction on China semis, (2) DRAM quality to meet Apple's specs (10Gbps+ speed, 1.1V power consumption, ECC function), and (3) DRAM IPs owned by major Korean/US chipmakers (litigations if Apple uses less patented chips). True, CXMT can target low-end iPhone 18e but actual DRAM order won't be significant, given weak sales volume of low-end iPhones in China (high-end more popular). Apple may try to use CXMT's DRAM to increase bargaining power when it negotiates 2H or 2027 contract prices with Korea/US big-3 DRAM makers, though actual purchasing volume (from CXMT) remains small.
**Peak concern following Korea's cluster construction plan**
Some investors said the Korea government-led new memory fab cluster construction spending W800tn in the country's southwestern region (e.g., Kwangju) signals a peak of memory cycle. However, we do not expect meaningful chip production volumes by 2033 (see report). It is a long-term plan after focusing on Youngin/Pyeongtaek fab cluster expansion (2026-35). Overall, we don't see yet any capex-driven memory cycle peak, given strong/diversified enterprise chip demand (HBM, SOCAMM, eSSD, etc.).
**What we learned from our Japan trip**
We met Japan investors and NAND supply chain companies this week. The investors were broadly bullish on memory but frequently asked potential downturn given currently strong industry growth. In fact, corporate management provided more bullish guidance, suggesting (1) upbeat 2Q ASP (particularly NAND), (2) still rising trend of 3Q/4Q ASP vs 2Q, (3) 2027 shortage (DRAM, NAND), (4) rising LTA (but still volume-centric), (5) disciplined capex and chip production volume (mainly for Japan NAND).
**Samsung's 2Q preliminary OP**
Samsung Electronics' 2Q preliminary OP (due 7 July) is likely to be slightly lower than the bullish consensus due to special bonus (including 1Q) and smartphone margin squeeze.
Memory-only OP can exceed consensus due to upbeat ASP - consistent with Korea's strong exports. DRAM spot/contract price also rebounded further in June.

immer noch besser als mein chef der "ASP" schreibt

Ask yourself what is "priced in" NIO current share price.
4000 swap stations? Completed 100 million swaps, performing 100k swaps daily? No.
1 million premium EVs sold with extremely high ASP? No.
Selling the biggest SUV EV in China at the quickest 120,000 record time? No.
Designing chips stronger and cheaper than Nvidia? No.
Not only non of NIO's work is priced in,
The share price stands $2 below IPO price as if the company never existed, or going bankrupt next week.

Ask yourself why NIO share price feels pinned or magnetized to 4-5-6.
This situation will not remain for long time.

Putting the ASP homeworks as projects is a bold move, maybe do a more relevant project that takes more than a few days to make. Rn project section seems like padding . But yeah you’ll pass the screening and from then on it depends on prep not on cv.

I’m confused with your calculation. For the ASP , it seems you’re taking the sales prices with the BaaS option, which excludes the price of the battery. If that’s what you did , your ASP and revenue calculation is totally wrong . No matter which option the buyers choose, ASP for NIO **includes** the cost of the battery as well . In BaaS option NIO sells the battery to MIRATERY, the battery management *company* .
This is what NIO said recently about the ASP;
“***Shanghai-based EV maker*** [***Nio Inc.***](https://eletric-vehicles.com/category/nio/)***‘s main brand averaged a transaction price above 450,000 yuan ($66,500) last week, VP of Branding and Communications Ma Lin said Monday on Weibo.***
***The figure marks a sharp increase from the 390,000 yuan ($57,600) average the brand recorded in the first quarter of 2026 and was driven by early deliveries of the flagship ES9 SUV.”***

⚡ NIO Q2–H2: Margin consolidation and profit acceleration. From narrative to cash flow: NIO enters strong profit territory. NIO H2 2026: ~$476–$500M USD net income under assumptions of stable ASP and premium mix