GM
General Motors Company
stockNYSE

100k in bonds… would be almost that. Imagine hes got 200k in dividend stocks. A mix of NOC,LMT,PFE,GM,XOM,KO stuff like that idk seems pretty normal?

OPs title says 170k is 3 years salary. 57k is probably what a Wendy’s GM makes 😬

GM snoo

(just sharing my notes that i wrote to myself today): Interesting concall this week on PFE, CAVA and FICO **on PFE:** >Thank you, Cecile. I would add that me as a CEO, when I see the difference between our internal projections and the Street projections, that of course creates to me the urgency to check our assumptions to make sure that in light of different opinions from the analysts, we are correct or not. So we have done that repeatedly and we came to the conclusion that we tell you that we expect to have a high single digit from '28 to '33. And we know very well where are the discrepancies between the products. >And as Cecile said, there are not only on the pipeline, which many analysts, they do not cover. So you have the phenomenon that from 12, 13 analysts that are forming the overall performance of the 2031, for some products, only five analysts, they have this one and the others, they don't. So this is something that is expected in pipeline. But we see also very big discrepancies in already launched new products that there's big difference. I will mention two as just examples that I think people need to reevaluate their assessment. One, it is regarding Nurtec, but we are already close to $2 billion, the way if you \[ annualize \] it and the Street has us almost $2.5 billion by year 2030. So I think there is a discrepancy there.” CEO of Pfzier Albert Bourla, saying three key points: (1) analysts estimates for the company is different from Pfizer's pipeline (2) from 2028 to 2033, expect high single digit of growth (3) (not said but implied ) 2027 will be the trough year for Pfizer. **on CAVA:** The missed top line and bottom line. And I expect CAVA stock to get choppy as analysts decide whether to accept the CEO/CFO explanation that they are willing to sacrifice 20-30 basis points to keep their crew happy by adding the assistant GM, addiitonal training for the GM. CEO said that by reducing personnel churn, the is looking out at the next 12 years rather than 12 months. I like the push to make the GMs take on a owner-operator mindset, this is similar to TXRH where GM's have to invest 25k of their own money and they do run it like a business owner. Of course this is a fast casual rather than a full service like TXRH. The only thing that bugs me was that they turned off 3P delivery for new restaurants so that the dining in experience is enhanced. I hope they dont give up on convenience since i hope they will track closely the trajectory of CMG. ( they do have 2x AUV of CMG when they had the same numebr of stores but that was 20 years ago). **on FICO:** (a) The company is in a tight spot. The FHFA is trying to give Vantage Score a headstart over FICO's Score 10T. Score 10T has been approved but not implemented at the GSE yet. FICO is saying that 2027 will be great year since Score10T has been approved. But in this respect, vantage score will be proceeding faster than Score10T. You can sense the frustration as the CEO puts on a brave face around it. (b) Other stuff: The software business is growing and FICO is saying that it should be measured on the rule of 40 (revenue growth + margins >40%). FICO doesn't want to give any guidance on Pull-pricing becasue being transparent has not worked well for them. Instead they will be working on a preferred plaform with various parties to workout a customised pricing per pull. Separately, the will still give analysts the annual management guidance on the business once it is firmed up. (c) I will be interested to buy this stock again. I am a sucker for strong leadership in an underdog, undervalued situation. I will prefer to buy it in the low 600s as it provides a better margin of safety. (500 is also good but that opportunity has passed)

GM British carbonara enjoyoors

I think GM also had an electric s10 kinda in that same program with a similar fate.

Cooper Standard Holdings’ primary business is to provide sealing systems and fluid transfer systems to auto companies like Ford, GM, Stellantis (Chrysler/Dodge/Jeep), Renault-Nissan, Toyota etc…   This one tends to miss value screeners because of their debt and their p/e.  The long and short of my thesis is that net leverage will be cut from over 5x to 2x or lower within 4-5 years, and their EPS will be over $10 within 2-4 years. Historically, the market has priced this company at around 14-20x earnings when their earnings are stable (2016-2018). So, $10 of earnings is equivalent to a $140-$200 stock within 2-4 years. 8 to 11 bagger in pretty short order. This is my highest conviction play right now because the business is mostly already booked, and it’s just a matter of waiting. Right now, we got extremely lucky that the market has priced this company harshly for factors completely out of management’s control. Because of high oil prices (running $30 a barrel above management’s plan), inflation, and global tariffs, we are looking at a company with earnings hovering around $0 (an adjusted net loss of $9.6 million through Q3) instead of $3-4 this year (my estimate from their initial 2026 guidance). Briefly, in February, before the war and the oil spike, the market saw the writing on the wall and priced CPS around $45, which implies $2-3 in EPS on the year. Not much upside at $45 in February. Lucky for us, we get a dip with an immediate route back to high EPS, and the market hasn’t caught on yet. The upside that doesn’t get factored into any of my assumptions: \-          Hybrids carry much more Cooper Standard content. Hybrids have about 80% more Cooper Standard fluid handling content per vehicle than standard internal combustion vehicles (EVs about 20% more). New programs are being won at or above their margin hurdle rates, and North American hybrid production is forecast to grow about 25% in 2027, to over 3 million units. \-          The number of licensed drivers in the US was 238 million in 2023 vs 225 million in 2017, and is projected at about 242 million for 2026. \-          Vehicle lifespans are starting to plateau. The average US vehicle age hit a record 12.8 years in 2025, but it is now rising only about two months per year. An old fleet has to be replaced eventually. \-          Light vehicle production in North America peaked at 17.75 million in 2016. It is currently about 15.0-15.3 million (15.3 million in 2025; Cooper Standard assumes 15.1 million for 2026. \-          Cooper Standard has OBSCENE operating leverage. Management says it has the available capacity to launch much of its new business with minimal incremental capital investment, and capex is running at only 2-3% of sales. Their 2030 targets assume North American production only recovers to about 15.3 million in 2029 and 15.6 million in 2030. Any production above that drops through at their variable contribution margin, which is well above their average margin. \-          China. Cooper Standard is booking a lot of business with the large Chinese OEMs such as BYD, Geely, and Chery confirmed in their 2025 q2-3 investor decks. Chinese OEMs are about 36% of their China revenue today. Management expects that to be more than 70% by 2030, and expects total sales to Chinese OEMs to triple over the next five years. Previously CPS earned around $7 GAAP EPS ($7.42 in 2016 and $7.21 in 2017; $11.08 adjusted in 2017) in a stable auto production market and received about a 20 p/e. So the market gave them a $140+ price at that point in history (peak of $144.83 in August 2018. Today they have 17.76 million shares outstanding, and management’s long-term incentive pay is tied partly to relative total shareholder return, so they are motivated to keep share count low. Not only this, insiders have been buyers of the stock: CFO Banas bought in November 2025, and director Mastrocola bought in November 2025 and March 2026. The only recent insider sales were a same-day, same-price batch by nine executives (including Edwards) at $34.15 on February 12, 2026, which appears to be shares sold or withheld to cover taxes on vesting awards rather than discretionary selling. Now, how is it that I can get to $10 EPS, or >$180 million in net income, in such a short period of time? Their investor decks target over 16% EBITDA margins for the fluid handling business and over 13% EBITDA margins for their Sealing business by 2030, and the CEO reaffirmed about 15% EBITDA for the whole company by 2030 on the Q3 2026 call. This guidance assumes virtually NO VOLUME UPSIDE: global production stays near 90 million units, and North America only gets back to about 15.9 million by 2030. It is mostly based on ALREADY BOOKED business: management says 2027-2028 business is over 95% booked. Like… fuck me. This is what Warren Buffett would call ‘a cinch’.   • CEO J. Edwards said management expects margin expansion and growth to bring the net leverage ratio down to 2x or lower by 2028, with projections that assume virtually no volume upside. On the Q3 2026 call, despite cutting 2026 guidance, he said they remain on track for their longer-term targets over the next 3-5 years. Net leverage is still over 5x today, so I’m giving them until 2030.   I just use management’s own numbers: net leverage of 1.5-2x (1.75x midpoint) and a 14.5% EBITDA margin. TTM depreciation & amortization is about $95 million. I’ll round up and hold it flat at $100 million, since capex is only 2-3% of sales. I assume revenue grows 8% annually from 2026-2030: $2.8 billion today, $3.7 billion in 2030. Management’s own framing is about $3.5-3.7 billion by 2030;   Here’s my math to get past $180 million net income using this info: |**Line item**|**8% growth**|**Mgmt. revenue**| |:-|:-|:-| |**Step 1: Operating earnings**| |Revenue (2030)|$3,800.0M|$3,600.0M| |**EBITDA (revenue × 14.5%)**|**$551.0M**|**$522.0M**| |**Step 2: Interest expense**| |Net debt (EBITDA × 1.75x leverage)|$964.3M|$913.5M| |Plus cash on hand \[2\]|$100.0M|$100.0M| |Total debt|$1,064.3M|$1,013.5M| |**Interest expense (total debt × 9.5%)**|**$101.1M**|**$96.3M**| |**Step 3: Net income**| |EBITDA (from Step 1)|$551.0M|$522.0M| |Less: depreciation & amortization|($100.0M)|($100.0M)| |Less: interest expense (from Step 2)|($101.1M)|($96.3M)| |Pre-tax income|$349.9M|$325.7M| |Less: taxes (25%)|($87.5M)|($81.4M)| |**Net income**|**$262.4M**|**$244.3M**| |**EPS (net income ÷ 18M shares)**|**$14.58**|**$13.57**| What does it take to hit $180 million ($10 EPS)? Holding debt flat at today’s $1.1 billion of notes (about $104.5 million of interest at 9.5%), I need about $445 million of EBITDA: an 11.7% margin on $3.8 billion of revenue. That’s well below management’s 15% target. At management’s own \~$3.6 billion of revenue, the same math gives about $244 million of net income, or $13.57 EPS, and $180 million needs a 12.3% margin. Reminder of the assumptions made to get here: \- Management is guiding for mid-teens EBITDA margins: over 16% for Fluid Handling and over 13% for Sealing by 2030, and about 15% company-wide. I used 14.5%, which is just the midpoint between the two segment targets. \- They said net leverage will be 2x or lower. I used 1.75x, the midpoint of 1.5x-2x. \- The interest rate already came down. The March 2026 refinancing replaced the 13.5% first lien notes and the 5.625% third lien and unsecured notes (about 10.2% blended) with $1.1 billion of 9.25% notes due 2031 \[1\]\[9\]. I used 9.5% to cover fees, and I assume no further rate cuts. \- I assumed 8% revenue growth. \- This is adjusted net income. It excludes restructuring charges, which were $40.9 million in the first nine months of 2026 \[10\]. \- I assumed a 25% tax rate. Disclosure: I hold VFC, CPS, and PYPL

Ford, GM or Toyota would be welcomed.

Inflation is a damned pathetic red herring here. The Cybertruck was announced at $40k in 2019 — even with inflation that would be just \~55k . Tesla never delivered that truck, and even the cheapest version now costs substantially more. Tesla's entire pitch was that its engineering prowess and vertical integration would allow it to deliver the CT at prices other OEMs couldn't match. It simply never delivered. Pointing out that Ford/GM also struggle with EV pricing isn't a rebuttal, but rather a tacit admission that Tesla is just another OEM and that Elon criminally over-promises what he can do.

Very insightful response. Thanks! Regarding the curve-fitting, out of my own curiosity I went back and picked some random stocks some that have different characteristics based on volume/volatility. For example: KO, F, GM, CMCSA for low volatility/volume stable stocks RKLB for heavy downtrend TSLA for Uptrend and whipsaws GME just for the apes :) \*Of all of those tickers 45M, only TSLA went red on PNL. But ALL of them never dropped below a 75% win rate. Max drawdowns stayed relatively the same, around 2-3%. You make a great point about the fill prices. I typically fill at the Mid price with a Limit order but yea some slippage may be the deal breaker. I'm very IT savy so I've considered building my own AI options tester using data from ThetaData or QuantConnect.. just want to make sure the strat is viable enough before I spend time/money building me an AI backtest engine to truly prove the concept. Thanks again.. I may just end up papertrading it for a while to see what happens anyway, at least its free. :)

Tesla can and does do things other car companies can’t, but too many people believe Musk doesn’t get that a highly profitable $25k car would sell well. Ford and GM can lose money on EVs and make it up on gas cars, Tesla can’t. CyberTruck helped them make a cheap Cybercab, and Cybercab will help them make a $25k car.

If you sell a car in the US you legally need to provide parts for 10 years. That's why the Saturn EV in the 90s never took off in the US because they couldn't hit critical mass. They got around the law by leasing (not selling) the cars but when the experiment ended, the rounded up all the cars and crushed them, which is why there's a limited number still out there. From wiki: GM cancelled the program in the early 2000s, recalled the leased vehicles, and crushed almost all of them by 2003, as detailed via the General Motors EV1 Wikipedia Page. A handful survived or were donated to museums

Frank did resist tougher oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mid-2000s, so he deserves some blame. But most subprime loans were packaged and sold by private firms outside the agencies he oversaw, so "spearheaded" overstates his role. The bailouts also cut both ways: Republicans voted for TARP, and the 2020 CARES Act passed the Senate 96-0, so this isn't one party's record. Btw. the TARP return figures come from Treasury's own published accounting, which is public and checkable. Whether the program made money is a separate question from whether it was good policy. On the "every year" point, bailouts are meant for systemic emergencies, and repeated rescues would create moral hazard, the expectation that firms will be saved regardless of their risk-taking. That's why Dodd-Frank in 2010 created an orderly liquidation process to wind down failing firms without taxpayer rescues. The goal is to make bailouts rarer, not routine. Also, since we’re talking about spearheading: \- TARP (2008): Bush Treasury under Hank Paulson conceived and pushed the program, and Paulson was its main advocate in Congress. \- Bear Stearns (2008): Treasury and the Federal Reserve, both led by Bush-era officials, arranged the JP Morgan takeover and the Fed's guarantee. \- Auto loans (2008): The Bush administration created the emergency loans to GM and Chrysler. \- CARES Act (2020): The Trump administration, through Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, was central to negotiating the package with Congress. \- Savings and loan bailout (1989): The George Bush administration proposed the plan that became FIRREA.

GM Moe 😘