GM
General Motors Company
stockNYSE

Cooper Standard Holdings’ primary business is to provide sealing systems and fluid transfer systems to auto companies like Ford, GM, Stellantis (Chrysler/Dodge/Jeep), Renault-Nissan, Toyota etc…   This one tends to miss value screeners because of their debt and their p/e.  The long and short of my thesis is that net leverage will be cut from over 5x to 2x or lower within 4-5 years, and their EPS will be over $10 within 2-4 years. Historically, the market has priced this company at around 14-20x earnings when their earnings are stable (2016-2018). So, $10 of earnings is equivalent to a $140-$200 stock within 2-4 years. 8 to 11 bagger in pretty short order. This is my highest conviction play right now because the business is mostly already booked, and it’s just a matter of waiting. Right now, we got extremely lucky that the market has priced this company harshly for factors completely out of management’s control. Because of high oil prices (running $30 a barrel above management’s plan), inflation, and global tariffs, we are looking at a company with earnings hovering around $0 (an adjusted net loss of $9.6 million through Q3) instead of $3-4 this year (my estimate from their initial 2026 guidance). Briefly, in February, before the war and the oil spike, the market saw the writing on the wall and priced CPS around $45, which implies $2-3 in EPS on the year. Not much upside at $45 in February. Lucky for us, we get a dip with an immediate route back to high EPS, and the market hasn’t caught on yet. The upside that doesn’t get factored into any of my assumptions: \-          Hybrids carry much more Cooper Standard content. Hybrids have about 80% more Cooper Standard fluid handling content per vehicle than standard internal combustion vehicles (EVs about 20% more). New programs are being won at or above their margin hurdle rates, and North American hybrid production is forecast to grow about 25% in 2027, to over 3 million units. \-          The number of licensed drivers in the US was 238 million in 2023 vs 225 million in 2017, and is projected at about 242 million for 2026. \-          Vehicle lifespans are starting to plateau. The average US vehicle age hit a record 12.8 years in 2025, but it is now rising only about two months per year. An old fleet has to be replaced eventually. \-          Light vehicle production in North America peaked at 17.75 million in 2016. It is currently about 15.0-15.3 million (15.3 million in 2025; Cooper Standard assumes 15.1 million for 2026. \-          Cooper Standard has OBSCENE operating leverage. Management says it has the available capacity to launch much of its new business with minimal incremental capital investment, and capex is running at only 2-3% of sales. Their 2030 targets assume North American production only recovers to about 15.3 million in 2029 and 15.6 million in 2030. Any production above that drops through at their variable contribution margin, which is well above their average margin. \-          China. Cooper Standard is booking a lot of business with the large Chinese OEMs such as BYD, Geely, and Chery confirmed in their 2025 q2-3 investor decks. Chinese OEMs are about 36% of their China revenue today. Management expects that to be more than 70% by 2030, and expects total sales to Chinese OEMs to triple over the next five years. Previously CPS earned around $7 GAAP EPS ($7.42 in 2016 and $7.21 in 2017; $11.08 adjusted in 2017) in a stable auto production market and received about a 20 p/e. So the market gave them a $140+ price at that point in history (peak of $144.83 in August 2018. Today they have 17.76 million shares outstanding, and management’s long-term incentive pay is tied partly to relative total shareholder return, so they are motivated to keep share count low. Not only this, insiders have been buyers of the stock: CFO Banas bought in November 2025, and director Mastrocola bought in November 2025 and March 2026. The only recent insider sales were a same-day, same-price batch by nine executives (including Edwards) at $34.15 on February 12, 2026, which appears to be shares sold or withheld to cover taxes on vesting awards rather than discretionary selling. Now, how is it that I can get to $10 EPS, or >$180 million in net income, in such a short period of time? Their investor decks target over 16% EBITDA margins for the fluid handling business and over 13% EBITDA margins for their Sealing business by 2030, and the CEO reaffirmed about 15% EBITDA for the whole company by 2030 on the Q3 2026 call. This guidance assumes virtually NO VOLUME UPSIDE: global production stays near 90 million units, and North America only gets back to about 15.9 million by 2030. It is mostly based on ALREADY BOOKED business: management says 2027-2028 business is over 95% booked. Like… fuck me. This is what Warren Buffett would call ‘a cinch’.   • CEO J. Edwards said management expects margin expansion and growth to bring the net leverage ratio down to 2x or lower by 2028, with projections that assume virtually no volume upside. On the Q3 2026 call, despite cutting 2026 guidance, he said they remain on track for their longer-term targets over the next 3-5 years. Net leverage is still over 5x today, so I’m giving them until 2030.   I just use management’s own numbers: net leverage of 1.5-2x (1.75x midpoint) and a 14.5% EBITDA margin. TTM depreciation & amortization is about $95 million. I’ll round up and hold it flat at $100 million, since capex is only 2-3% of sales. I assume revenue grows 8% annually from 2026-2030: $2.8 billion today, $3.7 billion in 2030. Management’s own framing is about $3.5-3.7 billion by 2030;   Here’s my math to get past $180 million net income using this info: |**Line item**|**8% growth**|**Mgmt. revenue**| |:-|:-|:-| |**Step 1: Operating earnings**| |Revenue (2030)|$3,800.0M|$3,600.0M| |**EBITDA (revenue × 14.5%)**|**$551.0M**|**$522.0M**| |**Step 2: Interest expense**| |Net debt (EBITDA × 1.75x leverage)|$964.3M|$913.5M| |Plus cash on hand \[2\]|$100.0M|$100.0M| |Total debt|$1,064.3M|$1,013.5M| |**Interest expense (total debt × 9.5%)**|**$101.1M**|**$96.3M**| |**Step 3: Net income**| |EBITDA (from Step 1)|$551.0M|$522.0M| |Less: depreciation & amortization|($100.0M)|($100.0M)| |Less: interest expense (from Step 2)|($101.1M)|($96.3M)| |Pre-tax income|$349.9M|$325.7M| |Less: taxes (25%)|($87.5M)|($81.4M)| |**Net income**|**$262.4M**|**$244.3M**| |**EPS (net income ÷ 18M shares)**|**$14.58**|**$13.57**| What does it take to hit $180 million ($10 EPS)? Holding debt flat at today’s $1.1 billion of notes (about $104.5 million of interest at 9.5%), I need about $445 million of EBITDA: an 11.7% margin on $3.8 billion of revenue. That’s well below management’s 15% target. At management’s own \~$3.6 billion of revenue, the same math gives about $244 million of net income, or $13.57 EPS, and $180 million needs a 12.3% margin. Reminder of the assumptions made to get here: \- Management is guiding for mid-teens EBITDA margins: over 16% for Fluid Handling and over 13% for Sealing by 2030, and about 15% company-wide. I used 14.5%, which is just the midpoint between the two segment targets. \- They said net leverage will be 2x or lower. I used 1.75x, the midpoint of 1.5x-2x. \- The interest rate already came down. The March 2026 refinancing replaced the 13.5% first lien notes and the 5.625% third lien and unsecured notes (about 10.2% blended) with $1.1 billion of 9.25% notes due 2031 \[1\]\[9\]. I used 9.5% to cover fees, and I assume no further rate cuts. \- I assumed 8% revenue growth. \- This is adjusted net income. It excludes restructuring charges, which were $40.9 million in the first nine months of 2026 \[10\]. \- I assumed a 25% tax rate. Disclosure: I hold VFC, CPS, and PYPL

Ford, GM or Toyota would be welcomed.

Inflation is a damned pathetic red herring here. The Cybertruck was announced at $40k in 2019 — even with inflation that would be just \~55k . Tesla never delivered that truck, and even the cheapest version now costs substantially more. Tesla's entire pitch was that its engineering prowess and vertical integration would allow it to deliver the CT at prices other OEMs couldn't match. It simply never delivered. Pointing out that Ford/GM also struggle with EV pricing isn't a rebuttal, but rather a tacit admission that Tesla is just another OEM and that Elon criminally over-promises what he can do.

Very insightful response. Thanks! Regarding the curve-fitting, out of my own curiosity I went back and picked some random stocks some that have different characteristics based on volume/volatility. For example: KO, F, GM, CMCSA for low volatility/volume stable stocks RKLB for heavy downtrend TSLA for Uptrend and whipsaws GME just for the apes :) \*Of all of those tickers 45M, only TSLA went red on PNL. But ALL of them never dropped below a 75% win rate. Max drawdowns stayed relatively the same, around 2-3%. You make a great point about the fill prices. I typically fill at the Mid price with a Limit order but yea some slippage may be the deal breaker. I'm very IT savy so I've considered building my own AI options tester using data from ThetaData or QuantConnect.. just want to make sure the strat is viable enough before I spend time/money building me an AI backtest engine to truly prove the concept. Thanks again.. I may just end up papertrading it for a while to see what happens anyway, at least its free. :)

Tesla can and does do things other car companies can’t, but too many people believe Musk doesn’t get that a highly profitable $25k car would sell well. Ford and GM can lose money on EVs and make it up on gas cars, Tesla can’t. CyberTruck helped them make a cheap Cybercab, and Cybercab will help them make a $25k car.

If you sell a car in the US you legally need to provide parts for 10 years. That's why the Saturn EV in the 90s never took off in the US because they couldn't hit critical mass. They got around the law by leasing (not selling) the cars but when the experiment ended, the rounded up all the cars and crushed them, which is why there's a limited number still out there. From wiki: GM cancelled the program in the early 2000s, recalled the leased vehicles, and crushed almost all of them by 2003, as detailed via the General Motors EV1 Wikipedia Page. A handful survived or were donated to museums

Frank did resist tougher oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mid-2000s, so he deserves some blame. But most subprime loans were packaged and sold by private firms outside the agencies he oversaw, so "spearheaded" overstates his role. The bailouts also cut both ways: Republicans voted for TARP, and the 2020 CARES Act passed the Senate 96-0, so this isn't one party's record. Btw. the TARP return figures come from Treasury's own published accounting, which is public and checkable. Whether the program made money is a separate question from whether it was good policy. On the "every year" point, bailouts are meant for systemic emergencies, and repeated rescues would create moral hazard, the expectation that firms will be saved regardless of their risk-taking. That's why Dodd-Frank in 2010 created an orderly liquidation process to wind down failing firms without taxpayer rescues. The goal is to make bailouts rarer, not routine. Also, since we’re talking about spearheading: \- TARP (2008): Bush Treasury under Hank Paulson conceived and pushed the program, and Paulson was its main advocate in Congress. \- Bear Stearns (2008): Treasury and the Federal Reserve, both led by Bush-era officials, arranged the JP Morgan takeover and the Fed's guarantee. \- Auto loans (2008): The Bush administration created the emergency loans to GM and Chrysler. \- CARES Act (2020): The Trump administration, through Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, was central to negotiating the package with Congress. \- Savings and loan bailout (1989): The George Bush administration proposed the plan that became FIRREA.

GM Moe 😘

Especially with Tesla still not far from 300 even with recent falls, and still worth more than other car companies combined. Even though it's way behind Toyota, VW, GM and Honda alone in sales and profits, and it's lost the EV industry to BYD and soon to Geely. (Even with the dumb handicap of the big tariff keeping Chinese EV's out of the US while Tesla can sell in China, it's getting crushed by an EV maker with a hand tied behind it's back). Tesla and SpaceX both have much farther to fall and fall hard.

This, and this where the USA's crazy fixed level costs of healthcare and housing, and other rent-seek harm us so much. It's a myth that China is just cheap wages the incomes there have grown a lot. But they can still make things cheaper because their healthcare costs, housing and childcare cost so much less. This also why China is the world's largest economy by big margin in things like production, PPP and trade that adjust for inflation, things just cost less. Even European countries, at high income and development can still manufacture cheaper than the US can, especially because their healthcare is so much cheaper. We have to reign in our healthcare costs in the US or we'll lose all our industries, it's the very reason GM and our whole auto sector went bankrupt in 2008 and needed a huge bailout.

Because many stocks, more than you think, will go down and never bounce back. Enron, Lehman, Kodak, GM. They were the top 10 at their peak.

Yeah there was never going to be a soft landing with that amount of extreme leverage and imbalance in AI and the neoclouds and hyperscalers, it was too dependent on extreme speculation and margin just like in 1929. And although it's true the Blue Tsunami puts in some tough anti-AI policy right away (Texas and Georgia are just tip of the iceberg with hard stops on data centers), it's much worse because the push against data centers it's bipartisan. Basically all of the data center ban initiatives passed and those take effect immediately, and many of the [harshest restrictions were actually passed in very Red areas like rural Ohio](https://www.toledoblade.com/local/politics/2026/11/04/data-centers-ohio-voters-reject-large/stories/20261104104) or [Indiana](https://www.ipm.org/news/2026-10-22/over-half-of-indiana-counties-now-restrict-data-centers). And the GOP state candidates like Donalds in Florida survived only because they read the room and went anti-AI bubble and opposed data centers themselves, and Florida with it's sinkholes hurricanes and storms would be the worst place to build them anyway, insurers won't cover them there. So there's not even any consolation prize and nowhere for the hyperscalers to run to. And now with China Europe and other places making their own cheaper frontier AI and chips (and China with it's own EUV, GPU's and chips supply coming online), the AI models already here can't raise their prices or they lose business. (Or bankrupt the customers they do have). So the shovel sellers take a hit too. This is why it's never a good idea to put so many economic eggs in one basket with so many companies priced to impossible perfection. Especially sector depending so much on massive debt and hype, and huge PE ratios and overvaluations even outside AI tech. Even with the massive falls today, TSLA still has a ridiculous valuation more than other car companies combined even though it's sales way below Toyota, VW and GM alone and it's lost the EV industry to BYD (and soon to Geely), way behind Waymo and even Mercedes in self-drive and Tesla not innovating as much. Much farther to fall, although in being fair they're hardly alone, Palantir has been same and even Nvidia's price for perfection had been ignoring cheaper GPU and TPU options, in general and now from China, no way to maintain those margins or prices. Heck even Apple couldn't sell enough for that kind of valuation, and Coreweave and Oracle have near junk bond status, just when debt re-finance gets pricier.

Yeah def not worth the roughly $15B a year GM pays its employees in salaries, EVERY YEAR… just total nonsense you are spouting if you think saving the automakers wasn’t a net benefit to the country and taxpayers

NVDA and GM are trading at nearly the sample TTM PE ratios.

Right? Next article "GM says if people dont buy American cars other countries will sell more cars"

GM and Ford

things could go catastrophically for $GM if they fail to deliver and customers cancel due to delays. what's your point?

I'm stuck on a Delta flight without wifi so I'm going off notes but I figured I would do a write up on a deep value stock I've opened a position in. I’m not a professional investor what so ever but over the last 12 years I've built and exited a few CPG brands that focused on DTC/3PM sales before transitioning to retail distribution and selling so the approach BODI is currently taking is somewhat in my wheelhouse. Feel free to creep my post and comment history & you can probably find random stuff alluding to all the above. # TLDR: I know most people won’t read this whole thing so here are the spark notes * **Share Price:** 4.25 **Market cap:** \~31M (52-week range 4.05–16.87) * **Balance sheet (6/30/26):** $32.4M cash | $25.0M debt | $8.8M net cash | Book equity \~$37M. (Trades below book and barely above cash) * **Enterprise Value**: \~$24M. * **Trailing 12 Months:** $219M Revenue | \~$35M Adj. EBITDA | \~$12.5M GAAP net income | $1.73 EPS | P/E \~2.5x | EV/EBITDA \~0.7x | EV/sales \~0.11x * **The Bad:** Revenue is down 22% YoY, digital subscribers are shrinking, in the middle of transitioning their business model from an MLM driven sales model to a more traditional retail & ecommerce focused CPG company.    * **The Thesis:** The market is pricing Beachbody like it’s spiraling towards bankruptcy and it’s completely overlooked by the market due its minuscule market cap and history post SPAC. However due to substantial changes in their business over the last couple years it’s now operationally profitable and trading at a substantial discount to similar health and nutrition focused CPG brands. It’s trading at a valuation of 0.15x their TTM revenue despite being profitable, holding net cash worth \~⅓ of their market cap, and owning IP that’s still a household name. If they can navigate the shift they are undergoing in their business model it’s got some meat on the bone in terms of upside.  # 1. The BeachBody Story I’m guessing most of you (over the age of 25) know Beachbody from their fitness programs P90X, Insanity, 21 Day fix, or maybe their Shakeology shakes some MLM friend tried to sell you back in the day. This is exactly who they were for the last 20 years, basically a TV informational driven workout program that utilized “coaches” via an MLM structure that paid coaches 40–50% commissions on everything sold. Then in 2021 during the “post-covid” market madness, the company went public via SPAC at a $2.9B valuation rolling up a few other supplement brands and “at home” fitness equipment brands in the SPAC. Their revenue peaked around $870M and then the post-COVID demand collapsed while the company's core cost structure & expenses didn't. Since then the stock is down \~98% and I’m assuming anyone who owned it from 2021–2024 got destroyed and has mentally written it off. Since then there have been some changes in the company as a whole that I’ll try to lay out:  * **June 2023**: Mark Goldston hired as Executive Chairman. His background is company turnarounds (LA Gear, NetZero/United Online, Einstein Bagels) and he even wrote a book called *The Turnaround Prescription*. (anyone can publish a book tough tbf)  * **Sept 2024**: Restructuring announced. Headcount shrunk from \~1,000 to under 300. * **Nov 1, 2024**: MLM side of the business begins shutting down and is fully wound down by January 2025.  * **May 2025**: Refinanced a 28% term loan into a ABL at SOFR+9% (\~12.7%). Debt reduced from \~$50M to \~$25M. * **2025–2026**: Push to ecommerce and retail sales launching a DTC store (built on shopify), selling on [Amazon.com](http://amazon.com) directly, & launching in nationwide retailers with Sprouts and Vitamin Shoppe, setting up wholesale distribution with KeHE and UNFI, & finally developing and beginning to release new product lines at more traditional retail price points leveraging their brand equity and household name recognition.  **The business today:**  \~63% digital fitness subscriptions for streaming their workout programs online and via their subscription app (87% gross margin, 760K subs, $179/yr annual plan) \~37% nutrition and supplements (47% GM, mix shifting toward 40%+).  \~270 employees.  Manufacturing, retail sales/merchandising (Advantage Solutions), fulfillment (3PL), and beverage distribution (L.A. Libations) are all outsourced leading to a leaner overall operational structure.  Obviously this is all still in progress but they are rapidly transitioning from a bloated MLM driven company into an asset-light brand and content company with 140+ programs and 11,000 videos of owned IP.  **You can see this in their breakeven revenue which required them to drive \~$900M top line in 2022 to now only requiring \~$180M in revenue to break even.**  # 2. Some Trailing Financials |**FY2023**|**FY2024**|**FY2025**|**H1 2026**| |:-|:-|:-|:-| |Revenue|$527M|$419M|$240M|$104M| |Gross margin|61%|68%|72%|72%| |Adj. EBITDA|–$9M|\+$28M|\+$31M|\+$15M| |Adj. EBITDA margin|–2%|7%|13%|14%| |Operating income|–$132M|–$52M|\+$12M|\+$5M| |GAAP net income|–$153M|–$73M|\+$10M|\+$3M| |Free cash flow|–$30M|–$7M|\+$17M|–$6M| Four consecutive quarters of GAAP net income *and* operating income (Q3'25–Q2'26). Eleven consecutive quarters of positive Adj. EBITDA. Opex down 32% YoY in Q2. Sales & marketing went from 53% of revenue (2023) to 31.5% (Q2'26). The biggest issue is revenue has continued dropping and it’s yet to be seen if their retail and ecommerce sales initiatives will be able to offset the shrinking revenue.  Note: Management has said every quarter through Q2 2026 was comping against a period that still had MLM revenue in it, so Q3 2026 is the first "clean" comp. So something to keep an eye on over the coming months. **Bonus Balance sheet** * Cash $32.4M. Debt $25M (balloon due May 2028) Net cash \~$8.8M.  * Deferred revenue $49M, down from $77M at end-2024. This is the subscription base shrinking in cash terms and it drags operating cash flow every quarter until subs stabilize which is another important thing to watch for imo.  * Goodwill $65M against $37M of book equity. 7.28M outstanding shares (\~7.5M diluted) Float \~3.7M. Insiders own \~42% & it’s probably worth noting there have been no insider sales in the last three months. # 3. So what's the deal? Why is it so “cheap?”  1. **Revenue is falling and there's no growth guide.** Until a quarter prints flat-to-up, every screen and/or algo is likely gonna treat this as a declining business. Declining businesses with sub-$50M caps don't get bids or attention. It is what it is.  2. **Q3 guide implies a GAAP loss.** Stock was $10.33 on the day of the Q2 print (Aug 10). It's $4.25 now. Nothing structurally bad was announced — the guide was worse than hoped, and with a 3.7M share float the stock halved on volume that wouldn't move a mid-cap in any similar way.  3. **Misunderstanding of the Business.** Anyone who isn’t following the transition is going to likely still think MLM instead of Subscription Streaming Service & Multi-Channel Distributed Supplement and Nutrition Brands.  4. **Expensive debt and two covenant amendments in seven months.** The August amendment loosened the covenant-test trigger (from \~$29.6M cash to $22.5M) but permanently gave up the rate step-down and raised the liquidity floor to $18M. That's a lender managing risk. Fair to read it that way. 5. **It’s Just Not On Anyone’s Radar At This Point.** It’s market cap and float is just too tiny for any institutional funds or managers to really have on their radar. On top of that most retail investors seem to have it on their radar either which isn’t surprising given it’s size and track record.  The biggest thing that sticks out to me about the above is that none of these are "the business doesn't make money." It does. The question is whether it succeeds with its new growth initiatives while maintaining profitability.  # 4. What's changed in the last six months that isn't in the trailing numbers * **Shakeology at retail for the first time ever.** Sprouts went from 90 to 131 doors within months on reorders. Vitamin Shoppe: 481 stores. 7-serve pack at $34.99 vs. the old $129/30-serve MLM price point. * **KeHE (May) and UNFI (shipping November):** The two largest natural/specialty distributors in the country. This is how a 270-person company gets into grocery without a sales force. Management said on the Q2 call that 12 retailer planogram decisions were pending this fall.  * **P90X and Insanity supplements on Amazon** at sub-$40 price points. P90X as a nutrition brand didn't exist 12 months ago. * **P90X Energy Drinks launched Oct 2** in Southern California via L.A. Libations. Small test market launch so will need to monitor results but we won’t know for a few months at the earliest.  * **MAX BUILT by Shaun T** & **Insanity Unhinged Release.**  These are the first new Shaun T programs released in years. Timed for Q4 launches and the New Years resolution push.  * **Nutrition-first funnel.** Every supplement & nutrition purchase includes a 30-day digital trial for the streaming service. Management says customer acquisition costs through nutrition is "substantially lower" than through traditional fitness advertising. New subscriber adds were actually up YoY in Q2 even as the total base fell (ie legacy churn is masking the new customer growth to a degree.) * **GLP-1 tailwind.** I don’t know how much I agree with this one but I figured it needed to be included as Management stated 10-Minute BODi and Shakeology are both seeing demand from GLP-1 users who need protein and low-intensity movement. None of this is in TTM numbers so we’ll need to wait until 2027 to see the results of all the above.  # 5. Comps It’s hard to find a good comp for a fitness focused subscription streaming service that also has supplement and nutrition products with nationwide distribution.  That said companies like BellRing (Premier Protein, Powerbar, Dymatize) & Peloton (subscription fitness but obviously also requires a large one time purchase) have both cut guidance and are shrinking in 2026 yet they still command PE ratios of \~7 and \~37 respectively.  That's a size, liquidity, sponsorship premium not something related to fundamentals imo. I'm not arguing BODi deserves parity whatsoever but the gap between valuations feels pretty “off.”  One more data point on IP value is that supplement and wellness brands have recently traded around 10x EBITDA and 2–3.5x sales in M&A (ie Simply Good paid 2.3x sales / 13x EBITDA for OWYN). Shakeology has sold over $3.7 Billion in it’s lifetime sales history (so it has pretty strong brand recognition) and this is the first time it’s ever been on retail shelves so it’ll be interesting to see how this translates to sales. Not to mention the name recognition of both P90X and Insanity. We’re talking about a company with an Enterprise Value of $24 Million here… basically a strategic could acquire the whole company for less than the marketing budget it would take to build a fraction of the comparable brand awareness.   # 6. Valuation Scenarios & Wrap Up Keep in mind: \~7.5M diluted shares, \~$7M net cash (haircut for the liquidity covenant to be fair),  & EBITDA is 2027 run-rate. |**Bear**|**Base**|**Bull**| |:-|:-|:-| |**What happens**|Subs keep bleeding, retail is slow, revenue settles \~$160M & margin compresses|Revenue Flatlines \~$175–185M in the second half of 2026 while Retail & Amazon add on top in 2027|Retail scales, Energy Drinks Hit, Revenue  returns to growth mode in 2027| |**2027 Adj. EBITDA**|$15M|$22M|$28M| |**Multiple**|1.5x|3x|5x| |**EV**|$22M|$66M|$140M| |**Equity value**|$29M|$73M|$147M| |**Per share**|**\~$3.90**|**\~$9.75**|**\~$19.50**| |**vs. $4.25**|–8%|\+130%|\+360%| The bear case is roughly where the stock is now which is why I think this is value play. You're not paying for the base case but rather you're paying for the bear case and getting the base and bull cases as upside potential. Even in my valuations above the base and bull cases are still *well below* the peer group. 3x EBITDA is a discount to Peloton & I'm not assuming a re-rating to CPG multiples which are way more frothy. I'm basically just re-rating from "left for dead" to "small profitable company." Usually when I see a company on this trajectory it screams value trap because it only looks cheap since the trailing numbers are about to disappear. The test is whether the company can be profitable at a materially smaller size. Bodi has to a degree already already answered this as revenue dropped from $870M to $219M and despite this net income went from negative $153M to a positive $12.5M over that same period.  Additionally value traps generally don’t have a reasonable path back to growth so you’re just throwing money at a slow liquidation. With Bodi you have the retail rollout, the Amazon rollout, the distributor deals, and the beverage launch all in addition to the high margin subscription service. These aren’t “ideas” but are real funded initiatives in progress as we speak. They don’t even need to be homeruns, they just need to do enough to offset the legacy decline. At 0.7x EBITDA and below net cash, you're being paid to wait for that answer I guess. If it's no, you lose 10–20% from here imo.  If it's yes, you're looking at a multiple of your money. That’s what intrigues me about this one & why I opened a position I can afford to be wrong on.

I'm stuck on a Delta flight without wifi so I'm going off notes but I figured I would do a write up on a deep value stock I've opened a position in. I’m not a professional investor what so ever but over the last 12 years I've built and exited a few CPG brands that focused on DTC/3PM sales before transitioning to retail distribution and selling so the approach BODI is currently taking is somewhat in my wheelhouse. Feel free to creep my post and comment history & you can probably find random stuff alluding to all the above. # TLDR: I know most people won’t read this whole thing so here are the spark notes * **Share Price:** 4.25 **Market cap:** \~31M (52-week range 4.05–16.87) * **Balance sheet (6/30/26):** $32.4M cash | $25.0M debt | $8.8M net cash | Book equity \~$37M. (Trades below book and barely above cash) * **Enterprise Value**: \~$24M. * **Trailing 12 Months:** $219M Revenue | \~$35M Adj. EBITDA | \~$12.5M GAAP net income | $1.73 EPS | P/E \~2.5x | EV/EBITDA \~0.7x | EV/sales \~0.11x * **The Bad:** Revenue is down 22% YoY, digital subscribers are shrinking, in the middle of transitioning their business model from an MLM driven sales model to a more traditional retail & ecommerce focused CPG company.    * **The Thesis:** The market is pricing Beachbody like it’s spiraling towards bankruptcy and it’s completely overlooked by the market due its minuscule market cap and history post SPAC. However due to substantial changes in their business over the last couple years it’s now operationally profitable and trading at a substantial discount to similar health and nutrition focused CPG brands. It’s trading at a valuation of 0.15x their TTM revenue despite being profitable, holding net cash worth \~⅓ of their market cap, and owning IP that’s still a household name. If they can navigate the shift they are undergoing in their business model it’s got some meat on the bone in terms of upside.  # 1. The BeachBody Story I’m guessing most of you (over the age of 25) know Beachbody from their fitness programs P90X, Insanity, 21 Day fix, or maybe their Shakeology shakes some MLM friend tried to sell you back in the day. This is exactly who they were for the last 20 years, basically a TV informational driven workout program that utilized “coaches” via an MLM structure that paid coaches 40–50% commissions on everything sold. Then in 2021 during the “post-covid” market madness, the company went public via SPAC at a $2.9B valuation rolling up a few other supplement brands and “at home” fitness equipment brands in the SPAC. Their revenue peaked around $870M and then the post-COVID demand collapsed while the company's core cost structure & expenses didn't. Since then the stock is down \~98% and I’m assuming anyone who owned it from 2021–2024 got destroyed and has mentally written it off. Since then there have been some changes in the company as a whole that I’ll try to lay out:  * **June 2023**: Mark Goldston hired as Executive Chairman. His background is company turnarounds (LA Gear, NetZero/United Online, Einstein Bagels) and he even wrote a book called *The Turnaround Prescription*. (anyone can publish a book tough tbf)  * **Sept 2024**: Restructuring announced. Headcount shrunk from \~1,000 to under 300. * **Nov 1, 2024**: MLM side of the business begins shutting down and is fully wound down by January 2025.  * **May 2025**: Refinanced a 28% term loan into a ABL at SOFR+9% (\~12.7%). Debt reduced from \~$50M to \~$25M. * **2025–2026**: Push to ecommerce and retail sales launching a DTC store (built on shopify), selling on [Amazon.com](http://amazon.com) directly, & launching in nationwide retailers with Sprouts and Vitamin Shoppe, setting up wholesale distribution with KeHE and UNFI, & finally developing and beginning to release new product lines at more traditional retail price points leveraging their brand equity and household name recognition.  **The business today:**  \~63% digital fitness subscriptions for streaming their workout programs online and via their subscription app (87% gross margin, 760K subs, $179/yr annual plan) \~37% nutrition and supplements (47% GM, mix shifting toward 40%+).  \~270 employees.  Manufacturing, retail sales/merchandising (Advantage Solutions), fulfillment (3PL), and beverage distribution (L.A. Libations) are all outsourced leading to a leaner overall operational structure.  Obviously this is all still in progress but they are rapidly transitioning from a bloated MLM driven company into an asset-light brand and content company with 140+ programs and 11,000 videos of owned IP.  **You can see this in their breakeven revenue which required them to drive \~$900M top line in 2022 to now only requiring \~$180M in revenue to break even.**  # 2. Some Trailing Financials ||**FY2023**|**FY2024**|**FY2025**|**H1 2026**| |:-|:-|:-|:-|:-| |Revenue|$527M|$419M|$240M|$104M| |Gross margin|61%|68%|72%|72%| |Adj. EBITDA|–$9M|\+$28M|\+$31M|\+$15M| |Adj. EBITDA margin|–2%|7%|13%|14%| |Operating income|–$132M|–$52M|\+$12M|\+$5M| |GAAP net income|–$153M|–$73M|\+$10M|\+$3M| |Free cash flow|–$30M|–$7M|\+$17M|–$6M| Four consecutive quarters of GAAP net income *and* operating income (Q3'25–Q2'26). Eleven consecutive quarters of positive Adj. EBITDA. Opex down 32% YoY in Q2. Sales & marketing went from 53% of revenue (2023) to 31.5% (Q2'26). The biggest issue is revenue has continued dropping and it’s yet to be seen if their retail and ecommerce sales initiatives will be able to offset the shrinking revenue.  Note: Management has said every quarter through Q2 2026 was comping against a period that still had MLM revenue in it, so Q3 2026 is the first "clean" comp. So something to keep an eye on over the coming months. **Bonus Balance sheet** * Cash $32.4M. Debt $25M (balloon due May 2028) Net cash \~$8.8M.  * Deferred revenue $49M, down from $77M at end-2024. This is the subscription base shrinking in cash terms and it drags operating cash flow every quarter until subs stabilize which is another important thing to watch for imo.  * Goodwill $65M against $37M of book equity. 7.28M outstanding shares (\~7.5M diluted) Float \~3.7M. Insiders own \~42% & it’s probably worth noting there have been no insider sales in the last three months. # 3. So what's the deal? Why is it so “cheap?”  1. **Revenue is falling and there's no growth guide.** Until a quarter prints flat-to-up, every screen and/or algo is likely gonna treat this as a declining business. Declining businesses with sub-$50M caps don't get bids or attention. It is what it is.  2. **Q3 guide implies a GAAP loss.** Stock was $10.33 on the day of the Q2 print (Aug 10). It's $4.25 now. Nothing structurally bad was announced — the guide was worse than hoped, and with a 3.7M share float the stock halved on volume that wouldn't move a mid-cap in any similar way.  3. **Misunderstanding of the Business.** Anyone who isn’t following the transition is going to likely still think MLM instead of Subscription Streaming Service & Multi-Channel Distributed Supplement and Nutrition Brands.  4. **Expensive debt and two covenant amendments in seven months.** The August amendment loosened the covenant-test trigger (from \~$29.6M cash to $22.5M) but permanently gave up the rate step-down and raised the liquidity floor to $18M. That's a lender managing risk. Fair to read it that way. 5. **It’s Just Not On Anyone’s Radar At This Point.** It’s market cap and float is just too tiny for any institutional funds or managers to really have on their radar. On top of that most retail investors seem to have it on their radar either which isn’t surprising given it’s size and track record.  The biggest thing that sticks out to me about the above is that none of these are "the business doesn't make money." It does. The question is whether it succeeds with its new growth initiatives while maintaining profitability.  # 4. What's changed in the last six months that isn't in the trailing numbers * **Shakeology at retail for the first time ever.** Sprouts went from 90 to 131 doors within months on reorders. Vitamin Shoppe: 481 stores. 7-serve pack at $34.99 vs. the old $129/30-serve MLM price point. * **KeHE (May) and UNFI (shipping November):** The two largest natural/specialty distributors in the country. This is how a 270-person company gets into grocery without a sales force. Management said on the Q2 call that 12 retailer planogram decisions were pending this fall.  * **P90X and Insanity supplements on Amazon** at sub-$40 price points. P90X as a nutrition brand didn't exist 12 months ago. * **P90X Energy Drinks launched Oct 2** in Southern California via L.A. Libations. Small test market launch so will need to monitor results but we won’t know for a few months at the earliest.  * **MAX BUILT by Shaun T** & **Insanity Unhinged Release.**  These are the first new Shaun T programs released in years. Timed for Q4 launches and the New Years resolution push.  * **Nutrition-first funnel.** Every supplement & nutrition purchase includes a 30-day digital trial for the streaming service. Management says customer acquisition costs through nutrition is "substantially lower" than through traditional fitness advertising. New subscriber adds were actually up YoY in Q2 even as the total base fell (ie legacy churn is masking the new customer growth to a degree.) * **GLP-1 tailwind.** I don’t know how much I agree with this one but I figured it needed to be included as Management stated 10-Minute BODi and Shakeology are both seeing demand from GLP-1 users who need protein and low-intensity movement. None of this is in TTM numbers so we’ll need to wait until 2027 to see the results of all the above.  # 5. Comps It’s hard to find a good comp for a fitness focused subscription streaming service that also has supplement and nutrition products with nationwide distribution.  That said companies like BellRing (Premier Protein, Powerbar, Dymatize) & Peloton (subscription fitness but obviously also requires a large one time purchase) have both cut guidance and are shrinking in 2026 yet they still command PE ratios of \~7 and \~37 respectively.  That's a size, liquidity, sponsorship premium not something related to fundamentals imo. I'm not arguing BODi deserves parity whatsoever but the gap between valuations feels pretty “off.”  One more data point on IP value is that supplement and wellness brands have recently traded around 10x EBITDA and 2–3.5x sales in M&A (ie Simply Good paid 2.3x sales / 13x EBITDA for OWYN). Shakeology has sold over $3.7 Billion in it’s lifetime sales history (so it has pretty strong brand recognition) and this is the first time it’s ever been on retail shelves so it’ll be interesting to see how this translates to sales. Not to mention the name recognition of both P90X and Insanity. We’re talking about a company with an Enterprise Value of $24 Million here… basically a strategic could acquire the whole company for less than the marketing budget it would take to build a fraction of the comparable brand awareness.   # 6. Valuation Scenarios & Wrap Up Keep in mind: \~7.5M diluted shares, \~$7M net cash (haircut for the liquidity covenant to be fair),  & EBITDA is 2027 run-rate. ||**Bear**|**Base**|**Bull**| |:-|:-|:-|:-| |**What happens**|Subs keep bleeding, retail is slow, revenue settles \~$160M & margin compresses|Revenue Flatlines \~$175–185M in the second half of 2026 while Retail & Amazon add on top in 2027|Retail scales, Energy Drinks Hit, Revenue  returns to growth mode in 2027| |**2027 Adj. EBITDA**|$15M|$22M|$28M| |**Multiple**|1.5x|3x|5x| |**EV**|$22M|$66M|$140M| |**Equity value**|$29M|$73M|$147M| |**Per share**|**\~$3.90**|**\~$9.75**|**\~$19.50**| |**vs. $4.25**|–8%|\+130%|\+360%| The bear case is roughly where the stock is now which is why I think this is value play. You're not paying for the base case but rather you're paying for the bear case and getting the base and bull cases as upside potential. Even in my valuations above the base and bull cases are still *well below* the peer group. 3x EBITDA is a discount to Peloton & I'm not assuming a re-rating to CPG multiples which are way more frothy. I'm basically just re-rating from "left for dead" to "small profitable company." Usually when I see a company on this trajectory it screams value trap because it only looks cheap since the trailing numbers are about to disappear. The test is whether the company can be profitable at a materially smaller size. Bodi has to a degree already already answered this as revenue dropped from $870M to $219M and despite this net income went from negative $153M to a positive $12.5M over that same period.  Additionally value traps generally don’t have a reasonable path back to growth so you’re just throwing money at a slow liquidation. With Bodi you have the retail rollout, the Amazon rollout, the distributor deals, and the beverage launch all in addition to the high margin subscription service. These aren’t “ideas” but are real funded initiatives in progress as we speak. They don’t even need to be homeruns, they just need to do enough to offset the legacy decline. At 0.7x EBITDA and below net cash, you're being paid to wait for that answer I guess. If it's no, you lose 10–20% from here imo.  If it's yes, you're looking at a multiple of your money. That’s what intrigues me about this one & why I opened a position I can afford to be wrong on.

Hello all, For your consideration today: [https://coindex.app/a/nByh6A](https://coindex.app/a/nByh6A) KITCO ASK at time of post: 52.43 2 beat ASEs ('92 and '05): $53 each 1 generic Ben Franklin: $53 1.5oz Affinity Gaming Aplay GM Club Card: $83 4oz Giant Buffalo Proof from National Collector's Mint (with box and COA): $213 Please add $7 for USPS GA shipping, $11 for USPS Priority. I do not have 3^(rd) party insurance but can ship USPS registered at cost. Zelle, Venmo, and PPFF for payment. See something you like but think I’m too high? Reasonable offers always welcome. Will ship first at my discretion. Always willing to use a MM. Will honor a BIN only if payment can be made within 30 minutes. If two BINs come in close together I will consult my email to see which notification was first (I’m just trying to be fair.) I try to make myself available for roughly an hour after posting. If ‘chatting’ after that I will respond as I am able. If I missed anything please let me know.

- 10:42 "Jim Cramer explaining the basics of stock market manipulation #JimCramer #Manipulation #market" - https://youtu.be/8DJlogbrDcA uploaded 2021 February 3 - 10:42 "Jim Cramer, 2006 discussion about tricks to manipulate the market" - https://youtu.be/jIfixbq_u0Q uploaded 2021 January 28 - [censored by deplatforming after 2026 April 21] "Jim Cramer from Mad Money in 2006 discusses tricks he use[d] to pull to manipulated stocks. Credit: Judd Bagley" - https://old.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/lg0ial/jim_cramer_explains_how_he_manipulated_the_market/ - https://old.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/opi1yr/jim_cramer_2006_discussion_about_tricks_to/ - also see https://old.reddit.com/submit?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DjIfixbq_u0Q - also see https://old.reddit.com/submit?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2FjIfixbq_u0Q - "Cramer on How Hedge Funds are Scamming the Market" - https://youtu.be/gyaPf6qXLa8?si=R-_VZILLIM7PEZKG uploaded 2020 April 5 - "Bloomberg Special Report - Phantom Shares (25 min)" - https://web.archive.org/web/20070501000000*/https://youtube.com/watch?v=7fcre8P2UUY / https://archive.today/uXbT3 uploaded 2007, March 13 by squeezetriggerreport - [censored by deleting by user before 2008 January 13 - "Jim Cramer and Stockwire.com" - https://web.archive.org/web/20070501000000*/https://youtube.com/watch?v=708wDFX28lc / https://archive.today/Y3Tqx uploaded before 2007 Some highlights: > 1:27 "and by the way, no one else in the world would ever admit that, but I can care [less] (That's right, and you can say that here) and I can't... I'm not going to say it on tv" > 1:49 "You've really got to control the market. You can't let it lift. When you get a research in motion, it's really important to use a lot of your firepower to knock that down because it's the fulcrum of the market today. So let's say I were, uh, I was short, what I would do is I would hit a lot of guys with rim [research in motion]. Now you can't foment. That's a violation of... You can't foment, you can't create a... yourself an impression that a stock's down, but you do it anyway because the SEC doesn't understand it, so you, I mean it's, that's the only sense that I would say this is illegal, but a hedge fund that's not up a lot really has to do a lot now to save itself" > 3:15 "Again, when your company's in a survival mode, it's really important to defeat research in motion and get the [Bob] Pisani's of the world, and the people talking about it as if there's something wrong with rim [research in motion], then you would call the journal and you get the bozo reporter in research in motion and you would feed [them] that there's a Palm's got a killer [story]; it's going to give away. These are all the things you must do on a day like today, and if you're not doing it, maybe you shouldn't be in the game" > 4:44 "... you use a 'hat' firm that doesn't know what the heck it's doing, maybe you go to UBS for puts, and and you just kind of create an image that there's going to be news next week, and that's going to frighten everybody and then you... they all go out and say large put buyer UBS, and then they call Pisani, again you have to use those guys ... and these are all what's really going on in the market that you don't see (Right, and nobody else talks about it)" > 5:08 "What's important when you're in that hedgefund mode, is to not do anything remotely truthful. because the truth is so against your view, that it's important to develop a new truth, to develop a fiction" > 5:41 "We're making the cash much more important than the fundamentals." > 5:45 "Who cares about the fundamentals? Research and motion just blew out the quarter, but look at what the people can do. I mean, that's a fabulous thing. Is......a great thing about the market is there's nothing to do with the actual stocks. Now, look, over maybe two weeks form now, the buyers will come to their senses and realize that everything that they heard was a lie" ---- full transcript: > 0:04 Welcome to Wall Street Confidential. I'm Aaron Task joined again by Jim Cramer. Jim, welcome! > 0:09 Good to see you. > 0:10 Thanks for being here. Uh, [there]'s a lot of economic data today, but I want to talk about something else first. Again today we have the misdirection from the futures. The futures probably went up market and as of right now sucks you down again. Is this just because it's the [...] period that we're seeing this? > 0:23 You know, a lot of times when I was short, at my hedge fund, and I was positioned short, meaning I needed it down. Uh, I would, uh, create a, um, a level of activity beforehand that could drive the futures. It doesn't take much money. Uh, similarly if, uh, or if I were long and i would want to make things a little bit rosy, I would, go in and take a bunch of stocks and make sure that they are, they're higher, and, uh, maybe commit five million in capital to do it, and I could affect it. Uh, what you're seeing now is maybe, it probably is bigger market now. Maybe you need ten (10) million in capital to knock the stuff down, but it's a fun game, and it's a lu... lucrative game, and you, you can move it up and then fade it. That's all... often creates a very negative feel. So let's say you take a longer term view intraday and you say 'Listen. I'm going to boost the futures and then when the mo... real sellers come in, real market comes in, they're going to knock it down. It's gonna create a negative e... uhh, negative view. That's a v... strategy very worth doing. When you're va... when you're valued on a day-to-day basis and, I would encourage anyone who's in the hedge fund game to do it, because it's legal, > 1:21 Right > 1:22 and it, uh, it is a very quick way to make money, and very satisfying. > 1:26 Okay. Um, well... > 1:27 By the way, no one else in the world would ever admit that but I can care... > 1:30 That's right, and you can say that here. > 1:31 and I can't. I'm not going to say it on tv. > 1:33 Um, well, on a related note, there's so many more hedge funds today than when you > 1:38 Right. > 1:38 were managing your hedge funds. > 1:39 Right. > 1:39 Do you think that that does that exacerbate the moves or does it make it tougher cuz there's > 1:41 Well, you know, the, uh, the hedge funds are positioned long/short, okay, not just long like mutual funds. So it's really vital these next six (6) days cuz of your payday. You've really got to control the market. You can't let it lift. When you get a research in motion it's really important to use a lot of your firepower to knock that down because it's the fulcrum of the market today. So, let's say I were, uh, I was short, what I would do is I would hit a lot of guys with rim [research in motion]. Now you can't foment. That's a violation of... of... > 2:06 Fermen? > 2:07 Yeah. You can't foment. > 2:08 Foment > 2:09 You can't create a, yourself, an impression that a stock's down, but you do it anyway because the SEC > 2:15 Right > 2:16 doesn't understand it. So you, I mean it's li... that's the only sense that I would say that it is illegal, but a he... a hedge fund that's not up a lot really has to do a lot now to save itself. So, um this is different from what I [was] talking about the beginning where I would be buying the queues and stuff. > 2:29 Right. > 2:29 This is actually just a blatantly illegal, but when you have six (6) days and your company may be in doubt because you're down, I think it's really important to foment, uh, if I were one of these guys. Foment an impression that research in motion isn't any good, because research in motion is the key. > 2:42 [Unintelligible, Race?] > 2:42 So, you know, you would, you would hit this guy and that guy and when you would see an offering, when you see a guy's bidding, you'd wipe out that guy very quickly, and... what I used to do, um, was called, if I wanted to go higher, I would take and bid, take and bid, take and bid, um, and if, um, if I wanted to go lower I'd hit an offer, hit and offer, hit and offer, and I could get a stock like rim for maybe, that might cost me fifteen (15)/twenty (20) million, eh, ante, to knock rim down, but it would be fabulous because it would beleaguer all the moron longs who are also keying on research in motion. > 3:13 Yeah. There's a lot of that going on today with [unintelligible]. > 3:13 So I see, we're seeing... Yeah. We're seeing that. That's, you know, again, when your company's in the survival mode, it's really important to defeat research in motion and get the [Bob] Pisani's of the world, and the people talking about it as if there's something wrong with rim. Then you would call the journal and you get the bozo reporter in research in motion and you would feed that there's a Palm's got a killer, it's gonna give away. These are all the things you must do on a day like today and if you're not doing it maybe you shouldn't be in the game. > 3:36 Okay. Uh, another stock that a lot of people are focused on right now seems to be Apple, [unintelligible]. > 3:40 Yeah. Apple's very important to spread the rumor that, um, that both, uhh, Verizon and Bell... and, uh, ATT have decided they don't like the phone. > 3:47 Right. > 3:47 That's a very easy one to do because, it's also, you want to spread the rumor that it's not gonna be ready for Macworld, and this is very easy because the people who write about Apple want that story and you can claim that it's credible because you spoke to someone at Apple cuz Apple isn't an addi... doesn't issue a statement. > 4:01 Right. They're not gonna comment. They're not gonna say. > 4:02 Right. So it's really an ideal short and I would, again, if I were, uh, short Apple, I would be working very hard today, to get that and the way you would do that is you pick up the phone you call SIX trading desk and you say "Listen. I just got a phone... a contact in Verizon, and he has already said 'Listen. We're not... we're a Lucky G [Lucky Goldstar? LG?] house, eh, we're a Samsung house, we... we... we're a Motorola house. There's no room for Apple. They want too much. That we're not gonna let them in. This is not... We're not gonna let them do what they did to music.'" and, you know, I think that's a very effective way to keep a stock down. > 4:30 Right. Well... > 4:31 I might also, by the way, cuz the stock at eighty-four (84)/eighty-five (85), a little bit of capital, you go buy some January $80 puts, that makes it look like there's going to be something going on. So maybe you, you know, you give Morgan [Stanley] an order to buy a thousand Jan $80 puts, then you go position limit with, uh, you know, uh, you use a 'hat' firm that doesn't know what the heck it's doing. Maybe you go to UBS for puts, and and you just kind of create an image that there's going to be news next week, and that's going to frighten everybody > 4:52 Right. > 4:52 and you go... they all go out and say large put buyer, uh, UBS, then they call [Bob] Pisani. Again, you have to use those guys, and say 'Listen. I'm a bought, you know, I see a big-buyer puts, and I'm told that it's like the it's SEC. You would do that too, um and these are all, uh, f... what's really going on under the market that you don't see. > 5:07 Right, and you don't, and nobody else talks about it except you [unintelligible] > 5:07 but, right, but what what what's important when you're in that hedge fund mode is to not do anything remotely truthful, because the truth is so against your view > 5:17 Right. > 5:17 that it's important to create a new truth, to develop a fiction, and, uhm, the the fiction is developed, uhhhh, by almost anybody who's down like two percent (2%) to up six percent (6%) here. You can't take any chances. You can't have the market up any more than it is if you're up six (6), because starting Jan two (2) you'll have all your money come out. > 5:34 Right. > 5:35 So, what would you do if you're in that situation, and you feel like you're desperate, is that you would do these actions. > 5:39 So, you're talking about the mechanics of the market, you know, the > 5:41 We're making the cash much more important than the fundamentals. > 5:43 Oh, well okay, well, but in terms of the fundamentals, you've been writing about how you think > 5:45 Who cares about the fundamentals? Research in motion just blew out the quarter. > 5:48 Right. > 5:48 but look what people can do. I mean that's fabulous thing. It's... great thing about the market is there's nothing to do with the actual stocks. > 5:53 Right. > 5:54 Now, look, over maybe two (2) weeks from now the buyers will come to their senses and realize that everything that they heard was a lie. Uh, but then again Fannie Mae lied about the earnings for six (6) billion dollars. > 6:03 Right and Bristol-Myers [Squibb] lied. Yeah > 6:03 So, you know, there's just... It's just fiction and fiction and fiction and, I think it's important for people to recognize that, the way that the market really works is to... is to have that nexus of... of hit the brokerage houses with a series of orders that can push it down, then leak it to the press, um, and then get it on CNBC. That's also very important, an... and then you have a kind of a vicious cycle down > 6:23 Right. > 6:23 and it's a pretty good game, and it can be play it could pay for percent or two. > 6:27 Right, and then do you get long before Macworld and the expectation that the iPhone is is gonna be good. > 6:30 Well yeah, because you're... you drove it down > 6:31 Right, and then you go back [unintelligible, puts?] to long side > 6:32 you well you've told me that you used the other side > 6:35 Interesting. > 6:35 [Unintelligible, Mah mah?], you know, and there's a case where I would say the January $80 puts can be justified, because after I've knocked the stock down to $80, I can buy a lot of common, and then... play it right in to Macworld where they'll probably introduce the phone and Verizon's gonna take it. > 6:47 Okay. Well, maybe the fundamentals don't matter, but let's talk about the fad a little bit > 6:49 Well, whenever [whatever?], I... what what Wall Street Confidential is > 6:52 Yes. > 6:55 Right. > 6:53 is is not giving in the party [parting?] line. Oh, here's the party [parting?] line by the way, um, the I I I I spoke that, but the phone, I hear the phones are good, and, uhm, Verizon might take it, nnn, as a matter of fact the research in motion sellers, they... I don't think they know what they're talking about, ih... mmp... bmmmmm, you know > 7:07 but you've been writing about the the cell market... you... cell phone market you think is, you don't want to be involved when the [unintelligible] > 7:10 well the problem the problem with the cell phone market frankly is, is that these guys are all killing each other, that, you know. > 7:15 Right. > 7:15 Someone has to take a dive. Motorola and Nokia have to get in a room and just fix price. They've been reluctant to do that because of the various justice departments and because they [unintelligible, actually?] > 7:23 and it's illegal. Right. Yeah. > 7:24 Whoa. That that hasn't stopped a lot of other companies > 7:26 This is, this is true. > 7:27 This seems to be a case where they seem to be directly worried about the authorities. It's almost as if they have a lawyer that... that matters on like say the Bristol-Meyers lawyers and, you know, what eventually happens is the shareholders demand that you get phony lawyers and you sit in the room and it'll happen soon. > 7:43 Real quick, the Fed, the numbers out today weaker than expected, the PC threat > 7:46 Oh, so what. The Fed is obviously got to cut > 7:48 They've got a cut > 7:48 but, [unintelligible, you know?], again, you call re... you call, uhm, the various guys who cover the bonds, and you say dy... 'Ignore the bond action. What's really happened is the Fed is very frightened, about...' and then you gin up the number that they're really frightened about. The Fed is actually, um, desperate to try to figure out, uh, you know, how quickly they have to cut without looking like dopes that they... that they raised it [unintelligible] they... > 8:05 Right, because they've been talking about they're worried about inflation all this past few months > 8:06 Yeah. Y.. You don't want to... You don't want to raise in May and then cut in... in January. It' look like Mexico [...]. I mean this is like a distinguished group of people who went to really good schools. > 8:15 Right. These are smart guys. Absolutely. > 8:16 Yeah. They don't want to look like dopes. > 8:18 Um, but when we were talking earlier in the week, you said you think it'd be some sort of crisis, possibly Ford being a trigger. > 8:23 Well, you know, Ford went and did all that, and you know, they pledged all this investment banking to all these guys so now that they're very reluctant to say negative things, it it makes it much tougher for the Ford story to play out. I mean, the amount of business that Ford has to do. Ford may be the big client of 2007. So, if I were in the corporate finance room, I would say listen to the to the research guy. I said listen, you know, I spoke with [Alan] Mulally. I actually have the inside, the plan works. So then you're the research guy and you said 'Oh man. What do I do? Um, it's bonus time. I'm not going to be a total idiot, but Spitzer's [spelling?] gone to Albany. Let, uh, let let's get back in the game.' > 8:54 Right. Uh > 8:55 I think that's important. > 8:56 Is it possible then, because a year ago at this time a lot of people were saying GM's about to go bankrupt and of course the stock's up fifty (50) some odd percent [unintelligible]. Could Ford be that stock [unintelligible]? > 9:01 Well, there are, you know, they're... they're GM. No, but GM... The difference between Ford and GM was the GM's balance sheet was never really, it turns out wasn't that bad. Ford's balance sheet's pathetic, and you know that because they're willing to screw over the comment for the bonds > 9:14 Right. > 9:14 That that's kind of a.. If if [unintelligible, weren't?] Ford, if this were, um, [unintelligible, Quaca? Qualcomm?] we'd be [unintelligible] [unintelligible, Quaca? Qualcomm?] is desperate, you know, but no, it's Ford. > 9:22 But it's Ford, and it's an American icon, and it's, so, right. > 9:22 So we say it's fine. It... Yeah. I I drove a Ford, you know. I owned a Ford once. > 9:26 and this is our country. Well this has been Jim Cramer [unintelligible] > 9:27 Yeah. Right. You, again, you know, I'm.. what I'm trying to go for in the Wall Street Confidential, and I'm not saying you're [unintelligible, senm ih?] I I have to talk about what it's like at at my hedge fund, okay, because... and what other hedge funds do, because the difference is, is that... if this is an intraday show, and you need to know what's going... what I know is going on > 9:48 Right. > 9:49 Now, we step back. Research in motion was a real blowout quarter. It was a really good quarter, and I was quite surprised how strong the margins were. It looks like the other guys have really dropped out. It's a terrific story. Should it be up six (6)? Yeah. I think so, but, you know, look where we are. It's friday. You kn... you got ss.. five (5) more days to make your quarter. > 10:06 Right. > 10:07 Can you really risk having rim up this much? I don't think you can. > 10:10 Okay, and they're not, and if i'm correct, you're off next week. > 10:13 Yes I am. > 10:13 Okay, and I am as well. So we'll be back in 2007 with more of this. > 10:14 but, you know, right. I'm [...] that we get, that we finish the year at twelve sixty cuz that's, uh, at twelve thousand four hundred and sixty (12,460) because that's what I said with the beginning of the year was. Now, yesterday we came in and we were twenty (20) points away from what I predicted, and you know, I I want to nail it. > 10:28 Do you have a forecast for 2007? > 10:30 Yeah, um, but I'm not... ey it comes [unintelligible] > 10:31 Ih in the [unintelligible] > 10:32 It it's over a series of five (5) days so people have to go to RealMoney.com. > 10:35 Alright peo... mmm, well check it out at RealMoney.com and Jim thanks very much for being here. > 10:38 Thank you. > 10:39 I'm Aaron Task. Stay tuned for more of TheStreet.com tv ---- Other transcripts: - https://dailyrake.ca/2022/11/15/transcript-of-jim-cramer-admitting-to-market-manipulation/ - https://old.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/lmblr3/after_going_viral_multiple_times_over_the_last/gnw9wlt/ by u/lifeaintsohard - http://web.archive.org/web/20210413073235/https://reddit.com/r/GME/comments/mpxem2/jim_cramer_hedge_fund_tactics_interview/ and https://web.archive.org/web/20250310192457/https://reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/mppa3b/infamous_jim_cramer_wall_street_confidential/ by u/mhcase22 (both censored, even the r/Superstonk post, which was censored sometime around four (4) years after it was posted) - https://web.archive.org/web/20090330121802/http:/antisocialmedia.net:80/?page_id=87 - https://uscentrist.org/2008/01/02/gaming-the-system/ - https://thestreet.com/personal-finance/cramers-thestreetcom-tv-recap-games-hedge-funds-play-10329451 (this is not a transcript) - https://harpers.org/archive/2007/06/the-invisible-hand/ (lol paywall) - https://old.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/nj86s0/lucy_komisar_ama_summary_transcript_23/ (partial) ---- Some notes: - Aaron L. Task https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aaron_Task - James Joseph Cramer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Cramer - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Pisani#Criticism_by_Jim_Cramer > "In December 2006, Mad Money host Jim Cramer used [Bob] Pisani as an example of an easily manipulated reporter used by hedge fund managers to spread false statements about a company in order to illegally drive the stock price down. Cramer said, "It's really important to get the Pisanis of the world and people talking about it as if there is something wrong...". Cramer later apologized to Pisani." - Published 2006 December 22 11:50 AM EST "Wall St. Confidential: Cramer on Gmaes Hedge Funds Play" - "Why Research in Motion can't rally despite the big quarter and Apple must be held down." (yep, misspelled 'games' cuz the blobgorithm is always watching/listening/parsing) - I think Jim Cramer intentionally mispronounced Qualcomm as Quaca also because of the algorithm - "stell off" instead of "sell off" https://youtu.be/8fTgvIEqYaI?t=19s lol James Mcdonald on Bloomberg - "Super Max 3" instead of "Super Mario 3" at 0:43 in https://youtu.be/kxi807ACxB8?t=0m43s as far back as 1990s - Hat firm is a slang term for a hedge fund, brokerage, or proprietary trading desk used as a front to place orders (in Jim Cramer's example, put options) so the real player isn't identified in the trade blotter. The "hat" refers to the desk "hatting" (i.e., executing) the order on behalf of someone else, a common back-office term for an intermediary that takes the name on the trade. - https://old.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/q9t693/video_of_jim_cramer_talking_about_short_selling/ - https://old.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/tze74a/from_2006_when_jim_cramer_talks_about_hedgefund/

Margins fell due to lack of consolidation for RYM which happen on October 10. 17M royalty payment dropped 5% GM which they noted in the PR.. same as last Q. The net income was a timing issue re: tax provision. With 316M in cash plus RYM consolidation next Q you’re going to see 365M+ in cash. I don’t see it being punished at all.

As a retail investor one may not need to know too much in technical details about the Eclipse projects. Just remember that it is a SDV industry working group formed by 26 world class members, including BMW and Mercedes Benz, GM and Toyota. QNX is a founding member of the group. Most importantly the industry’s highly anticipated Eclipse S-Core 1.0, the first deliverable open-sourced platform launched by the group has the following fact: **Safe Open Vehicle Core (S-CORE) Project:** The Eclipse Foundation's S-CORE project (part of the Eclipse Software Defined Vehicle Working Group) selected **QNX Software Development Platform (SDP) 8.0** as the foundational operating system for its open-source, safety-critical automotive software stack. Does market care about this? Very few people fully understand what this means. But institutional investors know. That’s why we see they choose low volume days and/or any other opportunities to scoop up retail shares at dips. Whoever said BB/QNX growth has been priced in could far off. My question is how could that happened prior the most industry influenced, open-source platform getting launched? Mark the date of Dec. 2, 2026! It should lead a blast of new deals to Alloy Kore afterwords. And QNX based ecosystem will also accelerate its broader expansion! That can definitely help QNX’ physical AI growing process. The conviction of Eclipse’ success will make a lot more BB/QNX’ industrial influence, profoundly. Nothing has been priced in at the current price level. IMO BB at $8 is deeply discounted, and played by hedge funds for their benefits. All IMO.

The investment argument isn't really whether FSD is usable. It's whether FSD is far enough ahead of the competition that it will cause TSLA car sales to sky rocket in future years. And the answer to that is no. Waymo and GM are potentially more advanced. BYD is supposedly good. Tesla FSD is the most available option today but that probably won't be true 5 years from now. Soon the tech may be broadly available in new cars, like Apple Carplay. So go ahead and buy a Tesla today if you have a long highway commute. But I wouldn't buy the stock on that rationale.

The biggest difference between the two is hidden. For AMD any shortfall of client is moved directly over into gains for server -- as Lisa said on the call, the silicon is fungible. For intel any shortfall of client screws them with their fixed cost fab business. That is evidenced by the horrific Q4 GM guide going down when it should have gone up on better product mix.