ETHEUR
Ethereum / Euro
cryptoComposite

Ich kann mich nicht beklagen. Möchte keine Zahlen nennen, aber mit Aktien/ETFs hätte ich es nicht soweit gebracht. Was man aber klar festhalten muss: Die Jahre 2018-2021 waren die besten Jahre, danach gings fast nur noch bergab. Vor allem für Leute die hauptsächlich in ETH und Altcoins investiert sind, wäre es das beste gewesen, 2021 komplett raus zu gehen aus dem Markt. Aktien/ETFs/Gold, alles hat seitdem massiv besser performed. Ob es jemals wieder einen Bullenmarkt geben wird bei dem auch ETH und einige andere Altcoins neue Allzeithochs erreichen, ich bezweifle es mittlerweile. Vermutlich war 2021 der letzte echte Krypto Bullrun. Sowas wirds wohl nie wieder geben.

USDe depegged. non event. Tom Lee said it caused the crash. He needed a get out for his constant ETH is going to 10k by end of month BS,

This is one of the craziest DeFi moves I've come across. Here's what allegedly happened: Tether froze $1.5 billion in USDT. Circle froze another $800 million in USDC. The hacker had reportedly deposited USDT into Aave as collateral. He borrowed ETH against that collateral and moved on. Now comes the interesting part. Tether can freeze USDT, but it cannot directly freeze ETH borrowed from Aave. So Aave could potentially be left with frozen collateral and bad debt, while the hacker holds liquid ETH. Essentially, the stablecoin issuers managed to freeze the collateral, but potentially couldn't recover the assets borrowed against it. My question is: Is this actually a loophole in DeFi lending protocols, or am I missing something? Can Aave recover the borrowed ETH, or is the protocol forced to absorb the loss? Would love to hear what people familiar with DeFi think.

Binance need to buy 200k ETH. Not even the Ethereum foundation has this much ETH.

You must not understand how big binance is. It will fully reimburse users for the $6.3 billion hack using its Secure Asset Fund for Users (SAFU, holding roughly $1 billion in Bitcoin) plus company funds. No private key leaks, and about $3 billion already frozen via partners.  The exchange maintains substantial reserves, with recent Proof of Reserves showing roughly $151–165 billion in crypto holdings and over 100% coverage ratios for major assets like BTC, ETH, and stablecoins. The loss represents only a small fraction of total reserves, enabling full coverage without impacting user balances or binance operations

No. Binance will come out of this okay. But they have a hole of 200k ETH (5% of user deposits) that they need to fill very quickly. They are likely busy slamming the buy button across exchanges atm.

Quote: The attacker raced the freezes by selling USDT to market makers and borrowing ETH against USDT on Aave. It now holds more than 420,000 ETH and 18,270 BTC, **about USD 2.4 billion in assets beyond any issuer's reach.** Thank you , please come again

Allocated 100% of my crypto account just now. BTC $77.6K MSTR $132.76 ETH $2244 Will go 2X when/if a bounce on strong volume confirmed, either here or lower.

BTC dropped \~5% to around $76.4K after the Binance hack, with ETH, SOL and XRP also down (BBC, citing AFP/Bloomberg). Given this is the largest theft in crypto history at \~$6.3B, that's a fairly muted move. The BBC's tech editor made a point I think is underrated: prices may be holding partly *because* so much is frozen while Binance investigates. So here are the two things I'm watching: **1. The reopening** Binance said Friday morning it's on track to resume withdrawals in \~45 hours (so roughly Sunday morning UTC). Binance claims \~35% of total crypto market share. When the doors open, do we get a rush of users pulling coins to self-custody or other exchanges? Moving coins isn't selling them, but a shaken user base on the largest venue, on a weekend with thin liquidity, is the kind of setup where moves get exaggerated. **2. The attacker's overhang** Per TRM Labs, the attacker still controls **420K+ ETH and 18,270 BTC (\~$2.4B)** that no issuer can freeze. That has to be laundered eventually. TRM expects bridges, swap services and OTC brokers next. For reference, after the Bybit hack in 2025, the attackers converted at least $300M into unrecoverable funds within about two weeks (BBC). We've already seen them willing to dump \~325M USDT for ETH at a 10%+ premium just to escape freezes, so price sensitivity isn't their concern. Slow drip via OTC, or something more visible on-chain? **Counterpoint:** Binance says it will cover every loss from SAFU and company funds, \~$2.7–3B is already frozen, and deposits never stopped. If the reopening is orderly and a credible post-mortem plus updated Proof of Reserves land quickly, this could be a one-week story. How are you positioned going into the weekend: hedging, waiting for the reopen, or treating the dip as noise? Not financial advice, just trying to think through the mechanics. Sources: TRM Labs; BBC live coverage (Oct 30).

**Tricky's Daily Doots #1,639** **Yesterday's Daily 29/10/2026** [Previous Daily Doots](https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1xiay27/daily_general_discussion_october_29_2026/19ruzlgf9ufy8/) - u/General_Illus breaks news of [the big Binance hack](https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1xiay27/daily_general_discussion_october_29_2026/19ruj9dbv6fy8/) and [confirms more details later — $6B total affected, ~$3B frozen and it was of course the North Koreans](https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1xiay27/daily_general_discussion_october_29_2026/19ruyoigllxdt/) 🔓 - u/ethdaily delivers [the daily ETH news.](https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1xiay27/daily_general_discussion_october_29_2026/19rux3s2f5l4w/) 📰 - u/asdafari14 covers [the Polymarket frontend exploit.](https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1xiay27/daily_general_discussion_october_29_2026/19ruerawknigy/) 🔓

To be authorised, a firm is required to hold - inter alia - balance sheet capital to cover prudential risks, and to have insurance cover for assets held in hot wallets. None of that can be covered by client funds - house and client funds must be legally segregated. Binance is regulated in multiple jurisdictions, so will have demonstrated to and satisfied multiple independent international regulators that they have sufficient coverage on an ongoing basis. So, although they may currently be short a specific asset (e.g., ETH), they will have the asset value covered. This is an asset mismatch issue, not a funding one.  Whilst I may be unable to alter your adopted perspective with any measure of wisdom, I'm simply trying to explain how this works. Regulation, compliance, risk and capital management across financial and crypto markets is my professional field of expertise.

It's not just loss of funds on Binance. The hackers used those funds across multiple DeFi protocols: \> During the first hours, the attacker converted freezable stablecoins into assets beyond any issuer's reach, at steep cost. About 325 million USDT was sold to professional fillers and market makers through UniswapX and other intent-based contracts in exchange for about 122,300 ETH. That implies a price near USD 2,650 per ETH when ETH traded around USD 2,300 to 2,350, a discount of more than 10%. The remaining 175 million USDT from that batch was frozen. \> A second attacker wallet supplied 60 million USDT to the lending protocol Aave and borrowed about 19,760 ETH against it, after which Aave froze the affected markets. On Tron, 300 million USDT moved to a wallet that began supplying it to the JustLend lending protocol. A further 200 million USDT moved through a chain of hop wallets that swapped it on Uniswap, and 30 million USDT from that chain was frozen. The 88.5 million RLUSD passed through two hops to a wallet that sold 48 million of it through decentralized exchanges between 21:42 and 22:01 UTC, until Ripple froze the remaining 40.5 million. \> With the ETH consolidated in a few wallets and the 18,270 BTC moving through the peel chain, the attacker controls about USD 2.4 billion in assets beyond any issuer's reach.

Aave will make money on the collateralized usdt when they dont pay the ETH back

I do like Ethereum and I’ve said that before. What you don’t like is that I’m critical of ETH failing to accrue value. I make enough off of staking to stay hopeful something changes and I’m just voicing how that’s been declining for the first time. You don’t really read my posts you just see something you consider negative and want me to stop lol. I said nothing unreasonable

L2s can make the network cheaper and more usable, but if most activity and revenue move to L2s, how much of that growth actually flows back to ETH?

I think the strongest argument is value capture, meaning how much of the activity on L2s and other apps ends up as fees and demand for ETH itself. The evidence I'd want is simple: do fee revenue and usage on the base chain grow over time, or do they move to the layers on top? It helps to compare chains by what they earn against what the market prices in, not by narrative. Cymetica's Gem Screener ranks chains and tokens by revenue against upside, which is one way to look at that.

You’ve probably seen by now, but they deposited it into Aave and took a loan out in ETH using the USDC/USDT as collateral. When the collateral got frozen…the hacker already withdrawn the ETH, which cannot be frozen. Such a simple move, but you need to know what you’re doing to have planned that part out - smart on their part.

Network congestion, yes. But the "numbers off" part was the price inside Uniswap itself: for about half an hour last night it sat way above the market, with the gas bidding war on top. Both lined up with the Binance outflow. I work on DEX data at DexPaprika, so I pulled the swaps from the main pools for that evening: \- Price: from about 20:45 to 21:15 UTC, the median swap in Uniswap's biggest ETH/USDC pool was 17-20% above Coinbase, and the ETH/USDT pools ran even higher. Coinbase and [Crypto.com](http://Crypto.com) both stayed between 2,230 and 2,318 that whole hour, while the pool sat around 2,650. One transaction at 21:09 swapped about 12.3M USDT for 3,890 ETH in the two main ETH/USDT pools alone, an average of about 3,150 per ETH. Someone was buying ETH with stablecoins onchain faster than arbitrage could close the gap, so the dip you saw on a chart wasn't there on Uniswap. \- Gas: the base fee went from about 0.1 gwei before 20:30 to a median of about 184 gwei around 21:15, peaking near 250. At that median a plain swap is roughly $60-80. A $600 quote would need a much bigger tip or gas limit than the network asked for even at the peak. By 23:30 it was under 10 gwei again. So skipping it was the right call. If a swap quote looks way off, check it against a CEX price before you sign. Here the gap was gone by about 21:35.

ETH may be down a bit, but hole hell, volume is huge. My liquidity positions actually enjoying this.

Because you want anonymity? Monero is the only blockchain I would ever really consider. With say ETH, everyone could go check all your transactions where you buy stuff, how much you pay for rent and so forth. 0 anonymity. This is also why blackmarkets bascially use xmr only.

Aave trägt hier keinen automatischen Verlust. Der Angreifer hat erfolgreich freezbares Collateral in unfreezbares ETH umgewandelt – das ist der „Move“ –, aber das Protokoll bleibt durch Overcollateralization und Liquidationen abgesichert, solange das Collateral seinen Wert und seine Transferierbarkeit behält. Das ist kein Bug im Code, sondern die logische Konsequenz daraus, dass Stablecoin-Issuer zentrale Kontrollrechte haben und Lending-Protokolle diese Assets trotzdem listen. https://cryptoslate.com/trumps-crypto-firm-joins-tether-circle-and-ripple-in-2-6-billion-stablecoin-freeze-as-binance-hack-outflows-near-6-billion/ https://governance.aave.com/t/binance-hot-wallet-exploit-aaves-response/25954 https://governance.aave.com/t/binance-hot-wallet-exploit-aaves-response/25954 https://nile1.com/binance-hack-split-in-two-as-issuers-froze-2-37-billion-and-the-rest-kept-moving/

Partly, yeah. They were written around CME futures (NQ, ES, gold), so some of it carries over and some doesn't. Carries over well: Auction Market Theory (value areas, balance vs trend days, failed auctions). That's just how any market auctions, and crypto is no different. The volatility one. Regimes and range expansion/contraction work the same way. The macro one. BTC trades a lot like a liquidity/risk asset, so Fed, dollar and yields still matter. Carries over in part: Intermarket. Crypto does link to the Nasdaq and the dollar, but the link comes and goes. Options and dealer flows. Deribit has a decent BTC/ETH options market, so the gamma ideas apply, but it's a smaller share of the flow than in the S&P. Doesn't really apply: The calendar one. It's built around NY cash session times, CME opens and closes, and US data releases. Crypto runs 24/7, so session structure is a lot weaker. What's missing for perps (none of the theses cover these): Funding rates Open interest Liquidation cascades Basis between perp and spot Those drive a lot of crypto moves, so you'd need to learn them separately. So it's a good foundation for how markets work, but not a perps playbook.

Okay, a spooked market can sell of some, sure. That's not unreasonable, especially if amounts change. But Binance didn't lose as much in the way of stablecoins as it did 'traditional' crypto, meaning if anything it would need to \*buy\* BTC and ETH to return that to its coffers. This would take time, but yeah, if Binance has assets in hard currency and needs to correct imbalances between customer holdings and its assets, it would need to buy up what the customers were holding which is missing. Ergo buy pressure. And 'non of this is federally insured' tells me you're from the US and think this would affect US customers, but this has nothing to do with the US or US customers at all.

While they did get hacked numbers are wrong. Just by looking at USDT you can realize that. Tether has frozen the account. It is centralized. From what i have seen from other posts hacked account is ETH not the others.

Moved quickly? Not fast enough to prevent from AAVE once again as the pawm shop of choice to borrow some ETH and leave the pool holding the bag on bad debt. Only two outcomes happen. Either Tether releases stables, and the attacker successfully laundered OR the bad debt is stuck in limbo by the Feds in the Southern District of New York.