PP
The Meet Kevin Pricing Power ETF
stock NYSE

I was going to suggest LQR for the acquisition target, beaten down 98% in the past year from naked short selling bastards! And the CEO was on PP show so you know he is credible

big PP move by RC, making sure to rescue the price, he has been clear about his ultimate goal.

PP is very notably a guy whose most notable characteristic is that he's a guy who sucks. Like even if he was a millionaire he'd still radiate immense fucking loser vibes, like one of those embarrassing dorks that shows up in the memes from that *Succession* show *I have not watched*.

Didn't he also quit his job and sell all possessions because he thought BBBY MOASS was imminent? I remember him calling into the PP show and talking about it. He was looking in magazines for houses and cars that he wanted to buy with all of his MOASS profits.

Fresh batch of company write-ups from Substack authors, all published within the last week.
Not my work - sourced from Giles Capital's weekly compilation: [https://gilescapital.substack.com/](https://gilescapital.substack.com/)
# Americas
**Long Term Pick** on [**Microsoft Corporation**](https://longtermpick.com/p/microsoft-analysis-2026) (🇺🇸 MSFT US - US$3.4tn) Azure crossed $100B in annual revenue this quarter, growing 43%, with $678B in contracted future revenue up 84% year-on-year. Trades 23.9x forward P/E, below the five-year average, as the capex cycle temporarily compresses free cash flow. Net cash, 68% gross margins.
**Archive Invest** on [**Meta Platforms**](https://archiveinvest.substack.com/p/the-ad-business-is-accelerating-and) (🇺🇸 META US - US$1.75tn) All the anxiety surrounding Meta's capex spending seemed to overlook that ad revenue accelerated 28% in Q2, with pricing and volume both expanding. Trades 17x forward P/E versus the five-year average of 24.5x. One-time legal charges obscure 9% underlying operating income growth.
**Kairos Research** on [**FTAI Aviation**](https://kairosresearch.substack.com/p/ftai-update) (🇺🇸 FTAI US - \~US$8bn) FTAI Aviation trades 9-11x 2028 EBITDA with a $350 base case - roughly 70% upside from current levels. Aerospace margins compressed deliberately to 28.5% as management prioritises market share over near-term profitability. The Power segment, guiding $450-750m EBITDA by 2027, is the unpriced option.
**Show Me the Incentives** on [**E.W. Scripps**](https://showmetheincentives.substack.com/p/the-ew-scripps-company-ssp) (🇺🇸 SSP US - \~US$500m) Scripps is a controlled, highly-levered equity stub at 10.7x EV/EBITDA with $125-150m EBITDA growth targeted by 2028. The CEO carries a $10m award tied to EBITDA targets plus 100% payout on any change of control. Aggressive insider buying signals confidence in a near-term M&A outcome as the regulatory environment improves.
**Acid Investments** on [**Vaso Corporation**](https://acidinvestments.substack.com/p/quick-deep-value-idea-vaso-corp) (🇺🇸 VASO US - US$37m) The market is ascribing a negative value to this profitable business as a going concern. Net cash roughly equals the entire market cap, meaning the GE HealthCare partnership business comes free. Founder family controls 44% and the exclusive service contract runs to 2030.
# Europe, Middle East & Africa
**Asymmetric Ventures** on [**LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton**](https://asymventures.substack.com/p/lvmh-1h-2026-results) (🇫🇷 MC PA - US$257bn) Fashion and leather organic growth turned positive in Q2 for the first time in seven quarters, ending a prolonged declining run. The question of when luxury would recover has now been answered. Arnault family owns 48%, stock trades at 20x earnings.
**Rock and Turner** on [**Universal Music Group**](https://rockandturner.substack.com/p/royalty-king-universal-music-group) (🇳🇱 UMG AS - US$28bn) Imagine finding a company with 13.3% revenue growth and stable 20.5% EBITDA margins trading 50% below a rejected takeover bid from three months ago. That is UMG at €14.50 today. Bolloré family owns 31.7%, buybacks accelerating.
**Trident Opportunities** on [**Avingtrans**](https://tridentopportunities.substack.com/p/avingtrans-plc-avgl-a-nuclear-beneficiary) (🇬🇧 AVG LN - US$330m) Nuclear supply chain covering decommissioning, life extension, and new build through Hayward Tyler, Metalcraft, and Booth Industries. Management projects nuclear revenue of £90m by FY31 from £35m today, at 35-38% EBITDA margins.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**BTG Consulting**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/btg-consulting-fy26-review) (🇬🇧 BTG LN - US$233m) Most investors see a 21x P/E and move on. The underlying number is 9x once acquisition accounting non-cash charges are stripped out - a distinction most will never bother to check. FY27 profit guided up 53%, dividend 4.3%.
**The Finance Corner** on [**PARKEN Sport & Entertainment**](https://thefinancecorner.substack.com/p/parken-sport-and-entertainment-a) (🇩🇰 PARKEN CSE - US$195m) The beautiful thing about Lalandia's business model is that 2,300 holiday home owners pay recurring commissions, making the revenue stream predictable. PARKEN trades DKK 2.1bn versus a fair value estimate of DKK 2.94bn across three assets: Lalandia, Copenhagen's national stadium, and F.C. Copenhagen.
**Demystified Value** on [**EuroEyes International Eye Clinic**](https://demystifiedvalue.substack.com/p/euroeyes-international-eye-clinic) (🇩🇪 1846 HK - US$100m) Founder-led German ophthalmology group at 4.5x EV/EBIT with 60% insider ownership. The HK$1.2B FYEO Europe acquisition drives 58% proforma revenue growth, and at 18% capacity utilisation the proforma earnings number is deliberately conservative.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**James Cropper**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/who-gives-a-crpr) (🇬🇧 CRPR LN - US$43m) A £34m paper mill pivoting into fuel cell substrates and aerospace composites, both growing 20%+ at 45% margins. Trades 0.85x NAV and 4.8x EV/EBIT. The new CEO comes from Zotefoams, where he ran the same playbook. This is operational accumulation, not financial engineering.
**Etruscan Capital** on [**Cedergrenska**](https://etruscancapital.substack.com/p/cedergrenska-ab-a-tiny-profitable) (🇸🇪 CEDER ST) Whether Swedish education policy shifts post-election is subject to interpretation. What's clear is that Cedergrenska buys schools at 3-4x EBITDA and trades at 7x, with 21% annual revenue growth across 54 facilities. The discount is political, not operational.
# Asia-Pacific
**Crack the Market** on [**SK Hynix**](https://crackthemarket.substack.com/p/sk-hynix-the-flagship-at-half-price) (🇰🇷 000660 KS - US$716bn) SK Hynix hit its first-ever 30% limit-up on July 31 after record Q2 revenue, then kept climbing. One cannot completely rule out the risk of a memory down-cycle reverting. But so far, the evidence is thin - and at 4.4x forward P/E with KRW 69 trillion in net cash, the downside is well backstopped.
**Angsana Anderson** on [**Nexon**](https://www.angsanaanderson.com/p/nexon-11-fcf-yield-zero-debt-and) (🇯🇵 3659 JP - US$12bn) Zero debt, founding family majority, and the Saudi sovereign wealth fund at 11%. DNF Mobile 2.0 relaunches August 13 - a catalyst with a known date. Trades at 11% FCF yield with takeover optionality priced at zero.
**Value Zoomer** on [**Ultragreen.AI**](https://valuezoomer.substack.com/p/ultragreenai-the-green-light) (🇸🇬 ULG SI - US$1.5bn) Think of Ultragreen.AI as the infrastructure layer beneath industrial cooling: 70% global market share, invisible from the outside, impossible to remove from within. Listed in December 2025, P/E 10x, net cash $176m, Sajwan family majority. The "AI" in the name is cosmetic.
**PP Invest** on [**GRAVITY Co., Ltd.**](https://ppinvest007.substack.com/p/good-prospects-for-a-revaluation) (🇰🇷 GRVY US - US$452m) TOP PICK GRAVITY is the South Korean game publisher behind Ragnarok Online, a franchise with over 100 million registered users that has dominated Southeast Asian gaming for two decades. At a $452m market cap the company holds $434m in net cash, meaning the franchise, the licensing royalties, and a new Chinese government approval for the mobile sequel are all priced at zero. First-ever dividend paid this year. P/E 8x.
**The Oak Bloke** on [**Altyn Gold**](https://theoakbloke.substack.com/p/altn-gold-double-or-fold) (🇰🇿 ALTN LN - US$320m) TOP PICK Gold at $4,035 per ounce, production plan to double by 2027, and an enterprise value approaching zero. Inventory is carried at one-third of spot price - you could almost buy the company, sell the inventory at market, and be left with more than you paid. Assaubayev family holds 65%.

Yep, PP prefers other people do the work, so long as he's the one getting paid. Marantz's ego would never allow that.

When you think about it: PP, who is objectively much more of a loser than Marantz (I can't imagine PP having the work ethic to get to the good job that Marantz was seemingly willing to throw away for all this, etc), has been far more successful as a grifter and streamer than him.
I think it's because Marantz's disprotionate ego could never let him share the spotlight with anyone else, unlike PP, who has happily let other people latch on him.

My DD go PP

They actually had a few bankruptcy attorneys not involved with the BBBY bankruptcy reach out to them on Twitter and tried to set them straight.
Jake and PP basically told them that they didn’t know what they were talking about.

The very same company you were investing in was also telling you in their fillings that they were most likely going bankrupt and you would lose everything.
Yet you chose to believe PP.
Enjoy being a poor dumbass forever.

why is doing PP in LA or NYC a questionable choice? the income rates for PP are much higher in those cities than other areas of the country.
the student loans are the only debt i’m in. no CC debt. no car payment. no mortgage. no kids.

Yes, this particular ape is blaming PP and his cohort and saying that incessant "WE WON" chant was the PSYOP.

Hey, just took a quick look through the model. Overall, I think it’s a solid foundation, but there are a few things I would probably consider revisiting in the next iteration 😊
I would probably model invested capital explicitly and introduce a terminal RONIC assumption rather than letting terminal FCF just fall out of the final-year capex, D&A and NWC numbers.
Based on the current 2030 numbers, I get net reinvestment of only around USD 0.9bn on c. USD 13.1bn of NOPAT. With 2.75% terminal growth, that seems to imply a RONIC of roughly 40%. That feels pretty high to me (however, happy to be corrected on that).
I suggest using the value-driver framework here, i.e. reinvestment rate = g / RONIC, and then solve for the reinvestment/capex needed in the terminal year. Otherwise you can quite easily end up with a terminal year where the company is growing without really reinvesting enough to support that growth (quite common mistake in DCF’s in my experience).
I would also revisit the PP&E schedule and the constant 11.1% D&A as a % of beginning PP&E. It works as a shortcut, but once capex starts moving around it can look a bit odd. If you want a nice modelling exercise you could build a separate D&A schedule based on existing PP&E + new annual capex. Painful the first time you do it haha, but rewarding when it is done (and can be copied to other models easily)
On NWC, The DPO calculation currently uses the full “accounts payable and accrued expenses” balance against COGS. Coca Cola’s 2025 balance was c. USD 14.8bn, but only c. USD 5.6bn of that was actual accounts payable. The rest includes things like marketing accruals, compensation accruals, lease liabilities etc. So… I’m not really sure the resulting 300+ day DPO is telling you much about supplier payment terms or how working capital will develop going forward.
I suggest to either 1) isolate actual AP and model the other accruals separately, or 2) just forecast normalized operating NWC as a % of sales for simplicity.
I initially wondered if leases were causing a cash flow issue, because that’s a pretty common DCF mistake, but having checked the 10-K I actually think you’re broadly fine there. Coca Cola had c. USD 405m of operating lease expense and c. USD 404m of operating lease cash payments in 2025, so there doesn’t seem to be a meaningful cash leakage missing from FCF. As long as you keep treating leases as operating expenses and don’t then also deduct the operating lease liability as debt, I think that part is internally consistent.
I would spend some time normalizing “other operating charges” though. The historical numbers include a lot of stuff that is clearly not normal recurring operating expense, for instance: BodyArmor impairments, fairlife contingent consideration remeasurement etc. If you want to improve the credibility of your baseline, I suggest to not just extrapolate the historical GAAP line. In fact, the current forecast at c. 2.55% of revenue gives you roughly USD 1.3bn of other operating charges every year, whereas Coca Cola only recorded USD 44m in H1 2026. Truth be told, this is always subjective, and I just wanted to flag that one-offs and special items are a black box which are incredibly difficult, and make Big4 Transacation Services departments a lot of money in M&A 😊
A few WACC / bridge points as well:
1)    The WACC uses USD 300.7bn of equity value, while the DCF sheet shows a current share price of USD 87.05. At USD 87.05 the market cap should be closer to USD 375bn, so I think you’re mixing valuation dates somewhere (unless my calculations are off). I also couldn’t see an explicit valuation date in the model, which would be useful to add.
2)    I would use market value of debt rather than book value where you can. Coca Cola discloses c. USD 43.9bn carrying value of long-term debt but only c. USD 39.4bn fair value. Adding the short-term debt gets you to around USD 40.9bn versus the USD 45.5bn currently used.
3)    In general it is best practice to add the source/methodology, for instance, it would be nice to understand how you retrieved the 0.35 beta and ERP. A 5.81% WACC feels… low? I don’t know, my experience within the consumer segment is extremely limited. But, with 2.75% terminal growth, you only have about a 3.1% WACC-g spread, so relatively small changes have a huge impact on value.
4)    On the same point, around 87% of the core EV seems to come from the terminal value. That’s not necessarily “wrong” for a company like Coca Cola, but it is definitely on the high side and means I would want to be very comfortable with the WACC, terminal growth and RONIC assumptions. Alternatively, you could model out 10 years instead of 5? Perhaps that won’t add much value seeing as Coca Cola is at its mature steady state stage already haha.
5)    I would also use mid-year discounting, or ideally exact stub-period discounting if this is supposed to be a current valuation. Your FY2026 is discounted as though all the cash arrives at the end of the year. Unless Coca Cola collects every dollar on December 31st, that’s unnecessarily harsh on the valuation.
Finally, I also noticed some stuff on the EV-EqV bridge:
You’re adding the c. USD 20.2bn of equity-method investments at book value, but Coca Cola actually discloses market values for a lot of the listed stakes. Monster, CCEP, KOF, CCHBC and CCBJ alone were worth around USD 19.6bn more than their accounting carrying values at FY2025 (with some tax leakage adjustments ofc.). And on NCI, I think the c. USD 2.1bn of non-controlling interests should be deducted in the EV-to-equity bridge, since the consolidated operating cash flows include subsidiaries that aren’t 100% owned by Coca Cola.
Overall though, I think it is a quality DCF with clean formatting. The main things I would consider revisiting for a next iteration are probably the terminal reinvestment framework, working capital build, valuation-date consistency and the EV-to-equity bridge.
 

PP?

Wenn man das wirklich sinnvoll machen möchte, dann führt kein Weg an PP vorbei. Absolute Empfehlung.
Gibt auch genug Videos im Netz zur Einrichtung und fürs Dashboard bauen, Rebalancing Hilfen usw.

PP measuring

PP ist ziemlich geil und komplett umsonst. Dafür ist es aber auch nicht ohne Arbeit. Transaktionen muss man selber pflegen.
Du wirkst eher als wenn du eine fertige Bezahllolösung möchtest. Dazu kann ich leider nichts beitragen.

>They really fucking doubted us
Other than the money you pocketed from Ploot, you're still broke PP.
Your shares for BBBY don't exist any longer. They're extinguished, and Lemonis took your ticker symbol just to teabag you fools.

Yes, apes, open your eyes to PP. Don't look away.
https://i.redd.it/ohopzn3ol7ih1.gif

08AUG26 kitco price
Silver $63.46/oz
Gold $139.58/gram
Proof: [https://imgur.com/a/B27P5jy](https://imgur.com/a/B27P5jy)
Venmo FF preferred, PP G+S also accepted (buyer pays fee)
5 gram gold MW3 bar $710 shipped
2 oz Waving hair $120 shipped
10 Oz silver John wick bar $630 shipped
1 oz silver John wick bar $67 shipped
2 oz Antiqued Cleopatra $200 shipped
Whale offer of $1,300 shipped for 5 gram gold bar and 10 oz silver bar
Mega whale bundle $1,600 shipped for everything.