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Middle East conflict: Regional auto industry comes under pressure

Just Auto | Nov 16, 2026 7:11 AM EST


Iran entered this year’s Middle East conflict already weakened. Sanctions, a depreciating rial, restricted access to foreign technology, and persistent difficulty sourcing imported parts had left the automotive sector with little resilience. Inflation was running above 40% in 2025, before the first US strikes, leaving manufacturers with almost no buffer.



Iranian Light Vehicle (LV) production fell from 623k units in the first nine months of 2025 to 381k units over the same period in 2026, a 38.8% year-on-year (YoY) decline. The country’s two largest producers, Iran Khodro and SAIPA, built 285k vehicles in January–September 2026, down 37% from 452k units a year earlier. Their combined shortfall of around 167k units accounts for roughly two-thirds of the national decline.



The conflict is not the sole cause of this contraction, but it is accelerating weaknesses that were already present. Even with a durable de-escalation, producers would need to rebuild parts inventories, restore import channels, and re-establish stable build schedules. We therefore expect any recovery in Iranian output to lag improvements in security by several quarters. Even in a benign scenario, production is likely to remain well below 2025 levels through at least H1 2027.



While Iran bears the most immediate impact on production, the wider Middle East faces growing exposure. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt are all vulnerable to varying degrees, whether through local manufacturing operations, component sourcing, logistics routes, or dependence on imported finished vehicles.



The wider Middle East: why the impact extends beyond Iran



The Strait of Hormuz is central to this exposure. While Iran’s losses are concentrated in its factories, the wider Middle East faces risks that are just as significant through its supply chains and markets.



Disruption to shipping through the strait has created uncertainty over the movement of oil, gas, industrial materials, and manufactured goods. For automotive manufacturers, the implications extend well beyond fuel costs to the availability of vehicles and parts.



The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries rely heavily on imported vehicles and components, with Japan, China, India, and Korea among their most important suppliers. Since many of the region’s major ports lie inside the Gulf, much of this trade must pass through Hormuz. Disruption to the route can therefore affect vehicle availability, delivery schedules, and production planning, even in markets where local assembly operations are not directly impacted.



UAE and Saudi Arabia: localization plans meet a logistics shock



The conflict arrives just as the UAE and Saudi Arabia are shifting from import-led vehicle markets toward local assembly. The disruption does not derail these plans, but it does expose how dependent on imports they remain.



ROX Motor (UAE): ROX began production in Abu Dhabi in early September 2026, with its ADAMAS SUVs carrying the “Made in the Emirates” mark. The plant at Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) is expected to reach an annual capacity of 20k units in 2027. Although more than 80 types of components are sub-assembled on site, the operation still depends on a continuous inbound flow of kits and parts, largely from China. The UAE’s main ports, Khalifa Port and Jebel Ali, both lie inside the Gulf. Until traffic through Hormuz normalizes, shipments must be rerouted through ports outside the strait, such as Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, or Sohar in Oman, and then trucked in. This adds cost and lead time, making the 2027 ramp-up more fragile. In our view, a slip in early production targets is very likely.



CEER (Saudi Arabia): CEER, the joint venture between the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Foxconn, has a $1.3 billion complex at King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) with a capacity of up to 240k units a year. The brand unveiled its first Sedan and SUV on September 21, 2026, with Saudi sales expected to begin in early 2027. Because KAEC is on the Red Sea coast, CEER has a structural advantage over its Gulf-coast peers, such as ROX—its inbound logistics are not tied to Hormuz. Its weakness, however, is localization. CEER is targeting 45% Saudi-sourced content by 2034, which means its early production years will rely heavily on imported powertrain and electronic components from Europe, Korea, and elsewhere in Asia. These parts still face higher freight and insurance costs, and the Red Sea corridor could itself be disrupted if the conflict widens. Saudi Arabia’s alternative ports and overland routes offer resilience, but not immunity.



Wider implications: If disruption to either route becomes prolonged, through a sustained closure of Hormuz or a severing of the Red Sea corridor, delivery delays would begin to translate into order cancellations and weaker demand in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. To mitigate this risk, several Chinese OEMs have indicated they may bring forward knocked-down assembly plants in Saudi Arabia and Egypt if shipping whole vehicles becomes impractical. This would reinforce localization in the medium term, but it would also make near-term production dependent on shipments of parts, shifting the risk rather than removing it.



Production risks therefore differ by market. For some, such as Iran, the most immediate threat is disruption at the factory level, while for others, such as the GCC markets, it is the cost and availability of imported materials, components, and finished vehicles.



Overall, for an industry already contending with electrification, geopolitical uncertainty, and cost pressures, the conflict adds a further significant threat to production stability and regional growth. While Iran is absorbing the most severe production losses, the conflict has exposed how much of the region’s automotive ambitions still depend on vulnerable shipping lanes, and the pace of recovery will be determined less by factory capacity than by how quickly secure trade routes can be restored.



Zakia Subhan, Analyst, Research and Analysis

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